# 2AC---DRR---Round 6

## Foreign Service ADV

### AT: Circumvention

Feder is wrong – they have own enforcement board

### FSOs---AT: SQ Solves---AT: Kroenig

#### 1AC Dinkelman was answering Kroenig---we agree structural reorganization of DoS was good---BUT isn’t responsive to the fact that stripping CBRs caused FSOs to panic---and the assertion that none were fired is false---inserted for reference

< FOR REFERENCE---1AC Dinkelman >

Dinkelman 25 [John W. Dinkelman, 40 years of distinguished service at the Department of State, including as acting Assistant Secretary of State for Administration and Deputy Assistant Secretary for Logistics Management, current president of the American Foreign Service Association, “Trump’s State Department Cuts Are a Self-Inflicted Wound,” Foreign Policy, 8-14-2025, https://foreignpolicy.com/2025/08/14/state-department-reform-trump-rubio-layoffs-afsa/]

There is broad consensus in the foreign affairs community that operational procedures do need reform—if only to streamline the infamous clearance process or clarify the division of oversight between regional and functional bureaus. But the Trump administration’s chaotic firing of the very subject-matter experts who could most effectively bring about such changes is a prime example of mismanagement at its worst.

AFSA has seen past administrations execute good reforms—ones that made the department nimbler, smarter, and better. These were marked by careful planning, broad consultation, and a focus on strengthening diplomats’ ability to serve the American people. For example, in 1999, after a careful review process, the Clinton administration consolidated the U.S. Information Agency and the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency into the State Department with minimal disruption. Leadership provided ample notice to all parties involved, sought (and received) input from them, and obtained their buy-in to assure a smooth transition of critical functions.

This latest round of reforms had none of those qualities. It was fast, chaotic, and more about making headlines than making the department stronger. The Trump administration’s diplomatic shake-up did not just unsettle people in Foggy Bottom—it left the United States weaker, less respected, and less safe.

Kroenig’s portrayal of a bloated Washington bureaucracy misses the mark. The State Department’s growth over the past two decades—under leadership of both political parties—has been commensurate with the mounting threats to U.S. national security and directly tied to national priorities: opening embassies to counter China, hiring more consular officers to meet record demand for passports and visas, and adding experts in cybersecurity and conflict prevention.

Kroenig correctly noted that U.S. diplomats are the “pointy end of the spear” of U.S. foreign policy. But it is subject-matter experts in Washington who aim that spear by analyzing intelligence, assessing U.S. priorities, and directing government resources. In one fell swoop, the department’s leadership undermined their ability to do just that.

Also misleading is Kroenig’s claim that the State Department did not cut any foreign service officers based overseas. I’ve heard from laid-off officers who shared concerning stories that counter this narrative.

One officer in Turkey was managing a crucial visa operation that served applicants from Iran, Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. On July 11, they were cut off from their phone and email with no plane ticket home. That office now has no dedicated manager. Another officer was set to lead the U.S. Embassy in Tonga as chargé d’affaires—a strategically important post in the Pacific. They had travel orders and tickets in hand. But on July 11, they were out of a job, leaving the embassy in Tongo leaderless at a time when China is expanding its influence in the region.

Turkey and Tonga are not isolated cases. Around the world, key posts and offices from Senegal to China have been left leaderless in the same abrupt, damaging fashion. Even the U.S. Embassy in Kyiv—one of the highest priority posts—was not spared from cuts.

Kroenig downplayed the State Department’s 1,350 layoffs as just a sliver of an 80,000-person organization. But that number includes more than 50,000 locally hired staff overseas, who are vital to U.S. missions but not part of the Washington-based policy core. (No locally hired overseas staff were part of the July 11 layoffs, according to AFSA’s tallies.) Measured against the actual U.S.-based workforce—which numbered about 17,600 in 2024—the cuts amount to nearly 8 percent. That does more than just trim the fat—it cuts into muscle and bone. Shedding staff in this manner is the difference between a department that can still function and one that can’t.

Moreover, the Trump administration’s reform process was not deliberate. Contrary to Kroenig’s account, the department did not “work for months to get the reorganization right.” A survey of nearly 200 AFSA members who lost their jobs on July 11 revealed they were fired even after the department, in its official notification of the reorganization to Congress, stated that there would be “no significant changes” to its offices. State Department officials said suggestions were “solicited” across the agency, but the lack of transparency in the decision-making process makes us believe that all key choices were made by a small circle of insiders with little or no experience in foreign affairs or managing the department’s complex operations.

Under previous administrations, any potential Foreign Service layoffs had a clear, merit-based process that ranked employees globally on performance, tenure, foreign language ability, and military veteran status, then the hard calls were made. However, just three days before the July 11 layoffs, the Trump administration scrapped those criteria. The only thing that mattered was where an employee was assigned on May 29, directly contradicting the testimony of Michael Rigas, deputy secretary of state for management and resources, to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

The result was predictable: Seasoned officers with critical language skills—including Russian, Arabic, and Chinese—veterans with disabilities, and people already assigned to high-priority hardship posts were shown the door without consideration for their service or expertise. Imagine closing a military base and firing every soldier stationed there, regardless of rank, record, or pending assignments.

There is still time to avert the cuts’ long-term damage to the United States’ diplomatic power, but only if State Department leadership recognizes its errors and changes course now. Since the mass layoffs, the department has reversed dozens of its decisions, inviting some employees to return to their duties. This is a step in the right direction, but leadership needs to go further. If they truly believe the department is overstaffed, then they should return to the previously agreed-upon reduction-in-force rules that had been in effect for decades, demonstrate what fields are overstaffed, and proceed with their reorganization plan accordingly.

The United States’ adversaries are watching this self-inflicted wound. The question is whether the country has the will to staunch it before it does permanent damage.

#### The sheer numbers quitting will make effective diplomacy impossible if not soon stopped

Rubin 25 [Eric Rubin, former U.S. ambassador to Bulgaria, served almost 40 years in the State Department, former president of AFSA, “The Way Ahead,” The Foreign Service Journal, September-October 2025, https://afsa.org/sites/default/files/flipping\_book/091025/18/]

The modern U.S. Foreign Service observed its 100th anniversary last year. The occasion was marked by celebrations, commemorations, and retrospectives on the history and achievements of America’s diplomatic corps. Despite the cause for celebration, there were many who thought the road ahead looked difficult.

Members of the Foreign Service who served in the first Trump administration can be forgiven for assuming that the second Trump administration would proceed along similar lines. That assumption has been demonstrably disproven in the past half year.

Some Things to Consider

In that regard, here are several basic conclusions and assumptions I wish to offer for your consideration.

1. This administration has almost nothing in common with the first Trump term when it comes to the Foreign Service, American diplomacy, and the role of career, nonpartisan public servants. Like many of you, I served in the first Trump administration, first as an ambassador and later as president of AFSA.

Today, our political leadership has revealed that it does not trust or respect career public servants and considers us untrustworthy. The administration’s attitude toward international development We know that our country needs diplomacy and needs diplomatic expertise, experience, and talent. assistance was made clear by the rapid and complete destruction of USAID.

2. The senior leadership of our foreign affairs agencies and the senior leadership at the White House appear determined to destroy the Foreign Service as we have known it since 1924. Starting with the closure of USAID, which ended thousands of careers dedicated to service, the administration has since moved at warp speed to de-staff and de-resource two more foreign affairs agencies, the U.S. Agency for Global Media and the State Department.

The Foreign Service has already lost close to a fifth of its workforce due to the “fork in the road” retirement incentives, the start of reductions in force (RIFs), and a very visible exodus of career talent at all levels.

The consequences in terms of lost capacity, lost experience, lost knowledge, and lost effectiveness cannot be exaggerated. Whether or not a significant number of posts are closed—it’s still unclear as I write this in July—our overseas presence will be a shadow of its former self, and John F. Kennedy’s vision of universal diplomatic representation will be in tatters.

And, as the cliché goes, the Chinese will eat our lunch. They are already doing so across the globe.

### GPC---AT: !/T---Trump FoPo Good---2AC

#### We read a Trump good 1AC! Only said expert capacity means the Donroe Doctrine stabilizes Venezuela and Latin America---that’s Heller, Fonseca and Oner

#### No-one thinks the “unpredictability good” theory is working after Maduro

Müller 26 [Jan-Werner Müller, Professor of Politics at Princeton University, “The High Cost of Trump’s Amateur Diplomats,” 1-12-2026, https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/trump-administration-costs-of-amateur-diplomacy-by-jan-werner-mueller-2026-01]

Amid all the damage Trump has done in the first year of his second term, the destruction of America’s diplomatic capacity has received relatively little attention. But alongside the gutting of the public-health system and the wanton abandonment of clean energy, it may prove to be the most consequential.

Of course, US presidents are entitled to appoint ambassadors to their liking, and many have chosen generous campaign donors. But these postings are always to less important capitals, where appointees perhaps can get away with a ludicrous lack of knowledge about their brief (something that Senator John McCain memorably exposed during Barack Obama’s presidency).

But, as is so often the case, Trump’s conduct is in a category of its own. The nepotism on display during his second presidency is shameless. Hence, he appointed Kushner’s father, a convicted felon, as ambassador to France; and he named his son’s former girlfriend as ambassador to Greece (whose citizens she once derided as “freeloaders”).

Then there is the designation of completely unqualified figures to pursue missions that are not just sensitive but outright offensive. Trump’s effort to “acquire” Greenland, a self-governing territory within the Kingdom of Denmark, is being led by the governor of Louisiana, adding insult to injury against a NATO ally. Other important posts have been left vacant, the size of the National Security Council has been halved, and the apparent lack of preparation for the day after the capture of Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro attests to the absence of a deliberative process, poor coordination, and a shortage of qualified personnel.

The gutting of US diplomatic capacity is partly the result of a misguided drive for efficiency (reprising the failed effort by Trump’s first-term secretary of state, the hapless former Exxon executive Rex Tillerson). But it is also a consequence of sheer inattention, which has resulted in a lack of coordination and chaos reminiscent of the first Trump administration.

This has not been lost on US adversaries. They are taking advantage of the situation, with some even de facto determining the composition of US diplomatic teams. As a Wall Street Journal investigation showed, the Trump administration has allowed its own special envoy for Ukraine and Russia to be completely sidelined in favor of Witkoff. (Moreover, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, eager to assert a larger international role for the Kingdom, apparently played an instrumental role in arranging Putin’s preferred outcome.)

In theory, relying on fresh faces and an unorthodox approach could be defensible. Those unencumbered by conventional wisdom may be able to find compromises by “thinking outside the box.” Trump himself clearly believes that knowing nothing about a conflict is the easiest way to solve it. But this ignorance-is-strength strategy has yet to yield stable results.

Any hope that the US itself would derive benefits from becoming more unpredictable has been dashed, not least because Trump and the loyalists he sends out into the world are utterly predictable. They have openly declared a desire to pursue financially advantageous “deals,” which implies that geopolitical or strategic concerns have been deprioritized. In every possible way, starting with “pausing” the enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, the Trump administration has signaled that the US is not only open for business but happy to accept bribes.

From this perspective, the road to lasting peace is paved with mutually beneficial business opportunities. While ostensibly committed to “illiberalism,” the Trumpists actually exhibit a naive, canonically liberal belief in what eighteenth-century thinkers called doux commerce (“gentle commerce”). But as Germany learned the hard way when it relied on trade ties to transform Russia for the better, the supposed benefits of interdependence will not materialize if one party has other priorities.

The war on diplomats is part of a long-standing campaign against professionalism. While Trump’s MAGA movement stokes resentment against “the elite,” not everyone who is powerful is included under that label. MAGA supporters have no problem with billionaires dominating Trump’s cabinet – only with those who claim authority on the basis of specialized training and education. In short: unelected bureaucrats bad; unelected real-estate developers good.

By creating the impression that professionals look down on ordinary folks and fail to see solutions that anyone with common sense could figure out, MAGA channels America’s long-standing tradition of anti-intellectualism. In the process, Trump is making the United States poorer, weaker, and more manipulable on the world stage. While one can certainly find grounds to criticize the vaunted “liberal international order,” at least it recognized that there is real global demand for common rules and stability.

### AT: No Trump FoPo [Ansel]

#### Ansel’s wrong---Trump’s unpredictability causes wars, not prevents them---transactional diplomacy causes deterrence breakdown that emboldens adversaries, that’s Kimmage and Homer-Dixon

#### AND, sending in drones, F-35s, and the Navy to the SCS and Caribbean disproves troop warrants

### Venezuela !---OV

#### 2 avenues to existential war over Venezuela:

#### 1---Trump escalates---already proved he’ll put JSOC boots on the ground if things get messy---which makes direct conflict likely with covert Spetsnaz and military “advisors” manning Russian hardware---it’s empirically how proxy wars escalate---that’s Cohen

#### 2---Russia escalates---even if not directly, they’ll deploy the Oreshnik, and trigger a Venezuelan Missile Crisis---that’s Pike

### Bioterror !---OV

#### Bioterror cause extinction---AI and cloud labs overcome historic checks like acquisition and formulation. Motive is proven and the next one will be worse, that’s Hiebert

### Nuke Terror !---OV

#### Nuclear terror ensures misattributed retaliation because the US accuses other countries of being a safe haven and must respond, that’s Beres

### NoKo !---OV

#### Trump’s capture of Maduro spiked NoKo decapitation fears, which Kim preempts with nuclear use, inadvertent or intentional---only diplomacy diffuses and reassures, that’s Kim and Beres

### Great Power Competition !---OV

#### Great power competition causes extinction---zaps cooperation on issues like pandemics and AI, and triggers nuclear and bio- wars---prefer forecasts and statistical models that show the risk is higher than ever, that’s Clare

## ASpec

### Aspec – 2AC

#### Counter-interpretation --- say US, use normal means, and get to perm sub-specification counterplans.

#### It’s best:

#### Aff ground – alts inflate agent and process counterplans – steals the aff and hurts topic education

#### Aff over-specification destroys the Neg

#### Cross-ex checks

#### Not a voter --- just force us to specify

#### Reasonability is best: good is good enough, they cause a race to the bottom

## T Subsets

### T: Subsets---2AC

#### Counter-interp: no article means yes subsets

---DP = determiner phrase (i.e. a noun phrase opening with a determiner like the, a, some, all)

---PP = prepositional phrase

Mador-Haim & Winter 7 [Sela Mador-Haim, MSc Computer Science, Technion, Israel Institute of Technology; and Yoad **Winter**, Associate Professor of Computer Science at Technion, Israel Institute of Technology; “Non-Existential Indefinites and Semantic Incorporation of PP Complements,” Semantics and Linguistic Theory, October 2007, pp.184-201]

So far we have considered only indefinites with the article *a* as showing non-existential effects in PP complements. It is important to note that the *some* indefinites in English do not show similar quantificational variability effects. Consider for instance the following examples, in contrast with sentences (1b) and (4b) above.

(8) We’re far from some gas station.

(9) The dog is outside some doghouse.

These examples, in contrast to their parallels with the article a, only show an existential interpretation of the indefinite. In the account that we present in the following section, we take this as an important clue for the origins of the non-existential effects with *a* indefinites.

Moving on to other DPs, we note that similar effects to the ones we observed with *a* indefinites, also appear with bare plurals and plural definites, and even with singular definites that denote objects with a mereological structure. Consider the following examples.

(10) We’re close to/far from lakes.

(11) We’re close to/far from the lakes.

(12) We’re close to/far from the lake.

In (10) and (11), existential/universal quantification over lakes is triggered by the locative expression, in a similar way to the contrast in (1). The statements made in (12) are that we are close to some part of the lake and far from all parts of the lake, respectively. We believe that the variability effects in (10)-(12) stem from the same principles about the interpretation of spatial expressions that we propose in this paper. However, we do not concentrate here on the interpretative strategies in such examples, and leave the semantics of plurals and part-whole structures beyond the scope of this paper.

#### Prefer it:

#### 1---Grammar---precision is a matter of fact and turns any other standard

#### [ ] AND, if I’m “in” my house, I’m not in every room simultaneously

#### 2---Aff Ground---PICs out of an enterprise, industry, or region are worse on the neg---they’re unpredictable and lack lit---generics shield their offense

#### 3---Mixes burdens---whether or not every worker is affected depends on their choice to join a union, not the plan’s mandate

#### 4---No offense---few advocates, cap k–econ double-bind, and states---PLUS, links are effect-based anyways

#### Reasonability’s best – competing interps cause a race to the bottom and substance crowd-out

### T: Subsets---AT: Tax Court 65 [Emory]

#### Tax Court is about “substantially all”---and says it is only appropriate in an explicitly quantitative context---like tax law---but NOT when modifying “strengthen”---inserted for reference

US Tax Court 65. Dudderar v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue. 44 T.C 632. Vlex. July 23, 1965. https://case-law.vlex.com/vid/dudderar-v-comm-r-890913901

[\*\*13] If the statement were "all" not modified by the word "substantially," it would refer to either 100 percent or such a small variation from 100 percent that such variation might be said to be de minimis. The word "substantially," however, is an elastic word not so easily susceptible of definition. That term as used in a provision of the Internal Revenue Acts of 1918 and 1921 dealing with corporate affiliations has been stated to mean all except a "negligible minority" interest. Ice Service Co. v. Commissioner, 30 F. 2d 230 (C.A. 2, 1929), affirming 9 B.T.A. 385 (1927). In construing these same statutes the Supreme Court in Handy & Harman v. Burnet, 284 U.S. 136 (1931), concluded that 75 percent of the shares of a related corporation "did not constitute substantially all of its stock," citing in a footnote the following cases: Ice Service v. Commissioner, 30 F. (2d) 230, 231; Commissioner v. Adolph Hirsch & Co., 30 F. (2d) 645, 646; American Auto Trimming Co. v. Lucas, 37 F. (2d) 801, 803; [\*\*14] United States v. Cleveland, P.&E. R. Co., 42 F. (2d) 413, 419; Commissioner v. Gong Bell Mfg. Co., 48 F. (2d) 205, 206; Onondaga Co. v. Commissioner, 50 F. (2d) 397, 399. The cases cited in this footnote involve percentage ownership of stock in the related corporations by the individuals specified by statute in amounts ranging from approximately 68 to approximately 85 percent. Similarly in construing the provisions with respect to affiliation contained in the Revenue Acts of 1918 and 1921 we specifically held that the combined holdings of two stockholders which were not in excess of 85.3 percent of the outstanding stock of the company which it was proposed be considered as an affiliate was insufficient to meet the statutory requirement of "substantially all," Gulf Coast Irrigation Co., 24 B.T.A. 958, 967 (1931), and cases there cited. HN5 We do not consider that the words "substantially all" as used in section 264(b)(1) should be defined to be a precise percentage to be used in every case without reference to the surrounding facts. Nevertheless section [\*\*15] 264(b)(1) does deal only with a quantitative amount in that it deals with money payments and therefore the words "substantially all" as used therein [\*638] must be given their ordinary meaning of all but a small negligible amount. 5Link to the text of the note Considering the purpose for which section 264(b)(1) was enacted, its legislative history as well as the factual situation present in the instant case, we conclude that the 73-percent payment in the instant case did not constitute "substantially all" the premiums on the insurance contract here involved. Since some uncontested adjustments were made in the notice of deficiency, Decision will be entered under Rule 50.

## T Workers

### T: CBRs Not Feds (Hayes+Vacca) [KU]---2AC

#### We meet:

#### The federal government is an employer.

Department of Labor ND – you know who it is

US Department of Labor, “Federal Employers”, DOL, No Date, https://www.dol.gov/agencies/odep/program-areas/employers/federal-employment

As the nation's largest employer, the Federal Government has pledged to model effective employment policies and practices that advance America's ideal of equal opportunity for all.

#### Federal workers are employees.

CFR 25 – U.S. Code of Federal Regulations

Title 5, Chapter XVI, Subchapter B, Part 2641, Subpart A, § 2641.104, https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-5/chapter-XVI/subchapter-B/part-2641/subpart-A/section-2641.104

Employee means, for purposes of determining the individuals subject to 18 U.S.C. 207, any officer or employee of the executive branch or any independent agency that is not a part of the legislative or judicial branches. The term does not include the President or the Vice President, an enlisted member of the Armed Forces, or an officer or employee of the District of Columbia. The term includes an individual appointed as an employee or detailed to the Federal Government under the Intergovernmental Personnel Act (5 U.S.C. 3371-3376) or specifically subject to section 207 under the terms of another statute. It encompasses senior employees, very senior employees, special Government employees, and employees serving without compensation. (This term is redefined elsewhere in this part, as necessary, when the term is used for other purposes.)

#### And, plan text’s the only objective standard

#### Counter-interp---the correct law defines BOTH “CBRs” and “employees” to include the plan

#### Counter-interp---the correct law---refers to the plan

Hirn et al. 25 [Richard J. Hirn, Keith R. Bolek, April H. Pullium, Attorneys at O’Donoghue & O’Donoghue LLP, Sharon L. Papp, General Counsel, and Raeka Safai, Deputy General Counsel at the American Foreign Service Association; Counsel for Plaintiff, American Foreign Service Association; “COMPLAINT FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF,” *AFSA v. Trump*, U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, 1:25-cv-01030, 4-7-2025, https://storage.courtlistener.com/recap/gov.uscourts.dcd.279230/gov.uscourts.dcd.279230.1.0.pdf

11. In 1978, Congress enacted Chapter 71 of the Civil Service Reform Act, also known as the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute (hereinafter “Chapter 71”), granting collective bargaining rights to most of the Federal civil service. But, because Congress found that “the unique conditions of Foreign Service employment require a distinct framework for the development and implementation of modern, constructive, and cooperative relationships between management officials and organizations representing members of the Service,” in 1980 it enacted the Foreign Service Labor-Management Relations Statute (“FSLMRS”), 22 U.S.C. §§ 4101-4140, which is Chapter 10 of Title I of the Foreign Service Act of 1980.

12. The FSLMRS defines “employee,” in relevant part, as “a member of the [Foreign] Service who is a citizen of the United States, wherever serving, other than a management official, a confidential employee, a consular agent, a member of the Service who is a United Citizen (other than a family member employed under section 3951 of this title, or any individual who participates in a strike in violation of section 7311 of title 5….” 22 U.S.C. § 4102(8)(A). “Employees” are commonly referred to as Foreign Service members.

13. The FSLMRS covers only Foreign Service members who are employed by the Department of State, the Broadcasting Board of Governors (now known as U.S. Agency for Global Media), USAID, and the Departments of Commerce and Agriculture, 22 U.S.C. § 4103.

14. Like Chapter 71, which governs much of the Executive Branch, the FSLMRS guarantees the rights of Foreign Service members to form, join, assist and serve as representatives of a labor organization, and to engage in collective bargaining with respect to conditions of employment through a representative of their own choosing. 22 U.S.C. § 4104

#### “Workers in the U.S.” too---they didn’t even define it

McGhee 15 [R.L. McGhee III, District 11 vice president of the International Association of Firefighters, includes 265 local unions and more than 25,000 professional firefighters, paramedics and EMTs in Oklahoma, Texas and the Panama Canal Zone, “Counterpoint: Collective bargaining rights for all workers,” NonDoc, 9-9-2015, https://nondoc.com/2015/09/09/counterpoint-afford-all-workers-collective-bargaining-rights/]

At the top of that list is the hodgepodge of laws that apply to workers in the United States. In 1935, Congress passed the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), presumably to protect all workers, except it hasn’t worked out that way.

The NLRA does not apply to federal, state or local government workers, domestic employees, agricultural employees, supervisors or independent contractors. At the same time, federal workers are subject to the provisions of the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, which created the Federal Labor Relations Authority.

Further, there is no federal labor law in America that governs or protects workers employed by state, county or local governments. Those workers must rely on state statutes or local ordinances for any rights or protections.

Other examples of miscellaneous labor laws include: the Railway Labor Act of 1926, which covers workers employed by railroads and airlines; the Postal Reorganization Act of 1970, which governs postal workers; and the Taft-Hartley Act, which prohibited the “closed shop” and also introduced Right To Work laws in 25 states.

#### That’s best:

#### Predictability---prefer future Justice Jackson to their arbitrary application of the wrong law---Hayes is about NLRA, which is only private-sector, CSRA (Title VII of which is the FSLMRS) is federal---and Vacca is about OSHA, which is employment law not CBRs/labor law

#### Ground---there’s plenty, including from private spillover links, half the community reads it because NLRA is virtually unwinnable against states and solvency presses

#### Reasonability’s best – competing interps cause a race to the bottom and substance crowd-out

### AT: Hayes

#### Their Hayes definition is about the NLRA’s definition, which only applies to the private sector so does NOT address whether or not feds are employed---the CSRA does---BUT it doesn’t matter because they did NOT highlight “wages” which is the only difference in definitions---and we meet terms of employment (which is also our C/I)

### AT: Vacca

#### Vacca is ONLY about OSHA, does NOT speak to whether feds are employed under CBR definitions---doesn’t evidence a violation. BUT it’s ALSO just criticizing the definition for being unpredictable---AND says that ALSO applies to the NLRA’s definition (their interp!)

Vacca 19, Professor of Law at the University of New Hampshire School of Law (Ryan Vacca, 2019, “Uncertainty in Employee Status Across Federal Law,” Temple Law Review, University of Kansas Libraries, Lexis)

As such, only an “employer” may be cited for a violation of the act.172 Like with the NLRA and ERISA, the definitions in OSHA are circular. “Employer” is defined as “a person engaged in a business affecting commerce who has employees,” but not federal, state, or local governments.173 Unhelpfully, “employee” is defined as “an employee of an employer who is employed in a business of his employer which affects commerce.”174

## ADV CP

### ADV CP

#### Perm: do both---solves the terminal impact to every disad

#### Doesn’t solve bioterror---which is existential even absent military response

#### Doesn’t solve Russia---allows them to gain control of Venezuela and become embolded so THEY first-strike

#### What is the net benefit??---links to every possible scenario

## US Code CP

### US Code CP---2AC

#### Perm: do counterplan

#### Perm: do both – shields net benefits

#### [ ] especially since they fiatted exec follow-on---adding the court follows-on too can’t destroy the net benefit

#### [ ] Perm: do the plan as follow-on---they’ve fiatted the exec defers, the plan is just part of that since they implicitly added timeframe

#### Links to net benefits: it’s so stupid it politicizes OLRC – their author

Cross ’20 [Jesse and Abbe Gluck; May 2020; Assistant Professor at the University of South Carolina Law School; Professor of Law and Faculty Director at the Solomon Center for Health Law and Policy at Yale University Law School; University of Pennsylvania Law Review, “The Congressional Bureaucracy,” vol. 168]

6. More Visibility and Politicization

Unorthodox lawmaking is not solely about doing things behind closed doors. It has actually elevated the visibility of some of the nonpartisan institutions-- as we have noted, not always in ways that are beneficial.

For the Senate Parliamentarian, resort to special procedures that get around the filibuster and other hurdles has made a difference in the public perception of the role. We were told: “The job is same as before, but it's gotten a higher profile and more personal largely because of the Byrd rule ... [and] fast track [procedures]. More light will be shone ... where expedited procedures have been written. And [they] have to make Solomonic decisions here and there.”569 Budget reconciliation proceedings, it was emphasized, “are very high profile, and criticized in the news ... the Byrd rule is the thing that makes Parliamentarians almost ‘Washington famous' every few years based on decisions that [they're] making about what is or isn't appropriate in reconciliation bills.”570

Just as CBO became more politicized once the importance of its reports became more salient, the Parliamentarian becomes a divisive figure when unorthodox processes put pressure on complex procedural workarounds.

#### Solves nothing---civil service still cowers or quits due to legal uncertainty---that’s Moynihan and Bednar

< FOR REFERENCE---1AC Moynihan >

Why does this matter? A maximalist interpretation of the unitary executive theory holds that almost any Congressional (or judicial) constraints on presidential power are unconstitutional. In more specific terms, it would hold that the civil service system itself is unconstitutional. If the court adopts that reasoning, then it becomes very hard to rebuild state capacity.

Because with unitary executive theory, there is no actor that can make credible long-term commitments to public servants.

With unitary executive theory, Congress cannot write robust new legislation that modernizes the civil service and stops politicization. A President could just ignore it. Even if Trump leaves office, and a new President looks to restore nonpartisan competence, their promises are only good for four or eight years before another President can come in and rip up the terms of their employment. And over time, why would even a good government President invest effort in restoring capacity if their successor can undermine it?

With unitary executive theory, the public sector becomes permanently viewed as an unstable and chaotic workplace that we are seeing now. The most capable potential employees decide its not worth the bother, and the workforce becomes a mix of people who cannot get a job elsewhere, and short term political appointees. (The irony here is that advocates of unitary executive theory say it is not just constitutional, but will improve the performance of the public sector, notwithstanding the omnishambles we are witnessing now).

So it matters, a lot, how courts decide on questions of presidential power over personnel issues right now. We do not have many tea leaves to read, but this SCOTUS is certainly more on board with any unitary executive theory than any prior version. Decisions like the one on presidential immunity last year suggests a court willing to imbue the President with unprecedented powers.

< FOR REFERENCE---1AC Bednar >

The president undoubtedly has the authority to create some version of Schedule Policy/Career. But whether Schedule Policy/Career poses a new, existential threat to the civil service and the merit principles depends on the meaning of “confidential, policy-determining, policy-making, or policy-advocating.” Congress did not define this phrase in the text of the Civil Service Reform Act. Consequently, the reach of Schedule Policy/Career depends on its implementation by the president and OPM.

#### ---only clear strike-down assures

Perez 24 [Alejandro Perez, JD candidate, Boston University School of Law, “The Return of Schedule F and the Perils of Mandating Loyalty in the Civil Service,” Boston University Law Review, 104, 2024, 104 B.U.L. Rev. 2233, NexisUni]

B. The Most Effective Response: The Judicial Response

For the reasons outlined above, the executive and legislative responses are ineffective to prevent the reimplementation of Schedule F. Both approaches seem to assume that Trump's actions are legal, and they aim to block the order from going into effect by changing the law or writing new regulations. However,

I do not believe that the legality point should be so readily conceded. Here, I explore whether the presidency actually possesses the power to strip civil service employees of due process protections. I present three reasons why Schedule F may in fact be invalid, concluding that the judicial branch is the appropriate avenue to strike down Schedule F and protect the rights of civil service employees.

There has been very little scholarship devoted to examining the legality of Schedule F. The United States District Court for the District of Columbia briefly considered the issue when the National Treasury Employees Union ("NTEU") sued the Trump administration in October 2020, seeking to enjoin Schedule F's implementation.114 However, the NTEU voluntarily dismissed the suit once Biden rescinded the order.115 Therefore, the judicial response to the reimplementation of Schedule F by a future administration is a live issue. The remainder of this Note suggests three frameworks that uniquely empower courts to invalidate Schedule F.

#### Trump will just fire anyone involved for insubordination

Meyerson 25 [Harold Meyerson, editor at large of The American Prospect, BA Columbia University, “Trump Celebrates Labor Day as the Most Anti-Union President Ever,” The American Prospect, 9-1-2025, https://prospect.org/labor/2025-09-01-trump-celebrates-labor-day-as-most-anti-union-president/]

What’s behind Trump’s union busting? At one level, he wants to destroy unions simply because they oppose him; opposition is all it takes for Trump to order a hit. At a deeper level, unions are a voice from below, and their autonomy poses a threat to autocrats. Even enfeebled unions have the potential to reawaken and join a battle to thwart despots. It’s no accident that every Western democracy has had—at one time, at least—a powerful union movement; just as it’s no accident that no autocracy—and no aspiring autocrat like Trump—can tolerate one. A core part of Hitler’s seizure of total power was the utter destruction of the German labor movement.

#### Gets reversed afterwards by everyone – inherency proves – they only spiked challenges, NOT inaction

#### Fiating extra-jurisdictional action with no solvency advocate is a voter for deterrence – spiking out of legal challenges artificially excludes the only responsive lit

## CBR PIC

### CBR PIC---2AC [Quick]

#### Perm: do counterplan

#### Perm: plan and every combo

#### CBRs are key:

#### 1---Performance---residual insecurity about CBRs causes terminal distractions that significantly undermine effectiveness---that’s Shannon

< FOR REFERENCE---1AC Shannon >

Many of us are or were members of unions that are the collective bargaining units for our former agencies, including the Foreign Service Officers of the Departments of Commerce, Agriculture, and others. From our own experience, we know that these unions, and the collective bargaining processes through which employees engage with federal management, created stability and discipline in the workplace and enhanced the ability of our diplomats and national security professionals to carry out the directives of each and every president since these Acts were approved by the Congress. The effort to rescind these rights, and violate the clear requirements of law, far from enhancing the ability of the president to conduct foreign policy, will undermine that ability by withdrawing the protections and guarantees that have represented the respect and commitment of the American people for the important and often dangerous work of our national security professionals. The recission of these rights and the legal actions the Executive Order invites misdirect attention that would be better placed on advancing our national interests around the world. Opening the federal workforce to intimidation, harassment, and mistreatment, and attempting to politicize a professional workforce that has been a faithful and nonpartisan partner of our elected leadership for over 100 years since the establishment of the Foreign Service, is a profound mistake. We urge President Trump to rescind this executive order.”

#### Only winning the ongoing case provides legal certainty

Perez 24 [Alejandro Perez, JD candidate, Boston University School of Law, “The Return of Schedule F and the Perils of Mandating Loyalty in the Civil Service,” Boston University Law Review, 104, 2024, 104 B.U.L. Rev. 2233, NexisUni]

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#### 2---Enforcement---empirics and recent surveys prove bargained grievance procedures are the only sufficient assurance---98% of FSOs said they don’t trust other processes---that’s Heller and Dinkelman

< FOR REFERENCE---1AC Heller >

As both the professional association and labor union for the U.S. Foreign Service, AFSA is uniquely positioned to assess the state of the diplomatic workforce. Its membership includes active-duty personnel from the remaining foreign affairs agencies and retired personnel from all agencies, providing an unparalleled view into the health and capacity of the Service.

This report draws on both quantitative and qualitative data from the survey to provide a comprehensive picture of the Foreign Service in 2025. It reflects not only the numbers behind the crisis but also the voices of those who carry out U.S. foreign policy every day on behalf of the American people.

…

Among our survey respondents, an alarming 98 percent reported somewhat or significantly reduced morale in the workplace since January.

Additionally, one-third reported that they have considered leaving the Service early since January.

…

Among those who remain, the reasons for reconsidering a career in diplomacy are clear: 65 percent cited the politicization of the workforce, while 41 percent pointed to fear of being personally targeted. Roughly 57 percent referenced circumstances beyond their control, and 30 percent noted a broader decline in public respect for government service.

This loss is reflected in the numbers of those who are planning to depart the Service early. Historically, less than 5 percent of the Foreign Service retire every year on average. By comparison, 9 percent of those surveyed plan to leave the Service this year— and that doesn’t count the hundreds who departed in the first nine months of 2025 and were not included in the survey. An additional 21 percent say they plan to leave in the next couple of years.

When asked what might persuade them to stay, respondents emphasized a desire for a return to pre-2025 professional norms, including restored workplace protections and depoliticized assignments. Nearly half said that such a restoration, along with stronger career and promotion opportunities, would influence their decision to remain.

…

In open-ended responses, more than 380 members elaborated on their concerns. The most common appeals were to reverse ongoing reductions in force, prevent additional layoffs, reform the employee review processes and assignments systems to ensure fairness and transparency, and reinstate collective bargaining rights—an essential mechanism for safeguarding the workforce’s voice within government.

…

Respondents were equally clear about what must be preserved to sustain the Foreign Service’s professional corps. Nearly all—an overwhelming 98 percent—rated nonpartisanship as “important” or “very important.” Other key priorities included maintaining opportunities for advancement into senior leadership roles, preserving collective bargaining rights, ensuring a fair and transparent grievance process, and protecting the Service’s rotational assignment system and training pipeline for new officers.

Together, these findings reflect a workforce deeply alarmed by the erosion of the systems that have long upheld their professionalism. The message from America’s diplomats is clear: Safeguarding the integrity of the career Foreign Service is essential to safeguarding the nation’s capacity to lead.

< FOR REFERENCE---1AC Dinkelman >

Moreover, the Trump administration’s reform process was not deliberate. Contrary to Kroenig’s account, the department did not “work for months to get the reorganization right.” A survey of nearly 200 AFSA members who lost their jobs on July 11 revealed they were fired even after the department, in its official notification of the reorganization to Congress, stated that there would be “no significant changes” to its offices. State Department officials said suggestions were “solicited” across the agency, but the lack of transparency in the decision-making process makes us believe that all key choices were made by a small circle of insiders with little or no experience in foreign affairs or managing the department’s complex operations.

Under previous administrations, any potential Foreign Service layoffs had a clear, merit-based process that ranked employees globally on performance, tenure, foreign language ability, and military veteran status, then the hard calls were made. However, just three days before the July 11 layoffs, the Trump administration scrapped those criteria. The only thing that mattered was where an employee was assigned on May 29, directly contradicting the testimony of Michael Rigas, deputy secretary of state for management and resources, to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

The result was predictable: Seasoned officers with critical language skills—including Russian, Arabic, and Chinese—veterans with disabilities, and people already assigned to high-priority hardship posts were shown the door without consideration for their service or expertise. Imagine closing a military base and firing every soldier stationed there, regardless of rank, record, or pending assignments.

There is still time to avert the cuts’ long-term damage to the United States’ diplomatic power, but only if State Department leadership recognizes its errors and changes course now. Since the mass layoffs, the department has reversed dozens of its decisions, inviting some employees to return to their duties. This is a step in the right direction, but leadership needs to go further. If they truly believe the department is overstaffed, then they should return to the previously agreed-upon reduction-in-force rules that had been in effect for decades, demonstrate what fields are overstaffed, and proceed with their reorganization plan accordingly.

#### They only trust the FSLRB---because it’s staffed by former FSOs rather than counterplan’s Trumpies---that’s Mangino…

#### …AND

Moynihan 25 [Don Moynihan, Professor of Public Policy in the Ford School of Public Policy at the University of Michigan, former President of the Association of Public Policy and Management and the Public Management Research Association, PhD/MPA public administration, Maxwell School of Citizenship and Public Affairs at Syracuse University, “Why the Supreme Court decision on firing independent agency heads is a big deal,” Can We Still Govern? Substack, 5-22-2025, https://donmoynihan.substack.com/p/why-the-supreme-court-decision-on]

For public employees, the removal of MSPB head is especially troubling, since this allows any President to neutralize the body that is supposed to monitor personnel abuses such as politicization. Federal workers unfairly treated by Trump’s appointees have little reason to believe they will get a fair appeal from other Trump appointees.

#### 3---Resources---only unions have the lawyers and win rates that provide confidence---that’s Rubin

< FOR REFERENCE---1AC Rubin >

Finally, in unity there is strength. If anyone was skeptical about the need for AFSA and for union representation in January, I hope that few are today. AFSA has spoken out forcefully and has won battles that individual employees could not possibly fight.

#### Individualizing processes and remedies fail to assure

Handler 24 [Nicholas Handler, Thomas C. Grey Fellow and Lecturer in Law at Stanford Law School, former Associate at Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP, clerked at the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, JD Yale Law School, MPhil University of Cambridge, “Separation of Powers by Contract: How Collective Bargaining Reshapes Presidential Power,” New York University Law Review, 99(1), April 2024, pp.45-127, HeinOnline]

This Section sets forth the special rights that unions enjoy under the CSRA, and the ways in which union rights advance the separation-of-powers goals of the CSRA. Unions are the bedrock of legalized resistance to presidential management. The CSRA did not individualize labor rights, but instead provided for collective organization in institutions that are capable of bargaining, litigating, and lobbying.159 Battles between the civil service and the President over the scope of unionization rights, the proper bargaining units to be represented by unions, and the resources and legal rights available to unions reflect the growing centrality of collective bargaining to disputes over bureaucracy and the importance of unions in determining the balance of power between the President and the tenured workforce. The following sections set forth: (1) the value of unions to the civil service and the internal separation of powers, (2) the ways in which the President and the civil servants contest the scope of union power, and (3) the ways in which unions serve to further democratic and interbranch supervision of the President.

1. The Value of Unions

The civil service's move toward unionization reflects a broader recognition of the value of organized groups in protecting rights and pursuing key political objectives.160 Unions accumulate resources and expertise, allowing civil servants to mount sophisticated and well-financed defenses in labor disputes and to lobby effectively on key issues.161 Unions, for instance, are more effective at litigating employment disputes, a key tool in resisting the disciplinary efforts of management.162 They achieve higher win rates than unrepresented employees before arbitrators, a key strategic consideration for union-side counsel, as well as a key source of criticism from opponents of unionization rights.163

### CBR PIC---AT: Merit / Employment---2AC

#### Merit and employment planks are the squo---they already can choose---BUT Heller says 98% choose the plan

Gilbert 25 [Gilbert Employment Law, P.C., “Foreign Service RIF, Appeal and Severance Pay Rights,” 4-1-2025, https://www.gelawyer.com/blog/2025/04/foreign-service-rif-appeal-and-severance-pay-rights/]

FSOs lack the right to directly appeal adverse actions (not including RIFs) to the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB), but the MSPB has jurisdiction over Foreign Service whistleblower reprisal claims through the Independent Right of Action appeal. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 7511(b)(6); Ang v. Dept. of State, 103 M.S.P.R. 324 (2006). FSOs appeal their adverse actions to the Foreign Service Grievance Board [FSGB]. See 22 U.S.C. § 4131(a)(1)(A-C). FSOs can raise their EEO complaints through the EEOC federal sector process or through the Foreign Service Grievance Board [FSGB]. See 22 U.S.C. § 4131(a)(1)(H); Smith v. Dept. of State, EEOC Appeal No. 0120055349 (January 3, 2008).

FSOs have a choice between appealing a RIF to the MSPB, or grieving RIFs to the Foreign Service Grievance Board (FSGB). See 22 U.S.C. § 4010a(c); 3 FAM 2589.1. FSGB grievances of RIFs are limited to “cases of reprisal, interference in the conduct of an employee’s official duties, or similarly inappropriate use of the [RIF] authority.” See id.

### CBR PIC---Sched F

#### Schedule F doesn’t apply to FSOs, so doesn’t solve

#### OR, it’s the plan since Sched F weakened CBR

### CBR PIC---Fund + Staff

Not our ILs

### CBR PIC---Change President---2AC

#### Fiating someone resigns is cheating---it’s an attitude, not a policy which is unpredictable and un-educational because no lit compares it---impact’s fairness and clash

#### No offense---they can impeach or issue a policy to fire someone

#### FSOs are quitting too fast to rebuild under the next President---immediate injunction and winning back CBRs in the current case is key to stop loss fast enough---that’s Hirn…

< FOR REFERENCE---1AC Hirn >

In so doing, the Defendants inflict immeasurable and irreparable harm upon the Foreign Service members and AFSA, their exclusive bargaining representative. The Defendants deprived the employees of their statutory rights to organize and bargain collectively, which courts have repeatedly found to constitute irreparable harm. The deprivation has concrete, tell-tale signs of such harm in this case. AFSA’s elected officers, who represent Foreign Service members on a daily basis, have had their official time (that is, time they could use for representing employees) taken away, which will force those officers to return to the field. Defendants have closed AFSA’s offices, where its staff handled the day-to-day representation of employees. AFSA’s dues revenue will be terminated on April 18, 2025. These actions were taken against AFSA because of its exercise of its First Amendment rights to free speech and to petition the government through its lawsuits, which, by definition, also constitutes irreparable harm.

But, most importantly, Foreign Service employees have been irreparably injured because they have lost the ability to bargain collectively over a wide range of employment conditions when it matters the most. The Defendants are implementing sweeping changes across State and USAID. The rights to organize and bargain collectively give Foreign Service members a voice in how decisions are implemented and how adverse effects can be mitigated. These rights provide AFSA with the ability to hold State and USAID accountable when they fall short of their legal obligations. There is no adequate remedy to address this loss because union representation matters in real time. It cannot be recreated after-the-fact when the changes have been implemented and the harms to employees have become irremediable.

#### …AND

Rubin 25 [Eric Rubin, former U.S. ambassador to Bulgaria, served almost 40 years in the State Department, former president of AFSA, “The Way Ahead,” The Foreign Service Journal, September-October 2025, https://afsa.org/sites/default/files/flipping\_book/091025/18/]

The next president is going to need the Foreign Service, and it will be a huge disadvantage if even more of our best talent vanishes ahead of the next election.

That said, anyone who is confronted by what they view as an illegal or immoral order must decide whether to carry it out. In the past, it was easy to request reassign ment, but that may no longer be an option for most members of the Foreign Service in the current climate.

The choice may be stark. It’s a lot easier for someone who already has qualified for full retirement benefits to decide to leave than it would be for someone with less than 20 years of service. At the end of the day, it has to be an individual decision: No one should tell friends and colleagues how to navigate this scary and difficult time.

I hope that those who want to stay will be able to stay, RIFs notwithstanding. But I also have enormous respect for those who decide they cannot.

Finally, in unity there is strength. If anyone was skeptical about the need for AFSA and for union representation in January, I hope that few are today. AFSA has spoken out forcefully and has won battles that individual employees could not possibly fight.

This includes retired members of the Foreign Service as well. Membership is voluntary, but now more than ever active-duty and retired members of the Service need to stick together on the long road ahead.

Retired members of the Foreign Ser vice can, of course, choose to remain aloof from the current crisis, but I would argue that in doing so, they are failing to respond to the destruction of their life’s work.

Our retired colleagues are free to speak and act in so many ways denied to active-duty employees. I hope more retired members of the Foreign Service will join efforts to save our Service, save our colleagues’ jobs, and save American diplomacy.

Unwarranted optimism is not helpful in the current crises that have befallen the Foreign Service and our country generally. But I believe strongly that all is not lost. We must fight to preserve enough of the Foreign Service to enable it to be rebuilt and revived in the (hopefully not too distant) future.

Let’s not sugarcoat the bitter realities we face today, but do not let that keep you from fighting for the Service we love, the profession we chose, and the country we have all willingly served with honor and for which many of our colleagues have died.

### CBR PIC---Guarantee Arbitration---2AC

#### Employment arbitration without collectivity fails---FSOs think they’ll lose without union resources---especially since Trump picks the arbitrators---that’s Rubin and Handler (if read in core block)

< FOR REFERENCE---1AC Rubin >

Finally, in unity there is strength. If anyone was skeptical about the need for AFSA and for union representation in January, I hope that few are today. AFSA has spoken out forcefully and has won battles that individual employees could not possibly fight.

#### Guaranteeing it also constitutes a CBR under federal law, despite being individual and non-union---AND links to net benefits even if not

CDF 12 [CDF Labor Law, LLP, “NLRB Enters Fray on Non-Union Employment Arbitration Agreements,” 1-10-2012, https://www.cdflaborlaw.com/blog/nlrb-enters-fray-on-non-union-employment-arbitration-agreements]

Last week the increasingly controversial NLRB issued a decision holding that class action waivers in employment arbitration agreements (non-union) violate employees' rights to engage in protected concerted activity under the NLRA. The case involved a national homebuilder, D.R. Horton, Inc. Like many employers, D.R. Horton several years ago started requiring its employees, as a condition of employment, to agree to resolve any employment-related disputes by way of binding arbitration. Also like most similar agreements, D.R. Horton's agreement contained a class action waiver provision--a provision that precludes arbitration of collective or class claims. There has been much litigation both in California and on the federal level concerning the enforceability of class action waivers, the most recent important decision being that of the United States Supreme Court in AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion. In the AT&T Mobility case, the Supreme Court upheld the validity of class action waivers in consumer arbitration agreements, holding that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) preempted a California state law invalidating such class action waivers in consumer agreements. Although the AT&T Mobility case was not an employment case, its reasoning may be applied to similarly support the enforceability of class action waivers in employment arbitration agreements. There have been numerous legislative efforts both in California and in the United States Congress to bar mandatory arbitration agreements in the employment context but none of these legislative efforts have succeeded to date. With the NLRB's decision in D.R. Horton, it appears the NLRB is now presenting a new attack on the validity of such agreements, at least insofar as the agreements contain a class action waiver.

In the D.R. Horton case, the employees were required to sign an agreement to arbitrate any and all employment disputes arising between them and the company. The agreement included a provision indicating that arbitration proceedings had to be conducted individually and not on a collective or classwide basis. Notwithstanding this provision, an employee by the name of Michael Cuda advised the company that he intended to initiate arbitration of a claim for unpaid overtime on behalf of himself and all similarly situated employees who were allegedly misclassified by the company. D.R. Horton took the position that the demand for arbitration was invalid because the arbitration agreement precluded class claims and mandated that any claim in arbitration be pursued individually. Cuda filed an unfair labor practices charge with the NLRB, alleging that the class action waiver provision violated the employees' rights under the NLRA. The NLRB agreed.

The NLRB first held that the arbitration agreement violated the NLRA because its scope could be interpreted by employees as precluding them from filing unfair labor practice charges with the NLRB. If this were the sole finding of the NLRB, it would not be much cause for alarm because employers with mandatory arbitration agreements could simply revise them to clarify that the agreement does not prohibit the filing of unfair labor practice charges with the NLRB. Most administrative claims (for example, EEOC claims and claims filed with similar state agencies) are already exempted from the scope of arbitration agreements by virtue of applicable law. The NLRB did not so limit its holding, however. Instead, the NLRB went on to hold that the agreement's class action waiver further violated employees' rights to engage in concerted activity to improve the terms and conditions of employment on matters such as wages, hours and working conditions. According to the NLRB, an individual pursuing a lawsuit on behalf of other employees is one such means of concerted activity: "Clearly, an individual who files a class or collective action regarding wages, hours or working conditions, whether in court or before an arbitrator, seeks to initiate or induce group action and is engaged in conduct protected by Section 7."

### AT: Freedom Foundation / Aaron Withe/Tom McCabe

#### Freedom Foundation is propaganda

SEIU 22 [Service Employees International Union Local 73, “Don’t Be Fooled by Freedom Foundation,” 2022 per page source data, https://seiu73.org/resources/dont-be-fooled-by-freedom-foundation/]

The Freedom Foundation (aka Opt Out Today) is an extremist political project of a group of right-wing billionaires who see workers’ collective bargaining rights and the political power they create through their union as a threat to their profits and the continued accumulation of their wealth.

“We as conservatives want certain things – we want education reform and we want pension reform and we want less taxes and we want smaller government, and you’re never going to get those things with unions in the way.” Tom McCabe, April 23, 2014

While the Freedom Foundation says they want smaller government, they had no problem taking $644,125 in COVID CARES Act funding from the government.

What does the Freedom Foundation want? They want to dismantle government, cut public services and outsource public jobs to the private sector. Our union protects public employees and the public good. As long as we’re strong they can’t get their hands on the billions of dollars invested each year in public services and public education.

Historic strikes led by Local 73 at Cook County, Chicago Public Schools, and the University of Illinois-Chicago resulted in higher pay, better benefits, and more respect for our members. Local 73 has been recognized by the Chicago Tribune, WTTW, and other media as a labor powerhouse. Our union played a key role in passing the Workers’ Rights Amendment and electing labor-friendly candidates. The Freedom Foundation sees our members growing strength in their workplace and winning the respect we deserve – and they want to stop it.

How is the Freedom Foundation trying to destroy labor unions? They contact union members are tell them to leave their union. They know that if enough members leave their union the wages, benefits and job protections in their contract go away too.

Who is funding the Freedom Foundation? Billionaires like Charles Koch, Lynne and Harry Bradley, Adolph Coors, Ed Uihlein, and Daniel Searle, to name a few. These billionaires create charitable trusts to fund their political agendas and then get the tax write-off. And they give millions to a network of similar organizations such as the Donors Trust and non-profit political organizations like the American Legislative Exchange Council, Atlas Network, and the State Policy Network. All of which have the same goal of destroying labor unions.

The Bradley Foundation has given more than 3 million dollars to the Freedom Foundation over the years to help build “conservative infrastructure” to help weaken workers’ rights. The Bradley Foundation proudly takes credit for dismantling the public sector unions in Wisconsin and for privatizing Milwaukee’s public schools, all to disastrous results for working families.

Illinois’s own Ed Uihlein Family Foundation has funded both Freedom Foundation and the Illinois Policy Institute. Moreover, the foundation’s board president, Richard Uihlein, was a funder and ally of former Illinois Governor Bruce Rauner’s agenda.

## Buddhism K

### T/L

#### Framework – the ballot is a referendum on the plan's desirability – links must be causal and unique with a solvent and competitive alternative – anything else unpredictably moots the 1ac, decimating procedural fairness and in-depth clash

#### Perm do both.

#### Perm do the plan and all non-mutually exclusive parts of the alt

#### Perm do the plan through the lens of the alternative.

#### Seeking change through rejection links – BUT “wholeness” is false

Hamilton 17 [Scott Hamilton, PhD candidate, The London School of Economics and Political Science, “Securing ourselves from ourselves? The paradox of “entanglement” in the Anthropocene,” Crime Law Soc Change, 68, 2017, pp.579-595]

This brings us to the combination of “security” and “entanglement” in discourses of the Anthropocene. Although entanglement refers to the behavior of particles at the smallest of imaginable quantum levels, it is now used commonly as a metaphor linking disparate spatialities and entities from micro to macro levels in IR.Footnote5 Declarations of our “entangled Anthropocene condition” thus imply a quantum or paradigm-shifting transition away from classical understandings of localized, mechanistic, and bounded units such as bodies and states, to an understanding of politics and humanity as being as enmeshed with all life systems on Earth. Calls to incorporate geophysical sciences such as Earth system science (ESS) and its popular planetary boundaries model, are indicative of this move to re-conceptualize how security can and will operate: through complex and simultaneous entangled interconnections or intra-actions, rather than the classical buffering of the space(s) between a subject in need of protection, and the external object from which it must be secured.

Upon inspection, however, entanglement does not replace nor re-conceptualize our understanding of security in the Anthropocene. Ultimately, it tacitly embraces neo-Newtonian conceptual foundations that repeat classical scientific and metaphysical assumptions concerning humanity, physical security, and the manner in which a human self represents the Earth spatiotemporally as an object. In other words, entanglement secures the ontological insecurity prompted by the Paradox of the Anthropocene firmly upon Newtonian pillars. This can be argued by examining its relation to time, ESS, and planetary boundaries.

First, consider time. The Anthropocene relies upon sciences, epistemologies, and ontologies of a neo-Newtonian and classical understanding of geologic time. As Maslin has recently stressed, the basic concept of the Anthropocene is ultimately dependent upon the geologic sciences and their understanding of a linear stratigraphic history. There is a strict temporal hierarchy of ever-finer hierarchical units or stages (dating from the earliest eon, to the more recent era, period, and finally, ‘epoch’). Basically, “[d]ivisions represent differences in the functioning of Earth as a system and the concomitant changes in the resident life forms” ([9], p. 3). The point here is not to dispute the social construction of these dating practices, nor to ignore their historicity or the fact they were initially constructed by the co-constitution of Victorian sciences and politics imbued with racist and misogynistic understandings about nature and humanity (see [33]). Instead, the point is that, ultimately, the conceptual foundation of the Anthropocene depends upon the measurement and recognition of discrete units of time that must be placed in a temporally linear sequence in relation to the golden spike of anthropos, the human. Regardless of its planetary politics, the Anthropocene “revolves around a series of technical and evidential questions about how to determine the boundary of a distinct ‘human’ controlled geological time unit” ([9], p. 9). If there is no geologically and stratigraphically discrete and sedimented linear foundation to the Anthropocene, the concept loses its significance and impact. This raises the question of how an entangled human/nature hybrid can truly form, when its recognition and justification ultimately depends upon hierarchical and classical understandings of discrete temporal measurements, as well as the insertion, identification, and development of humanity and its impacts into a linear geologic timeframe. Rather than non- or a-temporal quantum entanglement, therefore, the conceptual root of the Anthropocene looks more like thin layers of rock, secured as objects in a layered and linear temporal hierarchy determined by the human subject.

Second, and following from this first point, the ESS that brings the Anthropocene into being depends upon complex mathematical computer simulations combining the physics of fluid (thermo)dynamics with economic theory [34]. “Socio-ecological models are built based on our understanding of real-world systems, grounded in physical laws for the biophysical components, and economic theory and observations for the socio-economic system components” ([16], p.332). Although the nature of complexity science and ESS will not be explored here, it is worth considering how these simulations operate: by quantifying nature as grids of small and discrete variables or ‘parameterizations’, which then model “direct cause-and-effect explanations through multivariate statistics of available datasets” ([16], p.332). In short, these models project nature outwards through the representational and neo-Newtonian metaphysics noted above, in which every ‘thing’ in nature becomes a calculable coherence of objective forces that are amenable to quantification and simulation (see [35, 36]). Note that these ESS models lack the capacity to parameterize and predict the inexorably unpredictable social events and drivers of change, and hence, rational-choice algorithms from “economic theory and observations for the socio-economic system components” are used ([16], p.332). If ESS struggles to integrate society and human behavior into its models, then layering quantum entanglement on top of them appears epistemologically and ontologically incongruous. Rather, it implies that entanglement is a way of ordering the human self in relation to nature, as computed through ESS; through a vague analogy implying the certainty of holism or unity, despite a quantified and representational root.

Although the basics of quantum physics also depends upon statistics and a type of quantum causality to make predictions, “quantum mechanics is incompatible with the view that physical observables possess pre-existing values independent of the measurement context” ([37], p. 259). Nature might be manifested in certain phenomena in the macro world, but conceived through entanglement, these manifestations would be so incommensurable to everyday neo-Newtonian thought that they would be “irreducibly beyond anything we can experience or beyond anything we can possibly conceive of” ([38], p. 1653). In other words, quantum uncertainty rules entanglement in a mind-boggling way, while classical certainty (i.e., causality) rules Newtonian metaphysics so uniformly that today we barely even notice it. Declaring classical sciences and renderings of nature to be “entangled”, therefore, does not actually make them so. It actually masks the certainty of a classical Newtonian causality still working beneath the Anthropocene’s discursive surface. One cannot overcome Western metaphysics simply by reading about how to overcome Western metaphysics, and then asserting it to be so. This only intensifies the underlying conceptual foundations that treat quantum entanglement itself as a concept, tool, or object that can be causally applied to a human subject and its world.

For example, following Maslin, take the concept best framing the effect of humanity upon the Earth system: planetary boundaries ([9], p. 2). These are discrete and quantitative boundaries, units, or limits, within which humanity should operate to achieve a safe space for human development. Notions of quantified “safe” spaces obviously retain the classical Newtonian epistemologies of calculating secure, bounded limits for the “future” of humanity; a predictive orderly security, designed to reduce uncertainty within discrete limits, to ensure survival from chaos outside these spatiotemoporal limits. Indeed, humanity must respect the limits of these linear thresholds as “Earth’s ‘rules of the game’ or, as it were,. .. the ‘planetary playing field’ for the human enterprise” (Röckstrom et al., 2009). The point here is that ESS and its planetary boundaries model replicates a Western secular cosmology that works by explicitly measuring the distance between an “objective” nature and humanity. Nature is once again placed into a structural numerical box as the background context from which humanity is contrasted in order to make itself secure [34]. As Fagan [6] has noted, an implicit human/nature dualism results from this. Any relation of the environment and security supposedly erasing the boundaries between humanity and nature becomes itself a violent act [6]. In this case, entanglement becomes, therefore, an analogy masking a neo-Newtonian ordering of subject to object that is actually inherent to the ESS, and thus to conceptualizing the Anthropocene. If we were actually entangled, not only should there be no boundaries, but it would be impossible to detect them. This new metaphysical orientation would have to replace or transcend thinkable subject/object binaries, rather than focus on or assert their interdependence or interconnection, which we still see in IR’s security discourses today.

Alt fails. Trump crackdown causes diversionary war.

Alt theory

### 2AC – No Mystical Metaphysics

**Zero evidence for mystical metaphysics.**

John **Horgan 19**, directs the Center for Science Writings at the Stevens Institute of Technology, “Can Mysticism Help Us Solve the Mind-Body Problem?,” Scientific American Blog Network, 12/16/2019, https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/cross-check/can-mysticism-help-us-solve-the-mind-body-problem/

Do **human** being**s**, under particular and very special conditions, have **access** – empirical or experiential -- to the **metaphysical ground of reality?** Such access seems to be reported in large parts of mystical literature in many cultures. Are the descriptive narratives of mystical sources simply mere social constructions, more fashionable nonsense solely based on metaphor, but nothing else? Or is there something to these claims and reports that needs to be seriously considered to move us forward toward answering the deep unresolved questions of mind and matter and their place in nature?

Good questions. My colleagues sought to **account** for mystical visions and other exceptional experiences with a **variety** of frameworks, involving quantum mechanics, information theory, Hinduism, **Buddhism**, Jungian psychology or combinations of the above. These perspectives diverge from conventional materialism, which insists that matter is primary. Although I was invited to the symposium because of my interest in mysticism, I kept finding myself playing the role of skeptic, pushing back against my colleagues’ assertions. Here are points I made, or tried to make, at the meeting.

The Mystical Diversity Problem. Many scholars have tried constructing metaphysical **systems** out of **mystical visions**. They often focus on **insights** that share certain **features**, notably a sense of **oneness** with all things, plus feelings of **love** and **bliss**. Those fortunate enough to have these experiences often come away convinced that a loving God or spirit underlies everything, and there is no death, only transformation.

That’s a **consoling thought**. But as William James pointed out, many mystical visions are “**melancholic**” or “**diabolical**.” You feel profound **alienation** and **emptiness**, accompanied by feelings of **horror** and **despair**. The immense **diversity** of mystical experiences **thwarts** efforts to construct a **mystical metaphysics**.

The Neo-Geocentrism Problem. Mystics often insist that **mind, not matter**, is the fundamental stuff of reality, or that mind and matter are **two aspects** of an **underlying ur-stuff**. This non-materialist outlook, I think it’s fair to say, was the majority view at Esalen, and it has become increasingly popular among prominent mind-body theorists, such as Christof Koch and David Chalmers.

I call this view neo-geocentrism, because it **revives** the ancient assumption that the universe **revolves around us**. Geocentrism reflected our innate narcissism and anthropomorphism, and so do **modern theories** that make **mind**—as far as we know a uniquely terrestrial phenomenon—**central to the cosmos**. The shift away from geocentrism centuries ago was one of humanity’s greatest triumphs, and neo-geocentrism, I fear, represents a step **back toward darkness**.

Yes, **some** scientific materialists are **insufferably arrogant**. They claim they can explain everything, and yet they cannot account for consciousness, the origin of the universe or the origin of life. But materialism serves as a **sensible default position**, especially given the **spottiness** of the evidence for astral projection and **ghosts**. Bodies can exist without minds, but we have **no proof** that minds can exist without bodies.

The Exceptional Experience Problem. I worry that focusing on **exceptional** experiences—whether paranormal or mystical—**distracts** us from the **ordinary** moments that comprise the **bulk** of our lives. I want a worldview that helps me recognize that **all** my experiences are exceptional. Taking the subway to Hoboken, buying bananas at Food King, watching Silicon Valley with my girlfriend, sitting on a couch fussing over a blog post, as I am right now. To my mind, spirituality--because that’s what we were talking about at Esalen, really--should help us cherish every humdrum moment of our lives.

The Oneness Problem. Mystics often report **feeling** the **connectedness**, or **oneness**, of all things. Our sense of separation from the universe is an illusion, supposedly, as is our sense that reality consists of two different things, matter and mind. I have **misgivings** about oneness. Although I sometimes regret my alienation from the world, I cherish it too. Consciousness, it seems to me, **requires** separation, or duality, and so does **love**, the supreme emotion. As the Hindu sage Ramakrishna allegedly said, “I want to taste sugar. I don’t want to be sugar.”

The Ineffability Problem. An irony lurks within efforts to create a mystical metaphysics. Mystics often warn that their experiences are impossible to describe, or “ineffable,” as James put it. So there is something contradictory about trying to construct an explanatory system involving mysticism. My mystical experiences have reinforced my conviction—spelled out in my most recent book, Mind-Body Problems--that there can be no final, definitive solution to the question of who we really are.

The Improbability Problem. Science, philosophy and theology seek to **explain** **reality**, to give us an Aha! of understanding. But my **mystical** experiences have been more **Huh?** than **Aha!** They have left me with an abiding sense that our existence is **inexplicable**, infinitely improbable, weird. Science confirms this mystical intuition. The more science investigates the origin of the cosmos, of life on earth and of our weird species, Homo sapiens, the more unlikely we seem. There is no reason for us to be here, and yet here we are.

The Beauty Problem. Although this column is critical, I loved the Esalen symposium. High points: Trekking with my fellow seekers up a gorge lined with giant redwoods. Sitting naked in a hot tub (for which Esalen is famous) under a half moon and bickering about capitalism. Joining a morning dance led by Al Chung-Liang Huang, the original dancing Wu Li master, as surf crashed below us and seagulls wheeled above.

Esalen was an exceptional experience, a mystical trip. Being there made me recall a comment by physicist Steven Weinberg, a hard-core atheist and materialist: “I have to admit that sometimes nature seems more beautiful than strictly necessary.” Our world is filled with so much pain and injustice that I cannot believe in a loving God. This is the problem of evil. But the flip side of the problem of evil is the problem of beauty. Beauty, love and friendship--and our hard-won, halting moral progress--make it hard for me to believe that life is just an accident.

So to answer the question posed by my headline: No, mysticism **cannot solve the mind-body problem**, the mystery of our existence. Quite the **contrary**. Mysticism **rubs our face in the mystery**. I don’t believe in little miracles, like resurrections or angelic visitations, but I believe in the **Big Miracle** that confronts us **every moment** of our **lives**, and that **no theory** or **theology** will **ever explain away**.

### AT – Meiklejohn 19

#### This card is about conservation and rewilding – straight jacked from LD land

### CBA Good – Yes Read

#### Cost-benefit analysis and economic valuation are vital to environmental protection and justice – necessary to simplify info for decisionmakers

Polasky & Binder 12 (Stephen, Prof. of Ecological/Environmental Economics @ Minnesota, Seth Binder, “Valuing the Environment for Decisionmaking,” Issues, Summer 2012, http://issues.org/28-4/polasky/)

Virtually all important environmental management and policy decisions have a wide range of effects. For example, zoning or development decisions about land use can have a variety of environmental impacts (for example, on local water and air quality, the potential for flooding downstream, carbon sequestration, and habitat for wildlife) as well as economic and social effects (on economic development, jobs, and income). Similarly, decisions on limits on emissions of air pollutants or greenhouse gases can affect a range of environmental, economic, and social concerns. These results affect multiple groups who often have very different views about desired outcomes (for example, developers versus environmentalists). Effects differ across geography (upstream versus downstream) and time (current versus future impacts). Choosing among management or policy options that differ in terms of environmental, economic, and social outcomes with spatial and temporal components may at first glance seem overwhelmingly complex, with dimensions that seem incomparable. Good environmental management and policy decisionmaking, however, necessitates systematic evaluation and consideration of the effects of management and policy on the affected public. Even though the quantitative valuation of these effects will never be perfect, the outcome of attempts to assess value provides important information to help guide decisionmaking. Decisions, decisions Management and policy decisions typically involve difficult tradeoffs that bring improvements in some dimensions and declines in others. Ultimately, deciding whether to choose management or policy alternative A or B requires an evaluation of whether A or B is “better,” where better is determined by the objectives of the decisionmaker. It is easy to conclude that one alternative is better than another if it is better in all dimensions. But making comparisons in which one alternative is better in some dimensions but worse in others requires making difficult value judgments. For example, clearing land for housing development may result in higher incomes and more jobs but reduce habitat for species and worsen local water quality. Whether land clearing is the right decision will depend on whether an increase in incomes and jobs is valued more highly than maintaining habitat and water quality. But how can one really compare income versus habitat for species or jobs versus water quality? Comparing across these different dimensions seems like comparing the proverbial apples and oranges. Reaching an environmental management or policy decision, though, requires the decisionmaker to compare apples and oranges, either explicitly or implicitly. For an individual, deciding which college to attend, where to live, or what job to take is often a hard choice to make, in large part because it involves changes in multiple dimensions simultaneously. Moving to a new job in a new city may be a better professional opportunity and offer a new set of cultural amenities, but is it worth disrupting family life, moving away from friends, and making adjustments to a new community? Though it is difficult to compare such alternatives, people do make these decisions all the time. In choosing an option, taking account of all the factors, people make a determination that one option is better than the other available options. As difficult as such choices can be for an individual, making environmental management and policy decisions adds yet another level of complexity. Such decisions affect many people simultaneously and thus require finding a way to aggregate values across different people to reach a decision. Management and policy decisions can make some groups better off while making others worse off, requiring a different sort of apples-and-oranges comparison. Two methods used in such multidimensional, multiperson decisionmaking contexts are economic benefit/cost calculations and multicriteria decision analysis (MCDA). Each of these methods transforms a complex multidimensional problem involving multiple people into a single dimension that can be used to rank alternatives. These methods act like a blender that mixes apples and oranges to produce a fruit smoothie. Decisionmakers can then decide which fruit smoothie they like the best. Economics reduces multidimensional problems to a single dimension by measuring the value of changes in each dimension with a common metric, which is typically, but not necessarily, a monetary metric. Economist8s tend to prefer a monetary metric because it is a pervasive, intuitive, and easily observable measure of the values that people attribute to an array of everyday goods and services. In wellfunctioning markets, the price of a good or service reflects its marginal value to the buyer measured in terms of the common monetary metric: what the buyer is willing to pay to have the good or service. This fact makes the marginal values of many very different goods and services commensurable. The concept extends even to environmental attributes that do not have a market value, such as clean air, as long as people are willing to make tradeoffs in their consumption of some market goods in order to obtain other nonmarket attributes. The ability to measure values with a common monetary metric rests on two key premises. First, individual willingness to pay for an item is assumed to accurately represent the value of that item to the individual: that is, how much better off the individual is with the item than without the item, measured in monetary terms. Second, the aggregation of values to the societal level requires that the correspondence between willingness to pay and well-being be comparable across individuals, so that a measure of societal value is equal to the (appropriately weighted) sum of values across all individuals in society. This comparability is necessary in order to do benefit/cost analysis resulting in a single number that summarizes social net benefits. With the ability to produce an aggregate social net benefit calculation for any policy option, the economic benefit/cost decision rule is simple: Choose the option that maximizes social net benefits. This simple rule can be extended to account for uncertainty by maximizing expected social net benefits, where net benefits for individuals can include risk aversion (that is, a willingness to pay to avoid being subjected to uncertain outcomes). The decision rule can also incorporate constraints that restrict outcomes, so that they do not violate minimum environmental standards or basic human rights. As noted, however, the social net benefit calculation requires that individuals evaluate multiple dimensions with a single monetary metric of value and that these values be comparable across individuals. Without such interpersonal comparability, management or policy changes resulting in both winners and losers cannot be evaluated. In this case, only alternatives in which everyone is better off are clearly superior, and such alternatives are extremely unlikely to emerge. Benefit/cost calculations have been applied to a wide variety of environmental policies. All recent presidents, both Democratic and Republican, have required agencies to evaluate the benefits and costs of regulations, including environmental regulations. Executive Order 12866 signed by President Clinton in 1993 states that agencies “shall assess both the costs and the benefits of the intended regulation” and “in choosing among alternative regulatory approaches, agencies should select those approaches that maximize net benefits” The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has done extensive benefit/cost calculations of regulations, particularly regulations under the Clean Air Act. The EPA estimated that the 1990 Clean Air Act would provide benefits of $2 trillion between 1990 and 2020 while imposing costs of $65 billion, a benefit-to-cost ratio of approximately 30-to-1. A prior study of the benefits and costs of the Clean Air Act from 1970 to 1990 found a similarly large benefitto-cost ratio. The economic benefit/cost approach to maximizing social net benefits may be thought of as belonging to the broader class of MCDA methods, all of which require explicit or implicit weighting of various attributes of expected outcomes of management or policy decisions. Although some MCDA methods accommodate only quantitative attributes, others also permit qualitative attributes. Given attributes and weights, different MCDA methods take different approaches to evaluating alternatives. Some methods seek to identify the best alternative, similar to the economic approach of maximizing social net benefits, while others, such as goal programming, seek to identify alternatives that meet certain thresholds of performance. In goal programming, aspirational or minimally acceptable thresholds are set for each criterion, and alternatives are evaluated according to the priority-weighted distances by which criteria fall short of these thresholds. In general, MCDA methods seek to maximize a social welfare function of a particular, often implicit, form. Setting relative values To be operational, benefit/cost and MCDA methods require information on relative values (weights) for different dimensions of value affected by environmental management or policy. Economics and decision sciences tend to take different approaches to assembling information about values. In economics, the values of different management or policy options are derived from aggregating the net benefits to individuals in society for that option. In decision sciences, a variety of methods are used to assemble information on weights to assign to different dimensions. The task of the economist in understanding relative values for an individual is far easier for marketed goods and services than for nonmarketed environmental attributes. For marketed goods and services, economists use observations on how much is purchased at a given price over a range of different prices to construct a demand function. The demand function summarizes information on the willingness to pay of the individual for the good or service. In competitive markets, the supply function reflects the marginal cost of producing the good or service. Demand and supply can be used to define economic surplus, which is the difference between the (marginal) willingness to pay given by demand and the marginal cost of production given by supply. Summing up this difference over the entire quantity traded is equal to economic surplus; that is, the value generated from the production and consumption of the good or service. Some environmental changes directly affect marketed goods and services, and the value of these effects can be evaluated by assessing the net change in economic surplus in the affected markets. Take, for example, the potential effects of excess nutrients in a body of water that cause dead zones (areas of low oxygen), resulting in lowered fish and shellfish populations and reduced commercial harvests. With basic information about consumer demand and the costs of supply, economists can estimate the expected loss in economic surplus from the reduction in harvests. Adjustments to economic surplus calculations are necessary when market imperfections, such as monopoly pricing, taxes, or subsidies, result in price distortions so that prices are not a true reflection of the value of marketed goods and services. The concept of economic surplus (value) also applies to environmental attributes, such as clean air or access to natural areas, for which there is no market. Valuing nonmarket goods and services is more difficult, because there is no readily observable signal of value that is comparable to a marke8t price. Economists have devised a suite of nonmarket valuation tools that can be applied to value nonmarketed environmental attributes. Some nonmarket valuation methods use observable expenditure on a different marketed good or service to draw an inference about the value of the nonmarketed environmental attribute of interest. For example, housing prices may reflect the increased willingness to pay for housing in locations with better environmental amenities, such as access to lakes and parks or better air quality. The choice of where to recreate can reveal information about the relative value of environmental amenities that vary across recreation sites. Other methods of estimating value record changes in expenditures, such as changes in the cost to treat drinking water with changes in water quality. Economists cannot use observed expenditures to value all important changes to the environment. For example, if all of the lakes in a region are polluted and no one uses them for recreation, it will be difficult to assess the value of reducing pollution on recreational value, unless one is willing to make inferences from other regions. More fundamentally, there are limited or no directly observable expenditures or other behavioral clues for some environment attributes, particularly non-use benefits such as knowing that species exist. In Antonio Briceño, Overfishing, from the Millions of Pieces: Only One Puzzle Project, Digital c-print on Fuji Crystal Archival paper, 21 x 60 inches, 2010. the absence of observable behavior, economists use survey questions to ask people about values for changes in environmental attributes. Such “stated preference” methods include contingent valuation and conjoint analysis. The contingent valuation method presents survey respondents with a hypothetical change in the environment, such as a 10% increase in the size of humpback whale populations, and asks whether they would be willing to pay a specified amount for the change. Varying the specified amount and observing the proportion of people saying yes generates information analogous to a demand curve for marketed goods and services. In conjoint analysis, people are asked to rank a series of outcomes that differ in the quantities of various attributes. Conjoint analysis allows direct evaluation of how people trade off one attribute versus another, such as an improvement in air quality versus greater access to open space. If one of the attributes is income or expenditure, then the analyst can also estimate willingness to pay. Some actions, such as emissions of greenhouse gases, cause changes in multiple dimensions that occur over extended periods. For example, a change in carbon storage in ecosystems that reduces atmospheric concentrations causes changes in climate forcing and ocean acidification, which in turn affect myriad other environmental attributes, including precipitation patterns, with effects on agricultural production, the probability and severity of flooding, and the health of marine resources, among others. Summarizing the value of all these changes into a single estimate of the social cost of carbon (SCC) requires complex integrated assessment models that predict both environmental and economic outcomes and attach estimates of the value of those outcomes. Further complicating matters, SCC estimates depend on levels of emissions that can be affected by the very policy choice that SCC is meant to inform. For this reason and others, such as the choice of social discount rate, the estimates of the SCC range from near zero to hundreds of dollars per ton of carbon. Instead of the often-complex process of economic valuation, MCDA typically relies on a set of alternative methods for establishing relative values or weights on different criteria, to be chosen by the decisionmakers. The identification of weights may be done by introspection, deliberation, or negotiation—or some combination of the three—among stakeholders. Setting relative weights may also be done as part of an iterative process in which alternatives are evaluated, weights reassessed in light of the evaluation, and new criteria weights applied. One example of how relative weights for different criteria are set in MCDA is through application of the analytical hierarchy process. In this process, decisionmakers are asked to determine a set of top-level criteria, and within each of these to determine the subcomponent criteria. They are then asked to rank the relative importance of criteria at each level of the hierarchy. For example, suppose a decisionmaker is evaluating policies aimed at controlling non–point-source pollution from agriculture with two overarching criteria of water quality and economic effects. If these criteria are assigned equal importance, then each receives a weight of 0.5. At the next level of hierarchy, suppose that the water quality criteria include water clarity, dissolved oxygen content, and temperature, and that the economic criteria include farm income and jobs. If the decisionmaker believes that water clarity is twice as important as dissolved oxygen, and dissolved oxygen is twice as important as temperature, their weights at this level of hierarchy are 4/7, 2/7, and 1/7, respectively. Suppose that jobs are ranked as twice as important as farm income, then the weights would be 2/3 and 1/3. The overall weights in the analysis would then be 0.5 times these values: 2/7 for water clarity, 1/7 for dissolved oxygen content, 1/14 for water temperature, 1/3 for jobs, and 1/6 for farm income. A potentially important difference between economic and MCDA approaches to valuation is in whose values are incorporated. In principle, valuation in benefit/cost assessments includes the value of everyone affected by management or policy choices, though in practice there may be questions about whether economic valuation methods accurately reflect societal values. In MCDA, it is typically a smaller subset of people that is involved in setting relative weights. For local-scale problems, MCDA methods could include all affected parties in a deliberative process, but as the scale of the problem grows, this will not be possible. For larger-scale environmental problems, ranging up to global concerns such as climate change, there is the question of representation and whether those present adequately reflect the views of the wider public. In addition, relative weights in MCDA should not be treated as constant but should reflect changes in circumstances, something that is typically captured in economic valuation methods. Weighty issues Any environmental management or policy decision is likely to entail winners and losers. How should the distribution of benefits and costs across groups be treated in environmental management and policy decisions? Critics of benefit/cost analysis contend that reliance on economic valuation systematically disadvantages those with less money. Greater wealth means greater ability (and thus willingness) to pay, so benefit/cost analysis effectively gives more weight to those with more money (“voting with dollars”). One way to answer this criticism is to give a higher weight to the values of those with less wealth. Economists have found considerable evidence of diminishing marginal utility of income, meaning that the value of an additional dollar to a poor person is greater than to a rich person. This fact can be used to justify “equity weights” based on differences in wealth. For example, an equity weight argument would mean that otherwise equal damages from future climate change should be given greater weight in low-income countries than in high-income countries. In addition, if society is committed to protecting the interests of particular groups, it can constrain consideration of options to those that achieve specified distributional goals. Since the effects of alternative environmental management and policy options will differ across generations, a fundamental challenge in valuing environmental management and policy decisions is how to aggregate benefits and costs that accrue to current and future generations (inter-generational distribution). For example, more aggressive climate change mitigation strategies impose costs on the current generation but generate benefits for future generations.Economists typically use discounting to aggregate benefits and costs over time. The standard economic rationale for discounting is that investments yield a positive expected real rate of return, so that having a dollar today is worth more than having a dollar in the future. Costs and benefits realized at different points in time are thus commensurable in present value terms after discounting. The standard discounting approach works well for nearterm private investment decisions, but what about for longterm social decisions affecting the welfare of future generations? If one accepts the principle of equal moral standing of all generations, there would seem to be little ethical justification for discounting future welfare. Frank Ramsay, the father of economic approaches to discounting and growth theory, maintained that it was “ethically indefensible” to treat the welfare of current and future generations differently. However, to the extent that future generations are expected to be better off than the current generation, discounting can be justified as an intergenerational application of equity weights. By the same principle, if environmental conditions worsen significantly and future generations are expected to be less well off than the present generation, this would imply a negative discount rate; that is, discounting of present benefits relative to future benefits. As recent debates on climate change policy aptly illustrate, there is little agreement among economists, or between economists and others, on discounting. Uncertainty is a central issue in environmental management and policy. Uncertainty enters at various steps in the link between management and policy choices and eventual effects on the value of outcomes. There can be uncertainty about how changes in management or policy affect choices made by individuals and businesses (behavioral uncertainty), how changes in human actions affect the environment (scientific uncertainty), and how consequent changes in the environment will affect human well-being (value uncertainty). Recent work on the value of ecosystems services illustrates each of these uncertainties. For example, the Conservation Reserve Program, which pays landowners for taking land out of production and restores perennial vegetation, can shift patterns of land use and, in turn, result in changes in carbon sequestration, water quality, and habitat provision. Program participation and the provision of services depend on the choices of individual landowners, which are uncertain. There are key gaps in the science linking land use to service provision, such as how changes in land use will affect changes in carbon storage in soil or populations of particular species, making provision uncertain even when behavioral uncertainty is ignored. There are also key gaps in information pertaining to the link between services and benefits, making value uncertain even if provision is known. The value of water quality improvement, for example, depends as much on who uses the water and for what purpose as on the water quality itself. Economic approaches typically use an expected utility framework to deal with uncertainty, where the value of each potential outcome is weighted by its probability of occurrence. This approach summarizes expected social net benefits across dimensions, as discussed above, but also across all possible outcomes that could occur given a management or policy choice. Using the expected utility framework, however, requires information about probabilities as well as values under all potential outcomes. For environmental issues involving complex system dynamics, such as climate change or the provision of ecosystem services, the list of possible outcomes in the future may be unknown, much less how to specify probabilities or likely values for each of these outcomes. Beyond the challenge of scientific uncertainty, there may also be uncertainty about the preferences of future generation and how they will value various outcomes. Inability to objectively quantify probabilities or values requires modifying expected utility, such as by using subjective judgments to establish probabilities or values, or setting bounds on decisions thought to pose unacceptable risks (for example, safe minimum standards). A particular challenge to making decisions under uncertainty arises from consideration of catastrophic outcomes. It is difficult to set probabilities on such events because they are rare, but small changes in assumptions about these probabilities can lead to large changes in policy advice. People make mistakes, often in systematic and predictable ways. They tend to be overly optimistic, biased toward the present, and averse to losses. They have trouble thinking through complex problems, especially those with uncertainty. Given these facts, some analysts question the validity of using valuation studies that rely on observed choices, survey responses, or even deliberative processes among affected parties as an important input for setting environmental policy. The alternative, however, would be to delegate judgments about the relative value of outcomes to political leaders or scientific experts. Elected leaders, at least in theory, should reflect public values. Environmental scientists, however, have no special claim to understanding public values. In either case, there is no guarantee that top-down decisions will reflect the underlying values of the public at large any better than an imperfect reflection of values gathered through valuation exercises. In principle, economic valuation methods can estimate value for all environmental attributes, either through inferences from observable behavior or responses in stated preference surveys. In practice, however, it is generally not possible to get a complete economic assessment of all environmental values. Some values connected with the environment are notoriously difficult to assess in monetary terms. For example, what is the monetary value of conserving species with important spiritual or cultural value? Some critics contend that individuals are cognitively incapable of evaluating tradeoffs between utilitarian goods (such as commodities and ecosystem services) and moral goods (such as the existence of a species). There are sharp disagreements between psychologists and economists—and among economists themselves—on this point. Even when it is possible in principle to estimate monetary values, there may be insufficient data to do so. Nevertheless, economic methods can provide evidence about the value of many important environmental attributes. The value of valuation Though difficult, collecting information about the relative values of alternative potential outcomes, in all of their multiple dimensions, is vital to good environmental management and policy decisionmaking. Setting environmental policy is not simply a matter of applying the best science, as important as that is. Environmental management and policy typically involve making decisions about tradeoffs among multiple objectives about which society cares. Making decisions about such tradeoffs involves making value judgments. If these judgments are to improve human wellbeing, they should reflect the underlying values of individuals affected by the policy. Economic valuation methods applied in the context of environmental management and policy seek to inform decisionmaking by collecting information about the value of alternatives to affected individuals and then aggregating these values to determine an estimate of social net benefits. In simple benefit/cost analysis, the management or policy option with the highest social net benefits should then be the preferred option. The great advantage of the simple benefit/cost approach is that it incorporates economic valuation methods to represent values of the affected public, summarizes this information into a single ranking, and uses this ranking to help guide policy. Valuation information can also be combined with other decisions rules, such as those that minimize the risk of bad outcomes occurring.

## Cap K

### Cap K---FW---2AC

#### Framework – the ballot is a referendum on the plan's desirability – links must be causal and unique with a solvent and competitive alternative – anything else unpredictably moots the 1AC, decimating procedural fairness and in-depth clash

#### We DON’T need to win Cap’s sustainable nor desirable---ethics requires assessing causal solvency since all futures, including the alt, risk collapse---only centering flexibility and agency can solve---which only our framework does

---ethics = meliorism, virtue signaling becomes counter-productive when it’s combined with an argument to ignore questions of feasibility and process (which isn’t the same thing as saying all advocacy is virtue signaling nor that all virtue signaling is bad, nor is this the same idea as “capitalist realism”)

---less “must have blueprint” and more “people making don’t need a blueprint args in fact assume an unacknowledged blueprint, and compelling those people to make those assumptions explicit and evaluable is key”

---the bit around “avoid attaching to the hoped-for results of our actions” = not only a conventional “drop in the bucket of subjectivity formation” claim of link defense, but also an impact turn to the portion of their framework that asserts a 1:1 relationship between advocacy in debate and ethical judgment --- the actual argument being made by the author is importantly that even if we lose the “link turn” components of our strategy, the act of advocating it while not actually believing it to be a good idea is what’s actually key to effective praxis for anti-capitalist transition, the ethical flexibility to identify constraints (like political feasibility) on agency (and justice) and take advantage of opportunities as they arise during the process of transition --- inverts you-link-you-lose logic to functionally become you-link-you-win-provided-you-still-win-framework

Albert 24 [Michael J. Albert, Lecturer in Global Environmental Politics in the School of Social and Political Science at the University of Edinburgh, former Lecturer in International Relations at SOAS University of London, PhD Johns Hopkins University, “Conclusion,” Chapter 6, *Navigating the Polycrisis: Mapping the Futures of Capitalism and the Earth*, MIT Press, 2024, ISBN 9780262378260, p.225-241]

Ultimately, we do not know what the future will bring, and there will undoubtedly be numerous surprises. But we cannot proceed headlong into the turbulence of our planetary future without a rough map of where we are headed, the crises we will likely encounter, the forms of problem-shifting that would result from different present and future responses, the opportunities for progressive transformation that will emerge for social justice movements, and the obstacles and dangers these movements would need to overcome. Whether we realize it or not, we all operate with some map of the future, in the sense that we assume particular consequences will flow from our present-day actions.1 Thus, the question is not whether or not we develop a map of possible futures, but whether or not this is done consciously, systematically, and synthetically, taking account of all the most relevant parameters. I do not claim to have accounted for every possible parameter in this book, or exhaustively integrated the ones I do include. My goal has been more modest: to go further than existing approaches toward a synthetic transdisciplinary analysis of the future possibility space. Planetary systems thinking can be considered a meta-theoretical framework that facilitates transdisciplinary synthesis, in this way helping us construct qualitative models of the planetary problematic and its possible futures. In the years to come, as events in the world unfold and our knowledge of the planetary polycrisis advances, many of the specific scenario trajectories I discuss in chapters 4 and 5 will become increasingly dated or obsolete. But the theoretical framework and futures “methodology” presented in this book will remain as relevant as ever. I therefore hope that others will continue to build on, enrich, and refine this book’s map of the future by deepening its theoretical and methodological foundations, updating its scenarios and developing new ones, integrating new parameters, highlighting other feedbacks or more deeply exploring some of the feedbacks I do address (but insufficiently), bringing in other theoretical perspectives, and developing more fine-grained analyses of the possibility space in different states and regions across the world-system.

It is not easy to encapsulate the trajectories we have explored over the past two chapters into a succinct set of scenarios. Collapse, techno-leviathan, and ecosocialism may be the three main attractors that the planetary problematic is pushing the world-system toward, but numerous variations can be imagined for all three—involving many different timelines, parametric tweaks, and geographically uneven combinations. The future possibility space is indeed a messy multiplicity of overwhelming complexity, and to highlight representative scenarios is inherently selective and liable to occlude other potentials. Still, I suggest that we can identify seven main scenarios based on the trajectories explored in the previous chapters. Call them the uneven and combined world-system pathways, since each world-system trajectory will be the outcome of geographically uneven and combined struggles, though I will subsequently refer to them as the WSPs (which is a less-monstrous acronym). Like the SSPs, I call these world-system (rather than world-earth system) pathways to signify that each WSP could in principle be paired with different climate and earth system trajectories (e.g., because of variable assumptions about solar geoengineering, CDR deployment, and earth system feedbacks). But, like the IPCC, I will assume that each one would most likely follow a particular planetary pathway.2 Furthermore, I should emphasize that the WSPs should not be understood as “ends of history” (with the possible exception of breakdown, if it leads to human extinction). Rather, they are more like provisional attractor states for the world-system that would be subject to further evolution over time, and critical transitions between them are possible. For instance, volatile techno-leviathan may eventually shift into neofeudalism, neofeudalism into breakdown, abolitionist ecosocialism into ecomodernist socialism, ecomodernist socialism into one or other variant of techno-leviathan, and so forth. Together these scenarios give us a provisional navigational map of the world-system’s possibility space—one that will need to be updated and modified as we proceed ever-deeper into the future.

A diagram of a diagram

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THE UNEVEN AND COMBINED WORLD-SYSTEM PATHWAYS

WSP1 (breakdown). Starting with the worst-case collapse scenario, WSP1 tracks closely with what Raskin calls “breakdown.”3 In this scenario, a global collapse trajectory, whether triggered by a near-term fossil stagflation crisis or longer-term convergence of magnifying socioecological crises, inflames ethnonationalist reaction, fuels geopolitical tensions, and intensifies polarization and conflict within and between states. A vicious spiral between socioecological crises, state and nonstate violence, and war, leading to further socioecological breakdown, ensues. This is more likely to occur in a trajectory of slow and incremental technological innovation. But it could also happen in a context of exponential technological breakthroughs—which could be the result of destabilizing innovations in the cyber-nuclear- AI nexus, or the relentless advance and democratization of WMD capabilities (or, perhaps, the emergence of malevolent artificial superintelligence). Existential crises and hardened self/other relations are key to this scenario, since socioecological crises and technological risks would not by themselves lead to breakdown. But by inflaming existential anxieties that get exploited by opportunistic elites to sow division and drum up nationalist passions, and which motivate WMD terrorism by nonstate actors, socioecological crises can indeed trigger vicious spirals that lead to worsening violence, war, and planetary breakdown. If this happens in the course of a neoliberal drift trajectory, then a 3.5°C+ hothouse earth trajectory would likely be in the cards. Eventually, we would witness a world composed of pockets of surviving communities in the upper latitudes, with the human population perhaps numbering in the millions—as James Lovelock imagines in one of his eco-dystopian warnings4—though human extinction is possible over the course of the twenty-second and subsequent centuries. This is not the most likely scenario, but one that cannot be ignored.

WSP2 (neofeudalism). This collapse scenario is similar to Raskin’s “fortress worlds” archetype, though the term neofeudalism gives us a more precise articulation of its geopolitical and economic structure. In this scenario, world-system breakdown—whether resulting from near-term fossil stagflation or longer-term polycrisis amplification—leads to cooperation among global capitalist elites to manage geopolitical tensions and contain the “real and potential rebellion” of surplus humanity.5 But the relentless intensification of cascading polycrises over time, in conjunction with worsening WMD terrorism, leads to a softer breakdown of the capitalist world-system into a multiplicity of regional, national, and local political economies and security assemblages. Some nation-states may retain effective governance capacities, but most would eventually fragment and give way to a complex neofeudal geography composed of political-economic and security assemblages cooperating and competing over territory and resources—including corporate quasi-states, city-states, feudalized rentier capitalists and warlords that offer livelihood protection in exchange for tribute, and numerous communities of surplus populations left to develop their own survival strategies. No doubt there are neofeudal tendencies already operative in the contemporary world, just as there were capitalist tendencies at work in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries in Europe. 6 But this would be a future in which a collapsing world economy leads to the steady demise of capitalist social relations and their historical “laws of motion,” while neofeudal structures become ecologically dominant across the planet. This future could bifurcate into a deeper collapse trajectory over time if 2.5°C+ warming triggers tipping-point cascades. Alternatively, a combination of successful imperial projects and technological breakthroughs could potentially lead to world-system reintegration and regeneration over the course of the twenty-second century and beyond (e.g., if carbon-cycle feedbacks remain muted and planetary rewilding helps stabilize global temperatures), perhaps giving rise to a twenty-second- century variant of sixteenth-century mercantile capitalism.7 Or, more optimistically, rebellion from below—at least in certain regions—may eventually overwhelm and defeat these neofeudal bunkers, creating more egalitarian ecosocialist worlds.

WSP3 (volatile techno-leviathan). We can imagine numerous variants of techno-leviathan that combine different hegemonic configurations (e.g., a China-led world order, a US-or G7-led order, or a bipolar world of “competitive coexistence”), varying degrees of success in managing the climate and biodiversity crises, varying degrees of success in containing the threats posed by democratized WMDs, different levels of domestic and global inequality, and different degrees of capitalist or statist control of the economy. But I focus here on two ideal types. The first I call volatile techno-leviathan, which is a particularly dark and unstable variant that would be quite vulnerable to neofeudalist regression and breakdown over time. This scenario could be considered an answer to the following “what if” question: What if the world-system undergoes continuous neoliberal drift plus dramatic technological breakthroughs? In this scenario, technological breakthroughs allow states in the world-system core and semi-periphery to “muddle through” worsening polycrises over time while avoiding collapse. But the result is a volatile cocktail of stressors: geopolitical tensions between the United States, China, and Russia remain elevated; 2.5°C+ warming forces governments to rely on SRM and CDR expansion to ward of tipping-point cascades; breakthroughs in AI and robotics lead to 15%–25% technological unemployment in the second half of the century, meaning unprecedented inequality and populist anger; the same innovations lead to destabilizing advances in both democratized WMD technologies and the military AI-nuclear- robotic arsenals of states; and global governance of dangerous new technologies remains weak to nonexistent. As a result, the ranks of racialized surplus populations swell; a new wave of WMD nonstate terrorism ensues, fueling a spiral of insecurity and techno-authoritarian securitization; worsening geopolitical rivalries and destabilizing AI-nuclear- cyber technologies create a near-continuous threat of ruinous hot wars; SRM interventions are ungovernable and unstable; and global economic growth stagnates and plateaus from the combination of weakening consumer demand, climate chaos, and rentier strangulation. The world-system slowly mutates from capitalism into a bipolar or multipolar configuration of competing techno-leviathans that prioritize security, power, and geopolitical competition more than economic growth. This scenario forms a sort of middle way between neofeudalism and stable techno-leviathan— with more rapid technological innovation compared to the former and more intense inequality, geopolitical rivalry, and climate chaos relative to the latter. It may not form a stable attractor for the world-system. On one hand, an out-of- control technological arms race, rampant WMD terrorism, an increasingly unstable nuclear balance of terror, and climate tipping points may push it toward breakdown. On the other, if global elites cooperate over time to reduce geopolitical tensions and successfully deploy SRM and CDR to ward off climate tipping points, then this scenario would become more like stable techno-leviathan— but a particularly brutal and unequal version of it, with only a small elite reaping the fruits of continuous technological advance. The film Elysium—which envisions a world of poverty and techno-authoritarian oppression for most of the global population, combined with techno-luxury, transhumanist experimentation, and outer space expansion for global elites—may be an apt (if slightly extreme) depiction of this future.

WSP4 (stable techno-leviathan). This scenario can be considered a more politically and ecologically stable form of techno-leviathan, one in which green Keynesian transitions combined with FIR-driven innovations power a long wave of exponential growth and stabilize global temperature increases around 2°C. Geopolitical tensions are contained—most likely following a “competitive coexistence” scenario between the US and China-led blocs, though a “renaissance of democracies” leading to a renewed G7-led order is also plausible.8 Efforts to regulate synthetic biology and other dangerous emerging technologies have more success but remain limited due to concerns about hindering innovation. Within-country inequality is initially moderated by redistributive reforms, but over time relentless automation intensifies polarization by increasing technological unemployment, suppressing wages, and heightening precarity for most workers. Extractivist sacrifice zones proliferate across peripheral regions of the world-system, and the mass extinction crisis continues unabated as material-energy throughput continues to rise. But ultra-dense megacities, abundant solar and nuclear (and possibly fusion) energy, vertical farming, alternative proteins made from precision fermentation, and the plundering of mineral reserves from the Arctic and deep sea support lifestyles of unprecedented comfort and convenience— as well as ennui and digital enclosure—for perhaps between 20%–50% of the world’s population (though such percentages are impossible to determine in advance, which will be contingent on political struggles over wages, UBI access, income distribution, and adaptation plus loss and damage finance for the global south). The rest of the population, on the other hand, would form a racialized underclass suspected of WMD terrorism, and would thus be subject to particularly intensive surveillance and mobility constraints. Genetic modification and transhumanist experimentation among privileged classes—to enhance longevity, health, cognitive faculties, and physical capabilities—would over time reinforce these racialized divisions.9 In short, this would be a far more powerful, panoptic, and (over time) transhumanist version of today’s militarized global apartheid. Would “growth” go on forever? In a sense yes, though GDP would become an increasingly irrelevant indicator as automated abundance, technological unemployment, UBI, and rising concerns with security from democratized WMD terrorism alter the priorities of ruling classes. With the opening of the outer space frontier, there may be no fundamental limit to how far this technological civilizational assemblage could expand in terms of its geographic extensity and material-energy throughput, but the earth and its less fortunate inhabitants would undoubtedly be devastated.

WSP5 (ecomodernist socialism). The last three WSPs represent different ecosocialist scenarios. WSP5 can be understood as an ecomodernist and nonabolitionist socialist trajectory. To some extent this scenario overlaps with WSP4—particularly in the Chinese context, where techno-leviathan would most likely take an authoritarian socialist form. But at least within the democratic sphere of the world-system, ecomodernist socialisms would be more egalitarian political economies that harness a mix of democratic and algorithmic planning to redistribute the fruits of capitalist abundance, accelerate technological innovation in “green” industries, and prioritize the expansion of social welfare (rather than security and power). Transitions to ecomodernist socialism could emerge from a greenflation or carbon bubble crisis of green Keynesianism in an incremental innovation trajectory, a longer-term crisis of technological unemployment in an exponential innovation trajectory, or even a mid-to late-century crisis of neoliberal drift. More or less technologically revolutionary versions of this scenario are possible, from “fully automated” to more sober varieties. They can also be more or less globally egalitarian—including scenarios in which rich countries eventually stabilize their material throughputs while emerging economies “catch up,” or varieties in which large inequalities in material and energy consumption are sustained. Either way, all of these scenarios would entail expansive extractive demands that reproduce a core-periphery structure—not necessarily between the global north and south as traditionally understood, but between wealthy urbanized regions and their extractive frontiers or “green sacrifice zones.”10 And the pressures that ecomodernist socialist regimes face as a result of core-periphery exploitation, biosphere degradation even if warming is stabilized around 2°C, worsening violence-interdependence, and technological advance in the forces of military-police repression may eventually push them in more techno-authoritarian directions. In this way, over time, they might become indistinguishable from techno-leviathan, which would especially be the case with “fully automated” variants of ecomodernist socialism.11 Alternatively, we could envision a scenario in which core countries shift to a steady-state material throughput by mid-century, relations of ecologically unequal exchange between the north and south are brought to an end, all or most countries eventually reach European-esque consumption levels, and material-energy demands are to some extent moderated through massive expansions of recycling infrastructure.12 This would probably still be a world of biospheric depletion and modernist monoculture,13 but a much better future than most of the others on offer.

WSP6 (fortress degrowth). This scenario represents a nonabolitionist ecosocialist degrowth trajectory in core regions of the world-system. It would most likely emerge in the context of a world in the throes of collapse from a neoliberal drift trajectory (likely between 2050 and 2080 as the polycrisis storm reaches epic proportions), but could also emerge in the context of a particularly severe stagflation crisis of green Keynesianism. Strengthening ecosocialist movements would catalyze egalitarian degrowth transitions in the core, but compromise formations with conservative blocs—who would be fueled by fears of ecological scarcity and excessive migration—would force them to sustain militarized borders and racialized counterterrorism toward the periphery. Given that ecosocialist degrowth trajectories would almost certainly emerge in a context of deep crisis that intensifies material and existential insecurities, it would indeed be challenging to prevent these regimes from devolving into fortress or lifeboat-style ecosocialisms. Ecofascist variants led by far-right blocs—some of whom, at least in Europe, support certain aspects of degrowth platforms—can be imagined. 14 Most ecosocialist degrowthers would (understandably) refuse to call this a variant of degrowth. But regardless of what we choose to call it, ecosocialists must proactively strategize on how to prevent degrowth transitions—which would almost certainly, if at all, occur in the context of an epic and unparalleled polycrisis storm—from devolving into lifeboats for the privileged.

WSP7 (abolitionist ecosocialism). Finally, as extensively discussed in chapters 4 and 5, WSP7 represents the ideal resolution of the planetary problematic: an ecosocialist world-system that combines degrowth in the global north, abolitionist security assemblages, and a new “New International Economic Order” that purses contraction and convergence between north and south. I assume that abolitionist ecosocialism would most likely emerge from a deep and protracted stagflation crisis of green Keynesianism that emerges in the 2030s. But it is also plausibly compatible with longer-term transition scenarios that lead to 2.5°C+ warming. This climate trajectory would severely constrict adaptation capacities across much of the global south. But if northern ecosocialist states abolish militarized global apartheid, welcome migrants, develop resettlement programs in collaboration with the governments and peoples of the global south, and build new cities in the increasingly habitable far north, then a more just and livable world for the earth’s 9–10 billion human inhabitants may still be possible even as we near 3°C.15 Alternatively, or in conjunction with cooperative resettlement programs, ecosocialist regimes in a 2.5°C+ world may cooperate to bring down temperatures with solar geoengineering—while simultaneously scaling up programs of planetary rewilding, carbon-sequestering agroecology, and DAC in order to ward off hothouse earth and restore atmospheric carbon to safe levels over time.16 No doubt both of these longer-term scenarios would require “an orchestration so elaborate and requiring so much luck that people may find it a fantastic, utopian dream,” as Holly Jean Buck describes the prospect of ecosocialist geoengineering futures. 17 Yet neither should they be completely discounted, which would close our imagination to possible (if less desirable) ecosocialist futures.

IMPLICATIONS FOR COUNTER-HEGEMONIC NAVIGATIONAL PRAXIS

We should now consider how this provisional map of the planetary future might inform counter-hegemonic navigational praxis. Starting with the concrete utopian aspiration for ecosocialism, I have suggested that the best hope for such transformation would emerge in the context of a greenflation or green-stagflation crisis of green Keynesianism that undermines the ideological hegemony of green growth and enables a tipping point tsunami of support for radical post-growth policy interventions. This suggests two things. First, it is necessary to struggle for green Keynesianism (or a global Green New Deal) as soon as possible, enacting at least the minimum objectives of phasing out fossil fuel subsidies; raising and coordinating carbon pricing across the major economies; ramping up spending on green technology R&D, electricity grid modernization, and electrified public transportation; providing as close to $1.3 trillion as possible in climate finance for the global south by 2030; and ensuring domestic redistributive mechanisms are in place and fighting to include as many other social justice objectives as possible. 18 Second, climate justice movements should then anticipate and prepare for a crisis of green Keynesianism emerging from the convergence of greenflation, stagnation, job losses, transition risks, and populist backlash. In this context, how could ecosocialists and climate justice movements successfully prevent fossil fueled backlash while pushing governments in more egalitarian post-capitalist directions? Our best hope is to proactively forge a broad alliance of movements for post-growth social democracy, as described in chapter 4, in order to create the conditions for a very different kind of response to a greenflation or green-stagflation crisis—one based on price controls, reducing energy demand, replacing GDP with alternative indicators of wellbeing, ensuring economic security for all in the absence of GDP growth, and shrinking military budgets. In conjunction with anti-imperialist struggles in the global south, the conditions might then be in place for metamorphosis in the direction of abolitionist ecosocialism and contraction and convergence over time. But this would be a long-term struggle, involving numerous “temporary stations on a continuous, yet rocky journey” toward the hoped-for utopian destination.19

On the other hand, if green Keynesian regimes succeed in catalyzing a long wave of accumulation with the aid of FIR-driven breakthroughs, then social justice movements will need to strategize on how to preempt the emergence of increasingly techno-authoritarian regimes over time. Some of the key struggles that could help prevent or at least moderate an incipient techno-leviathan include proactively fighting for a livable and unconditional UBI; ensuring adequate climate finance for the global south; pushing governments to revamp the Biological Weapons Convention or develop new global initiatives to regulate the dangers of synthetic biology, even if this means slower innovation; and fighting to institutionalize restraints on the deployment of facial and emotion recognition, predictive policing, drone swarms, and neurotechnologies by security agencies and police forces. The goal must be to moderate the inequalities and forms of imperialist violence that would fuel terrorism from nonstate actors, force governments to cooperatively restrain the dangers of unchecked FIR innovation, and institutionalize constraints on the efforts of security agencies and police forces to exercise untrammeled techno-authoritarian power.20

However, if insecurity-securitization spirals end up pushing liberal democratic states down the techno-authoritarian road, then this is not the end of the story. Rather than simply bowing down to techno-leviathan, counter-hegemonic movements must then struggle to ensure as much democratic oversight, accountability, inclusion, and justice as possible— ideally by pushing governments in more ecomodernist socialist directions (but, as noted previously, this would be quite challenging to pull off in this context). Alternatively, if a decisive green Keynesianism transition never materializes or undergoes backlash and bifurcation back to neoliberal drift—setting us up for a 2.5°C+ world—then this is also not the end of the story. There is a tendency in some sectors of the climate movement to say “we have ten years” to solve the problem— otherwise collapse is imminent and there is nothing more we can do.21 There is a logic to this way of thinking, but it is also misguided. Warming of 2.5°C could plausibly trigger tipping-point cascades, but this is not inevitable; earth system feedbacks would likely remain moderate and reversible before we reach 3°C, but no doubt this would be a highly uncertain and alarming situation. Ecosocialist transitions later this century are possible, which would be much less ideal given that they would emerge in a context of intensifying socioecological scarcities and existential crises—making it more challenging to avoid the path of fortress degrowth. But ecosocialist geoengineering futures that advance the ends of climate justice, or ecosocialist migration futures that redraw the political map (or a combination of both), can be imagined in a 2.5°C or 3°C world.

Finally, we should not shy away from the navigational dilemmas that would arise in a collapse future. Many analysts across the political spectrum resist talking about the prospect of collapse. Ben Hayes, for instance, calls collapse anticipation “the very worst of foundations for thinking about just and proportionate responses to current insecurities, let alone trying to organize radical politics.”22 Others like Jem Bendell, on the other hand, have come to the conclusion that some form of global collapse is now inevitable.23 As I have shown in this book, while I do not view global collapse as inevitable, it is nonetheless a very real potential, and a time may come when a path-dependent collapse process is set in motion that would be very challenging to escape. Thus, rather than solely adopting a “revolution or bust” strategy, more careful thinking about the threats, constraints, and opportunities that diverse communities and regions would confront during a world-system collapse is needed. Far-right movements are currently doing the same,24 and it would be unwise to allow them to monopolize the space of collapse anticipation. We must recognize that, for all the suffering that would emerge during a collapse trajectory, it would continue to pose geographically uneven socioecological, violence, and existential problematics that can be “solved” in better and worse ways. It is even plausible that a world-system collapse could lead to the emergence of more egalitarian ecosocialisms—for example, from transformations of consciousness in the wake of nuclear war,25 or through ecosocialist insurgencies against neofeudal fortresses. In this sense, the “breakdown of the prevailing system,” as Nafeez Ahmed writes, “heralds the potential for long-term post-breakdown systemic transformation.”26

Even if we fail to avoid the dystopian regions of the possibility space—whether collapse or techno-leviathan— it is still necessary to imagine how social justice movements and communities might sustain spaces of care, compassion, and solidarity in a grim future. Speculation on dystopian futures can aid us in this regard. As Kathryn Yusoff and Jennifer Gabrys describe, dystopian futures force us to imagine “the full range of emotional challenges and difficult choices that have to be made once all the usual landscape markers and reference points have shifted or disappeared . . . to think about what it might be like to endure and survive.”27 Social justice movements in the global north can also learn from what Audra Mitchell and Aadita Chaudhury call “BIPOC futurisms”—written by Black, African, Caribbean, Indigenous, and other authors who have already experienced the end of their ancestral worlds under the yoke of white supremacy—which dramatize the “always-already active labor of world-building and flourishing” in the wake of apocalypse.28 Following these authors, the point of dystopian futurism is not simply to galvanize preventative action (though this is the ideal outcome), but also to help us prepare cognitively and emotionally to not just survive but also discover new sources of meaning, community, resilience, and perhaps even flourishing within such futures. This is the strength of the Deep Adaptation movement, for instance, which pushes us to explore challenging questions about how we might navigate collapse futures in a way that centers compassion and solidarity.29 Likewise, we must do the same for techno-leviathan futures— which could be even worse than collapse, at least depending on one’s geographic and intersectional positionality. This does not mean we accept such futures as inevitable, simply that we do not remain stubbornly attached to a “revolution or bust” framework. Instead, we need both the intellectual work of analyzing how these futures might unfold and the geographically uneven challenges and opportunities they would present, as well as the more existential work of cognitive-emotional preparation.

BETWEEN PESSIMISM AND HOPE

Antonio Gramsci once remarked that we should maintain an optimism of the will alongside a pessimism of the intellect. Indeed, this stance is as relevant as ever, though we should reflect on what an “optimism of the will” should mean in the context of our twenty-first-century planetary predicament. For centrist liberals and ecomodernists, this takes the form of a “can-do” spirit of apolitical innovation that reminds us of the technological wonders of the modern world and the promise of breakthroughs yet to come. Ecosocialists and degrowthers rightly critique these faith-based analyses while countering with a faith of their own: that mass social movements can save us. But whether hope is placed in technological innovation or social movements (or both), these optimistic narratives always require a leap of faith.

Others, on the other hand, are rejecting these faiths and forging new intellectual, practical, emotional, and (sometimes) spiritual responses to the planetary predicament. These thinkers aim to go beyond these “green positivity” narratives and their diverse brands of “hopium,” which they critique for constricting our capacities to grieve for the losses we confront and find new meaning in life beyond the search for “solutions.”30 For example, Roy Scranton skewers what he calls “fictions” of ecosocial transformation and technological miracles as “farcical daydreams against the coming chaos, popsicle-stick castles in a hurricane wind.” Instead, he counsels us to confront our fears of death and cultivate a more humble understanding of our cosmic insignificance.31 In the context of IR, Jairus Grove calls for a form of “negative thinking as an alternative to the endless rehearsing of moralizing insights and strategic foresight,” which “celebrates useless thinking, useless scholarship, and useless forms of life at the very moment we are told to throw them all under the bus in the name of survival at all costs.”32 Coming from a more literary angle, the Dark Mountain Project summons a new practice of “uncivilized” literature that breaks from the stories of endless progress that capitalist civilization has spoon-fed many of us from childhood. They ask, “What would happen if we looked down? Would it be as bad as we imagine? . . . We believe it is time to look down.”33

It is in some respects easy, and in others challenging, to go the route of the “new pessimists” (as we might call them). In short, there is a reasonable argument to be made that, as the saying goes, “we’re doomed,” though what that means must be nuanced by appreciating the geographically and intersectionally uneven vulnerabilities that constitute the “we.” At the same time, any proclamation that “we’re doomed” must bear the weight of the incalculable losses in lives, ways of life, species, and ecosystems that would be implicitly accepted as inevitable. I am thus uncomfortable with at least certain forms of the new pessimist perspective, which can become a form of escapism that avoids the grief, pain, terror, and rage that a genuine reckoning with our predicament must provoke.34 Just as importantly, as Scranton himself recognizes, the stance of fatalistic pessimism can often be read as an attempt to remain “above the fray,” or to avoid the “embarrassment” of committing oneself to an erroneous or hopelessly unrealistic future. 35 In other words, rather than risking the fight for a better future, risking the pain and disappointment of failure, the new pessimists can lapse into an apolitical quietism that brings them the cold comfort of likely being proven right in the end. “An enviable position, so high above the fray!”36

In contrast, we can navigate a more fruitful path between hope and pessimism. As Elisabeth Grosz suggests, a Deleuzian ethics—inspired by the stoics, a Spinozist love of nature, and Nietzschean amor fati—can aid us in these times. The “question of ethics,” from this perspective, is “How can I be worthy of the events that await me, how can I enter into events that sweep me up, preexist me, or that I cannot control? . . . What am I capable of doing, what is my degree of power and how can I act to enhance and maintain an active use of it?”37 These are valuable questions that those of us struggling for more just and sustainable futures should ask ourselves. Taking our bearings from Grosz and Deleuze, the aim is to rigorously determine (as far as possible) what is within our power as movements that could become more than the sum of their parts, how we can take that power to the limit to create the best possible or least bad future, and how we can live well and in solidarity no matter what future ultimately unfolds. On one hand, as noted earlier, this means that we should avoid a revolution-or- bust approach, which is not only likely to end in disappointment and burnout but may also disable the flexibility needed to maximize our collective power to act and flourish within the constraints that limit us. Sadly, if the world’s most powerful corporations, capital managers, and governments are hell-bent on protecting their wealth and power at the cost of the earth, and large sections of the global working class remain too constrained by ideologies of capitalism, race, nationalism, and misguided masculinities, then there is only so much that the rest of us can do. Yet, on the other hand, to say that collapse or techno-leviathan is inevitable also limits our praxis and ignores the potentials for transformative agency that will emerge in the coming upheavals. The future is open, and—to paraphrase Deleuze and Guattari—we do not yet know what a planetary polycrisis can do.38 Nonetheless, as Joanna Macy advises, while we remain open to the uncertainty of the future, we should also avoid attaching to the hoped-for results of our actions. “Active hope,” in this sense, means we remain steadfast in the struggle for a more just world, not because we think we will succeed but because serving life and reducing suffering is an end in itself.39 Every iota of harm that our collective efforts are able to reduce, even if only temporarily, is significant. It is not all or nothing.

Perhaps an optimism of the will, understood along these lines, can provide a compass to help us navigate through the unfolding polycrisis. On one hand, democratic ecosocialist transformation during this century of upheaval is possible, and this is a goal worth believing in and fighting for. On the other hand, our optimism should not reside in the belief that we can and will create a more sustainable and just world, but that we can collectively discover new ways of life and new sources of meaning, purpose, community—and even joy—no matter what the future brings.

### Cap K---Perm---2AC

#### Perm: do both --- if that’s severance, do the plan and non-mutually exclusive parts of the ALT

#### The 1AC was always-already critiquing capitalism---plan’s a necessary element of any solvent ALT---and their link framing only inhibits BOTH mobilization AND implementation

Cohen 25 [Jean L. Cohen, Professor of Political Theory and Contemporary Civilization in the Department of Political Science at Columbia University, PhD New School for Social Research, “Eviscerating the State: The New Oligarchic and Authoritarian Project to Undermine American Constitutional Democracy,” Emancipations: A Journal of Critical Social Analysis, 4(2), 2025, DOI 10.55533/2765-8414.1136]

That capitalist class interests and the oligarchic power of the very rich at the founding was secured by the Constitution and prevailed again after the upheavals of the civil war has been a charge asserted not only during the founding but repeatedly ever since Charles Beard’s Economic Interpretation of the Constitution, written at a time (1913) when corporate capital had gained enormous economic power, political influence, and constitutional rights (of legal personhood).23 This enabled them to use private law and Supreme Court rulings to overturn state level regulations of the economy (wages, hours, rules for workers and restrictions on the power and mobility of corporate capital generally). They were able to generate such extremes of concentrated wealth and monopoly power at one end and poverty at the other that the epoch was dubbed the gilded age.24 In short, what is now happening is not entirely new, and I fully agree that democracy and capitalism have always been in tension in the U.S. as elsewhere, and the oligarchic dynamics within capitalism is one of the main culprits. By this I mean the tendency of capital to accumulate in ever fewer hands, (what Marx called the centralization and concentration of capital), generating monopolistic market positions, and inequality of wealth and (economic) power. This tension and the frequent failure to control for the rise of oligarchic power not only in the economic system but also its influence in the political system, is antithetical to the egalitarian principles undergirding democracy and thereby perforce restricts democratic quality. But to jump to the conclusion that the essence of the political form of a representative liberal constitutional republic is essentially oligarchic, or that liberal constitutional democracy despite severing the link between citizenship and property only ends the formal and overt but not the real rule of oligarchic power is triply misleading.25 First, because it underestimates the successes of anti-oligarchic and democratizing struggles not only in the U.S. but elsewhere; second because it diverts us from examining how (through which mechanisms) capitalist oligarchs manage to influence or gain real political power, how this changes, and why capitalist oligarchs periodically turn away from liberal constitutional democracy to endorse authoritarian rule. Third, by depriving democrats and anti-oligarchs of key concepts such as ruling in the public good, or in the common interest, concepts denounced as rhetorical smokescreens deployed by oligarchs to conceal the occupation of Lefort’s famous ‘empty place of power’ by wealth, this approach loses the tools needed to denounce political corruption which I define here as the use of public power for private particular class purposes. 26 Supposedly such ‘depoliticized’ concepts are deployed by oligarchs to distract from the class nature of their de facto rule in liberal constitutional democracies (republics). But concepts like the use of public power for public purposes, tied to accountability mechanisms, are indispensable for countering rule in the interest of a particular class or group.

It is not my task here to retrace the dynamics of oligarchic and antioligarchic struggles in the U.S. or to defend existing liberal constitutional democracies against the charge of oligarchy. Indeed, I argue that the U.S. political institutions are and have always been deeply flawed from the dual perspective of the dynamics and inordinate influence of capitalist forces (and powerful oligarchs emerging within that system), and from the perspective of institutionalized constitutional mechanisms that have never been democratic enough, inclusive enough or sufficiently committed to political equality so as to block autocratic rule, related to but not identical with capitalist or oligarchic power. I thus also disagree with the recent claims by Sinanoglu, Way, and Levitsky that capitalism can “save democracy” insofar as private capital and free markets foster the liberal pluralism and political competition (a variety of veto points and countervailing powers) that democracy needs to thrive. For them, in short, autonomous private power – i.e. a free capitalist economy independent of political interference – is crucial not only to a free plural civil society but also to political democracy. Accordingly, it is state capture of business rather than business capture of the state that represents the most direct threat to democracy.27 To be sure, the alternative they present and rightly reject: corrupt state control of capital, finance and investment exemplified today by Putin’s Russia, Orban’s Hungary, and Erdogan’s Turkey, are decidedly not compatible with democracy or social justice – and lead to a shift from flawed democratic to competitive authoritarian regimes. But that is hardly the only alternative to libertarian models of capitalism or the only threat to democracy. The threat posed by oligarchic economic and political influence to liberal democracy is real and should be analyzed, not ignored.28 Indeed, unless we also grasp the dangers that unaccountable private economic power poses to democracy (state and popular sovereignty and justice) we will be hard put to understand the resentments, rage and risks the most recent neo-liberal version of deregulated and deeply inegalitarian and oligarchic capitalism has generated that fuels the mass movements behind authoritarian populist projects sweeping long established western democracies today. Nor will we be able to see what is distinctive about the ways in which unaccountable private power (of capital/oligarchs) challenges constitutional democracy today and how this intersects with the projects of aspiring autocrats seeking unaccountable public political power. Clearly both dynamics--business or capitalist capture of the state and state capture of business--pose serious threats to democracy and the principles of political equality undergirding it, especially when these projects merge.

Indeed, the issue facing us now is how to ward off the contemporary dual threat of autocracy and a new form of oligarchy emerging within (but not only there) the quintessential liberal democracy—the U.S.— in which a key and powerful oligarchic faction has explicitly abandoned democracy in favor of strong man rule. What prompts capitalist oligarchs to rhetorically and de facto support Trump’s authoritarian project and what is new with respect to the old model of oligarchic capture of policy making in liberal constitutional democracy? (I will address what is distinctive in the autocratic project of the pretend populist president in the next section.)

For there is something new going on today. It is not just that autonomous oligarchs with enormous global private economic power radically undermine equality, push the ever-greater concentration of capital in ever fewer monopolistic hands and subtly capture key governmental regulatory agencies, seeking privatization of public services while attacking labor organizations. Rather, according to Kuttner and Stone we are witnessing a ‘‘re-feudalization’’ of the commons: whereby a new privatization of jurisprudence overlaps with, but is more sinister than, the earlier privatization of public services such as prisons, schools etc.29 At issue is the bypassing of public common law and the evisceration especially of ‘pre-distributive’ labor and consumer rights through a wholesale shift of key areas of rule-making and ‘adjudication’ to private law and decision making involving such mechanisms as compulsory arbitration instead of use of the courts.30 They cite the emergence of entire fiefdoms of private law in, e.g. Silicon Valley. As they put it: Western democracies today do not simply deregulate the economy in reaction to ‘overregulation’ and the liberal consensus that prevailed from the New Deal to 1980. In addition, corporate elites are now pursuing a project in which entire realms of public law, public property, due process, and citizen rights revert to unaccountable control by private business. This is tantamount to a direct attack on the democratic commons i.e. on the democratic state’s ability to serve as a counterweight to the concentrated power that flowed to concentrated wealth in the capitalist economy and to use public power for public purposes. They pinpoint what is distinctive in the current oligarchic project quite succinctly:

The age-old elements of private law, such as contracts and torts, have long coexisted with public law and regulation. Contention between public law and private power is a very old story. What is new and alarming is the displacement of entire areas of public law by private commercial interests and the resurrection of abusive forms of private law. This is a reaction against earlier developments of the commons. Not only did the 20th-century state expand democratic public law. Acting through the courts, the state intervened to police private contracts and protect weaker parties from abuse by the powerful…20th-century judicial interpretation and enforcement of contracts emphasized fairness between the parties…courts in the 20th century refused to enforce contracts between parties with vastly unequal resources, knowledge, or bargaining power when they found agreements to be oppressive, coercive, grossly one-sided, misleading, or blatantly unfair.31

Accordingly, the carving up of public law and property into proprietary domains is the new tragedy of the commons. Thus, the capture of public law and the reversion to one-sided private law reinforce each other, creating vast pools of proprietary power. Indeed, one of the startling trends of recent decades has been the success of the giant tech monopolies at creating their own proprietary systems of law and insulating themselves from public regulation. Companies such as Google, Apple, and Amazon have invented their own jurisprudence, hidden in obscure terms of service, to govern the consent of users to the commercial use of personal data. Amazon requires all its independent sellers to sign the now-familiar arbitration clause, requiring submission of disputes to an arbitrator selected by Amazon.32 Most of this ought to be illegal, but it isn’t. Accordingly, the authors note that American democracy is under assault on multiple fronts. While the autocratic incursions of the Trump administration are only the most urgent and immediate, they maintain that the private capture of public regulatory law is more long-term and more insidious.

Another distinctive feature of today’s new oligarchs (in tech, finance) is that they have come out into the open and accepted appointments as heads of key governmental agencies and departments or created and steered powerful unofficial ones like DOGE, (the ‘department’ of Government Efficiency) gaining public state power, their anarchotechnocratic impulses notwithstanding. 33 We seem to be witnessing a partial shift from indirect to direct oligarchic political power (especially if we count Trump among the oligarchs)—a form that is increasingly incompatible with formal democracy and the rule of law despite the appearance of working within the law and reliance on the democratic legitimacy of the elected populist president. But the project isn’t simply state capture. It is to eviscerate depth in the state (what they, like Trump, call the deep state) – i.e. the autonomy, expertise, and authority of the civil service and of independent agencies--so as to escape regulation, taxation, oversight, and to use public power unhindered, for private purposes. Today’s American tech, finance and some other types of super rich actors and managers fit the concept of oligarch if by that we understand monopoly market power; excessive media influence; fortunes greater than a million times the living wage, and now rather open participation in political life.34 Oligarchs in the U.S. are autonomous of the state unlike in the USSR, or China and many post-communist regimes, and they involve new forms of capital (tech, crypto, finance) but also some old ones (oil, pharmaceuticals).

### Cap K---ALT: State-Based---2AC

#### Means the ALT merely empowers Trump’s rent-seeking and anti-environmentalism by nationalizing industries

Tienhaara & Walker 21 [Kyla Tienhaara, School of Environmental Studies & Department of Global Development Studies, Queen’s University, Canada; and Jeremy **Walker**, Climate Justice Research Centre and Faculty of Social & Political Sciences, University of Technology Sydney, Australia; “Fossil capital, ‘unquantifiable risk’ and neoliberal nationalizations: The case of the Trans Mountain Pipeline in Canada,” Geoforum, 124, August 2021, pp.120-131, DOI 10.1016/j.geoforum.2021.06.005]

To a significant degree, the ‘free market’ philosophy promoted since the 1930s by neoliberals and from the 1970s increasingly embedded in international economic institutions and investment treaties was specifically developed to prevent social democratic and post-colonial governments pursuing nationalist strategies of industrial and social development, often predicated upon the nationalization of strategic mineral resources and infrastructures. Now, as the free market begins to abandon the fossil fuel sector, certain voices within the Atlas Network are reciprocating, calling liberalism into question and discovering the virtues of conservative nationalism and nationalist industry policy – as Alejandro Chafuen (MPS member, board member of the Fraser Institute, Canada’s premier Atlas-affiliated think tank, and Atlas Network president and CEO from 1991 to 2018) reports in a recent article ( 2019 ).

This is also manifesting in proposals from politicians aligned with fossil capital. In 2018, the Trump Administration investigated whether it could invoke wartime emergency measures to effectively nationalize struggling coal power plants in order to keep them open ( Kaufman, 2018 ). The plan was dropped due to legal and cost concerns ( St. John, 2018 ). Something very similar occurred in Australia. The energy company AGL announced in 2015 that Liddell Power Station (a 48-year-old coal-fired power plant built by a state-owned public electricity monopoly, later privatised), would be closed in 2022, and the site used for cleaner and cheaper electricity generation. In 2017, the federal government urged AGL to keep it running, claiming that its closure would result in electricity shortages, but the company remained firm on the decision ( Latimer, 2016 ). In March 2018, a group of MPs from the ruling Liberal/National Coalition called on the government to nationalize the plant ( Koziol, 2018 ). They were rebuffed by then Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull, who noted that “nationalising assets is what the Liberal Party was founded to stop governments doing” ( Kenny, 2018 , n.p.). However, MPS member John Roskam of the abovementioned Institute of Public Affairs—an Atlas unit closely associated with the Liberal Party, and a long-term advocate of electricity privatisation—made a strong statement in support of the proposal: “[t]he reality is that the government has broken energy policy in this country, and government intervention might be required to fix it” ( 2018, n.p. ).

These proposals for nationalization from political actors that otherwise claim to strongly support the free market may seem at first surprising. However, the way nationalization is envisioned by hydrocarbon corporations and the neoliberal pundits who pursue their public policy objectives at arms-length is quite distinct from traditional conceptions of nationalization familiar from the history of the oil and gas sector, where state-owned corporations ensure direct control over resource development and the collection of resource rents for sovereign wealth funds and redistributive welfare. Exemplary here is the relation between Norway’s StatOil (recently renamed Equinor) and its Government Pension Fund ( Austvik, 2014 ).

The proposals in Australia and from the Trump Administration have some of the hallmarks as the emergency government ‘interventions’ and partial bank nationalizations during the GFC. In the context of the potential failure of the global banking system, these were defended as measures of last resort, only to be used in extreme circumstances when the alternative (to let the company/industry fail) would have dire economic repercussions ( Kitromildes, 2010 ). These exceptions to neoliberal doctrines were supposed to be “temporary [..] to be reversed as soon as market conditions permit” ( Kitromildes, 2010, p. 150). As President George W. Bush put it in announcing the first US banking bailout: “the government's role will be limited and temporary…these measures are not intended to take over the free market, but to preserve it” ( Bush, 2008 , n.p.).

Even after Bush was replaced by Barack Obama in the White House, the role of the US Government remained limited to providing public funds to ensure private companies remained solvent, without significant public interest conditions being attached to the bailouts, even in companies that were partially nationalized by government purchases of corporate stock. For example, the Government could have exercised its power as the majority shareholder in GM and Chrysler to require significant changes in production models to address climate change and loss of market share to more energy-efficient foreign competitors. Instead, only modest fuel economy standards were included as a condition of the bailout ( Wigglesworth et al., 2017 ), and these were promptly denounced by the Atlas-affiliated Heritage Foundation ( Gattuso, 2009 ).

Carroll et al. (2019, p. 780) argue that in response to the GFC “[s]tate intervention…had been used [..] simply as a stop-gap policy measure to protect the interests of capital, stock market valuations, the functioning of markets, underwrite (socialize) market excess, and restore investor confidence.” Similarly, Mirowski (2013, p. 347) argues: One might regard this innovation as co-opting the very idea of nationalization of business firms from the history of the left, but turning it on its head, lumbering the state with only the failed assets off the crippled private balance sheets while leaving the remainder of the firm in private hands, to enjoy revived profitability.

#### AND triggers domestic and foreign conflict---even if transition succeeds

---“more desirable forms” and “The above sketch” are references to “The world-system pathways (WSPs)” diagram in Albert 24 on FW

Albert 24 [Michael J. Albert, Lecturer in Global Environmental Politics in the School of Social and Political Science at the University of Edinburgh, former Lecturer in International Relations at SOAS University of London, PhD Johns Hopkins University, “Futures of Geopolitics, Security, and the Planetary Problematic,” Chapter 5, *Navigating the Polycrisis: Mapping the Futures of Capitalism and the Earth*, MIT Press, 2024, ISBN 9780262378260, p.177-223]

The above sketch provides a sense of how ecosocialist degrowth in the overdeveloped world and abolitionist strategies can mutually complement and reinforce each other. But we must also consider how ecosocialist regimes might respond to lingering and emerging threats from other states and nonstate actors. Even in a best-case scenario in which the US, China, the EU, and others collaboratively embark on ecosocialist trajectories, other powerful states would likely resist. Russia, as we’ve seen, would likely pose a threat to ecosocialisms-in-transition because of its reliance on plummeting oil and gas rents, simmering vengefulness, and powerful nuclear, cyber, and info-war capabilities. Thus nascent ecosocialist regimes in Europe and North America may need to sustain military and nuclear force structures while reducing them to the minimum needed to deter aggression, while also committing to clear no-first- use policies, taking nuclear missiles off hair-trigger alert, ending nuclear modernization and hypersonic missile programs, and working with other states to move toward deeper nuclear disarmament and institutionalized mutual constraints over time.155 Things would of course be far more challenging if the US undergoes Trumpian backlash and remains a resistant outlier to a China-EU- centered ecosocialist bloc. In this case, a global ecosocialist transition may still be possible, but only if US military and geopolitical power declines precipitously. This is possible, since a mass sell-off of US treasuries by China and other states—along with declining demand for US dollars as the global economy transitions beyond oil (thereby undermining the “petro-dollar” nexus, historically foundational to US financial hegemony)—could erode its capacity to sustain its bloated military budget. 156 But the obvious danger is that a US dollar crisis would inflame nationalist passions and bring a Trump-like figure to power promising a return to “greatness” on the back of US military might. Thus it is plausible that great-power war could break out during the course of ecosocialist transitions—particularly if the world splits into competing fossil nationalist and ecosocialist blocs—and it is unlikely that ecosocialisms could survive such a conflagration (at least in their more desirable forms).

Furthermore, even if counter-hegemonic struggles succeed in pushing the US toward democratic ecosocialism, and even if Russia undergoes a social democratic revolution, other threats would remain. In particular, a secure digital communications ecosystem would be critical to the stability of ecosocialisms-in- transition: cybersecurity risks involving disinformation operations and critical infrastructure sabotage could potentially destabilize these regimes by fueling polarization and discord between worker and environmentalist elements of red-green coalitions, particularly in their early phases when their resilience is relatively weak. These risks may come from petro-states like Russia and Saudi Arabia, as well as from far-right groups, fossil capitalists, conservative billionaire networks, and other elements of the capitalist class seeking to restore their power and privilege. Cyberdefense would thus remain critical, which could involve what Ron Deibert describes as collaborative “epistemic communities” of cybersecurity experts across borders—a distributed cybersecurity assemblage that builds up local, national and regional capacities to defend digital infrastructures from state, corporate, and other threats.157 Similarly, ecosocialisms-in-transition would benefit from open-source synthetic biology and 3D printing, which would allow states and local communities to decouple from far-flung global supply chains, create more localized and less energy-intensive medical infrastructures, and boost efforts to create locally adaptive and climate-resilient crop varieties. 158 Biosecurity risks would therefore remain, which would be lower relative to a world with higher reliance on synthetic biology and more intense levels of structural violence, but significant enough that they would warrant novel institutions for ensuring the safety and benefits of open-source synthetic biology. There may be a difficult trade-off between accessibility and biosecurity, since stronger government regulations and intrusive inspection/verification regimes would likely limit access to the benefits of these technologies. But decentralized biosurveillance assemblages, similar to the model for cybersecurity discussed by Deibert, may provide a viable path forward. I do not pretend to have all the answers, which must be developed by bio-and cybersecurity experts and communities of practitioners in the course of ecosocialist transitions. But the questions must first be posed to facilitate the emergence of creative solutions.

This provides merely a brief sketch of the VP challenges that ecosocialisms-in-transition may confront. Again, different states and communities would confront their own relatively autonomous VPs shaped by distinctive problems, histories, and geographies. An ecosocialist regime in the US, for example, would face a particularly difficult challenge from far-right terrorists and insurgents, since there may be hundreds of thousands of participants in armed far-right militias in the US—many of them police and military personnel.159 Tackling this problem would simultaneously require abolitionist and socialist police science strategies: by addressing the root causes of far-right extremism—including underinvestment in rural regions, agribusiness oligopolies that destroy rural economies, and economic insecurities that fuel compensatory investments in white supremacy160—as well as developing more democratically accountable surveillance and public safety practices that can limit and respond to the inevitable far-right violence that does occur. The root drivers of far-right violence would not heal overnight, and ecosocialist security strategies that can limit and respond to this violence would be needed. Otherwise ecosocialisms-in-transition will find themselves beset with reactionary backlash, fear and doubt among populations, and internecine conflicts that risk destabilizing these transitions and forcing them back toward capitalism and its military-police assemblages. These problems remain insufficiently addressed by Marxists and others struggling for egalitarian postcapitalist futures, though a clear-sighted analysis of the possibility space requires that we bring them to the surface, ask difficult questions, and collectively develop creative solutions rather than skirting or downplaying the obstacles these movements would confront.161

#### That domestic unrest escalates to multiple scenarios for nuclear use---that’s Hymans

#### < FOR REFERENCE---1AC Hymans ---\*\*\*CAUTION: ACTUAL 1AC HIGHLIGHTING MAY NOT PERFECTLY MATCH, THIS IS JUST AN AID TO FIND THE RIGHT SECTIONS >

I have argued that nuclear-armed establishments are more dangerous than Meier and Vieluf suggest. Now I will also argue that nuclear-armed populists are dangerous for even more reasons than Meier and Vieluf enumerate.

Meier and Vieluf’s article does not do enough with its basic definition of nationalist populism as a black–white oppositional stance toward internal as well as external enemies. If we take that definition seriously, it becomes apparent that the biggest problem stemming from the rise of populists is not that they might ignore the advice of traditional nuclear and defense establishments and behave carelessly toward foreign powers. The biggest problem is that populism is a gateway drug to internal political violence, revolution, and civil war.12 And, perhaps needless to say, serious domestic upheaval in a nuclear power also increases the likelihood of a nuclear incident of some kind.

…

The domestic divisions fomented by populists do not have to arrive at their logical end point of revolution and civil war to increase deterrence instability and the chances of a nuclear incident. Below I elaborate three more specific hypotheses on the deterrence consequences of internally divisive populist governments. The hypotheses are speculative, but they logically follow from the definition of populism and should therefore serve as useful points for further discussion of Meier and Vieluf’s core idea.

…

The hypothesis that populists will demand concessions from their domestic political opponents in exchange for issuing nuclear-deterrent threats on their behalf may at first glance appear to be only a matter of internal politics, but the distractions caused by internal political wrangling could greatly affect the denouement of a time-sensitive nuclear crisis. Foreign powers could also be tempted to initiate a nuclear crisis precisely in order to intensify their adversary’s domestic divisions. In addition, when facing the double burden of a nuclear threat and simultaneous shakedown by the president, politicians from disfavored regions would likely appeal to friendly elements of the military for assistance. That possibility tees up the third hypothesis:

Hypothesis 3. The establishment’s reaction to populism is likely to increase deterrence instability at least as much as the actions of the populists themselves. Meier and Vieluf’s article implies that the fate of the world hangs on the establishment’s ability to keep populist fingers off the nuclear button. But the establishment’s effort to fend off the populists could itself dramatically increase deterrence instability, for instance by sowing confusion about the chain of command. This hypothesis is not mere speculation. Reacting to widespread fears that Trump might be tempted to launch a nuclear attack against China or another country after his 2020 election loss to Joe Biden, in January 2021, General Mark Milley, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, quietly worked the phone lines to reassure key people at home and abroad that he personally would not allow the president to do anything of the sort. The chairman of the Joint Chiefs is legally outside the chain of command for the execution of the president’s military strategy. Indeed, neither he nor anyone else has the legal authority to prevent a determined president from launching a nuclear strike.33 Yet Milley told Pelosi, “The president alone can order the use of nuclear weapons. But he doesn’t make the decision alone. One person can order it, several people have to launch it.” 34 Essentially, Milley was saying that if push came to shove, the military would mutiny. Meier and Vieluf seem to think that Milley did the right thing (pp. 15–16). Maybe so, but he also set an ominous precedent.

As I mentioned at the outset, these comments are simply intended to spark further discussion about the important issues raised by Meier and Vieluf’s stimulating article. I would be relieved to discover that I am being overly pessimistic about humanity’s chances of survival with either the establishments or the populists in charge of nuclear arsenals. But the more I study the issue, the more pessimistic I become.

#### AND, foreign cooption only magnifies their impacts and ensures existential global wars---that’s Richmond

#### < FOR REFERENCE---1AC Richmond ---\*\*\*CAUTION: ACTUAL 1AC HIGHLIGHTING MAY NOT PERFECTLY MATCH, THIS IS JUST AN AID TO FIND THE RIGHT SECTIONS >

While we are sympathetic to the underlying political intention of reordering global politics in more favor of historically exploited societies, this article challenges the assumption that the rising multipolar order is equipped or designed to achieve this goal. Postcolonial and decolonial critiques tend to highlight epistemological and methodological issues and ontological questions about the limitations of the LIO (i.e., the entanglement of the LIO with militarization, settler colonialism, and extractivism and its shortcomings regarding global justice issues). Yet such critiques tend to equate multipolarity with pluriversality and “…de-imperialization; de-racialization; de-patriarchization; de-corporatization; de-tribalization; and democratization…” (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2022, 105), despite the rise of regressive authoritarian alliances in the contemporary multipolar order. Indeed, such opaque arguments have captured the mantle of critique in some cases for Realpolitik, and reject the case for peace, peacemaking, or peacebuilding tools. Yet, this would mean that any new global order would be oriented around political power structures and security interests controlled by rising and regional powers, whereas human rights, democracy, and a rule of law may no longer be prioritized as global norms within the International Peace Architecture (IPA). This line of argument has parallels in the postcolonial literature on International Relations (IR), including in contributions by scholars like Samir (2019), and it has been directly invoked by world leaders from India’s President Modi, Brazilian President Lula to Russian President Putin (Chaudhury 2018). Historically this indicates a turning point though, since postcolonial and decolonial critique seems in danger of abandoning the political objectives of human rights and democracy that anticolonial leaders were striving for in the decolonization processes of the twentieth century (Getachew 2019).

From a critical perspective this juxtaposition of postcolonial claims and multipolarity reflects the unlikely notion that geopolitics, securitization, the balance of power, and other “multipolar” concepts and tools may be peace-oriented. This is in tension with the emancipatory goals of exposing and overcoming the violence and injustice hidden in systems of politics, economics, society, in global order, and subsequently reimaging political orders (Ndlovu-Gatsheni 2019; Richmond 2022). Since anti-western, revolutionary politics has a long history of substituting emancipation for autocracy (Levitsky and Way 2022), significant challenges to the LIO, liberal peace, and related democracy, rights, and justice orientations could follow the same path (Young 2024). Such a camouflaged and potentially regressive framework might idealise sovereignty and revive the old, long-discredited argument that peace can be equated with victory, power, and stability (Paris 2020, 454). Indeed, this framework might be described as a competing but as yet embryonic Authoritarian International Order (AIO) (Richmond 2025). Peace is required to align with power in these terms, rather than with critical issues of representation, justice, or sustainability.

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Under liberal internationalism, subaltern claims from the global south and conflict-affected societies were often poorly understood and marginalized (Comaroff and Comaroff 2012; Mishra 2012). The fragmentation under the multipolar order into distinct security spheres, however, renders subaltern mobilization in regions dominated by competing authoritarian regimes increasingly precarious. Indeed, multipolarity and its constraint of the IPA has enabled the violent oppression of emancipatory subaltern claims (Allinson 2022). From Venezuela to Myanmar, Egypt, Bahrain, Syria, Yemen, and Libya, fierce states have received support from rising authoritarian powers for their oppression of peaceful mass mobilization.

…

In many cases in which international actors did not build strong alliances with civil society to curb the power of military leaders (such as in Mali, Myanmar, Egypt, Central African Republic, Sudan, Burkina Faso, and Niger), the invocation of the state of exception went together with backsliding into authoritarianism (Tokmajyan 2024; Haggard and Kaufman 2021, 208–33; Jett 2023).

…

Local populations’ resilience in such circumstances has little to offer in terms of security, or in tackling the structural root causes of conflict or achieving sustainability (Chandler 2020).

…

The devastating consequences of the competition between different authoritarian orders in the Middle East and North Africa since 2011 might serve as a warning for those romanticising the end of liberal internationalism: Syria, Libya, and Yemen have been reduced to war-ravaged and territorially fractured shells (Allinson 2022). In Syria, an inclusive UNled peace process was replaced with a Russian-led process, devoid of an engagement with root causes, reconciliation, or any pretence of offering more to local subjects than bare life (Hellmüller 2020; Adleh and Favier 2017).

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Furthermore, the localization, decentralization, and federalist impulses of democratization, also connected to social movements and resistance (Zanden 1959; Vinthagen 2015), has led to weak centralized global authority, which cannot support global efforts to align around far-flung peace efforts. It also cannot oppose the return of the authoritarian, “fierce” state, and has diluted the link between scholarship and foreign policy, which was always prone to ideological contestation in any case, opening the way for atavistic geopolitics. This has undermined peacemaking, and the vacuum that has been left behind has increasingly been occupied by conservative (if not reactionary) views of the state and international order (Paris 2020; Butler 2018).

#### Fiating through all that by imagining the USFG---or foreign governments---are ideologically aligned is a voter---necessarily plan-plus (imagining Trump simply stops attacking ideologically non-aligned subordinates is an interp of the plan text) AND nullifies all comparative lit, rigging the game and voiding any pedagogical benefit

### Cap K---Sust---2AC

#### Studies of 208 countries over the last 30 years prove decoupling is possible---and EKC is true

-EKC being true means alt causes their impacts

-Condensed portion are explaining methodology and intent of the study

Tariq et al. 24 [Muhammad Tariq, PhD researcher at Southeast University, PhD Applied Economics, Southeast University; Yingzhi **Xu**, Professor in the School of Economics and Management at Southeast University; Kifayat **Ullah**, Professor in the Department of Economics at Karakoram International University; and Biying **Dong**, Professor in the School of Economics and Management at Southeast University; “Toward low‐carbon emissions and green growth for sustainable development in emerging economies: Do green trade openness, eco‐innovation, and carbon price matter?” Sustainable Development, 32(1), February 2024, pp.959-978, DOI 10.1002/sd.2711]

[Tables Omitted]

Due to substantial development in emerging economies over the last three decades, climate complexities are increasing which have posed serious threats to environmental quality and sustainability. To this end, eco-innovation, green trade openness (GTO), and carbon price have been recognized as effective tools for environmental mitigation and promotion of green growth (GG) in the core of COP 26, Sustainable Development Goals 2030, and Carbon Neutrality by 2060. Considering this, the aim of this study is to investigate the influence of eco-innovation, GTO, and carbon price on GG [Green Growth] and low-carbon emissions in emerging economies over the period 1996–2021. The current study provides a standard green Solow growth model by introducing a new GG index using the entropy weight method. This index incorporates 30 indicators across five dimensions which emphasizes the essential roles of the investigated factor. Additionally, the current study provides a new index for GTO utilizing an extensive green trading basket of 255 commodities. Due to the cross-sectional dependency, and slope heterogeneity in the models, this study used dynamic heterogeneous panel data estimation techniques that is, cross-sectional based augmented nonlinear autoregressive distributed lag, and nonlinear augmented mean group to probe the asymmetric effects. The outcomes from the empirical analysis reveal that positive shocks in environmental innovation, GTO, carbon price, and green energy mitigate carbon emissions and promote green economic growth while the negative shocks in these variables cause environmental degradation and reduce GG in emerging economies. Finally, from policy insight, this study suggests that policy makers in emerging economies should invigorate GTO, stimulate environmental innovation and green energy, implement carbon price mechanisms, and establish a balance between environmental protection and economic growth.

[CONDENSED FOR READABILITY]

1 INTRODUCTION Considering the Paris COP26 Conference, environmental sustainability in major economies has remained a contentious topic in policy discussions. Undoubtedly, economic growth is a necessary condition for every nation's social and economic development since it increases income levels, improves health and educational outcomes, and raises its population's living standards. Similarly, brown economic growth poses serious threats to ecological sustainability as economies compromise their natural resource deposits during the growing phase. Brown growth produces significant solid and manufacturing waste and other soil, water, and air issues, ultimately leading to environmental deterioration which has recently witnessed in emerging economies (Danish Ulucak & Khan, [2020](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0022)). Emerging market economies (EMEs) have enjoyed remarkable growth in recent decades however, this over growth in population and output in most of these economies have raised strains within environment and natural resources (Balsalobre-Lorente, Driha, et al., [2022](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0010)). Due to the decreasing quality and quantity of natural ecosystems, the world has started to recognize the need to switch from the conventional economic growth perspective to a sustainable development glimpse (Fatai Adedoyin et al., [2021](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0029)). Green growth (GG) is a concept which is intimately associated to sustainable development in which economies delve and encourage economic progress without vitiate the environment, yet rather by preserving it OCED. Considering the consequences of climate change and the deterioration of the environment, there has been a significant emphasis on environment friendly growth. Several organizations and institutions, namely, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the World Bank (WB), the United Nations Department of Economics and Social Affairs for Sustainable Development, and the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific, are concerned about the green economic growth. Current study appraises influences by eco-innovations, green trade openness (GTO), carbon price, and green energy on GG and low-carbon emissions in emerging countries. One of the decisive factors affecting greenhouse gas emissions is international trade, which is a substantial economic action, because it increases economic growth and the exchange of goods and services. In contrast, increase in trade leads to significant increase in energy consumption and other resources utilization, which put tremendous strain on the ecosystem resilience. Considering the injurious impacts of trade, it might be claimed that creating a green economy could support reducing environmental deterioration and achieving carbon neutrality (Can et al., [2021](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0016)). Though, green trade is an essential factor for rapid green economic growth by boosting the country's economic progress, reducing greenhouse gas emissions, expanding industrial production processes, improving the effectiveness of energy sources, and increasing trade volume via trade liberalization and global integration (Ahmed et al., [2021](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0001); Alam & Sumon, [2020](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0006)). Nonetheless, the global proliferation of a green economy is difficult to achieve without the world trade of eco-friendly goods. It is expected that the usage of these goods would significantly improve environmental trait. On the other hand, green technological innovations may also play a supportive role in green development. Without green technological improvements, the faster GG is impervious (Umar et al., [2021](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0072)). These advancements not only instigate cheaper and eco-friendly technology besides lower the cost of ecological sustainability. It also increases production efficiency and encourages the preservation of natural resources by reducing CO2 emissions. The main forces behind green economic growth, the green energy sources also maintain ecological sustainability and macroeconomic efficiency (Li et al., [2021](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0049)). Along with advancements in green energy, and wastewater treatment, eco-innovation processes also include clean and sustainable food production and other areas that are thought to be major drivers of economic growth and environmental sustainability (Chen et al., [2022](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0017)). In similar lines, technological investment and acceleration of research and development of energy saving technologies promote sustainable development (Li, Dong, & Dong, [2022](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0047)). Moreover, green innovations reduce the strain on the country's balance of payments and minimize dependency on imported fossil resources (Sohag et al., [2019](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0064); Usman & Hammar, [2021](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0074)). Besides, this research also evaluates the importance of carbon price/tax for green economic growth and low-carbon emissions in EMEs. There is widespread agreement among major nations, environmentalists, and policymakers on the need to establish new policy guidelines to address the ecological challenges posed by environmental degradation. A rising amount of the present literature has centered empirical study on carbon pricing in order to create the most recent environmental policy recommendations (Doğan et al., [2022](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0024)). Based on the percentage of emissions in a polluting fuel, governments across the globe levy carbon taxes (one of the most effective prices to decrease carbon dioxide emissions) on those fuels (Ojha et al., [2020](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0055)). Researchers advocated recycling carbon price income (i.e., transferring the cash earned from carbon price/tax on fossil fuel-based energy to renewable projects as subsidized) to encourage green economic growth and environmental sustainability (Hao et al., [2021](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0033); Ojha et al., [2020](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0055)). Thus, we can conclude from the above debates that the concerns about the environment and sustainable development are receiving a lot of attention worldwide (Jiang et al., [2022](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0043)). Global efforts are being made to change economic and industrial structures to promote green economic growth that is ecologically adjusted and green in nature. For a while, studies on the major forces behind GG have captivated the attention of academics and policymakers. GG strategies can achieve economic development and environmental sustainability rather than mutually exclusive therefore, it is need of the day to adopt certain approaches that ensure and safeguard environmental sustainability during the long-term growth process in emerging economies. The current research concentrates on EMEs because, during the past few decades, these economies have witnessed exceptional growth. However, present economic and population growth trends in most of these economies have raised strains on the environment and natural resources. The present study has focused on the need to move towards a development path that avoids enslaving ecologically destructive infrastructure and leaving a legacy of costly environmental damage and resource depletion. The current study has fundamental objectives in terms of practical relevance to the literature, theory, and policy implications for EMEs e.g., (1) To examine the nonlinear impacts of GTO, eco-innovation, and carbon price on GG in EMEs. (2) To examine the nonlinear impacts of these factors on CEs in EMEs. (3) To test the validation of the EKC hypothesis in EMEs. The main contributions of the current study in the literature are as follows: i. This study attempts to discover the dynamic 4G (GG, trade, energy, and innovation) nexus for emerging countries since the 4G nexus is essential for emerging economies to attain socioeconomic and environmental sustainability. ii. This study provides a systematic framework of a classical Green Solow growth model that highlights the essential role of green innovation, green energy, and green trade in driving GG. Even though the concept of GG has been widely discussed for some time, the development of a GG index is still in its initial stages. The current study contributes to the construction of a new GG index with the combination of 30 indicators from five dimensions (i.e., environmental and resources based, natural asset base, environmental quality of life, economic opportunities and policy responses, and the socioeconomic context and characteristics of growth) proposed by OCED and (GGGI, [2020](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0031)). These are the best possible and most reliable indicators that are capable of monitoring key features of GG while also being representative of a wider set of GG challenges. iii. To the greatest of the authors' knowledge, this research will be the first to use an indicator to measure the influence of GTO on GG and low-carbon emissions in a holistic approach across a group of emerging economies. Most of the previous studies used conventional environmental goods for the green trade index. While some studies used individual green traded products to capture green trade indicator, but the GTO index generated in this study is based on both traditional environmental goods and eco-friendly products. This research expands the on study of Can et al. ([2021](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0016)) to construct a new green openness index using 255 green goods of EMEs. As a result, policymakers in emerging economies may take advantage of developing policies to boost local GG and rationally adjust the international trade structure. iv. The current study fills the gap in the current body of knowledge by incorporating asymmetric short and long run links of the selected explanatory variables to capture their positive and negative effects on the achievements of GG and low-carbon emissions for the sample countries. To this end, we employed newly developed cross-sectional augmented nonlinear ARDL (CS-NARDL) and nonlinear augmented mean group (NAMG) techniques to supplement the literature on GG and low-carbon emissions. The remaining sections of the paper are carried out as follows. Part 2 provides some useful insights from the existing research. In part 3, we address the analytical and theoretical framework, data, and methods. In Section [4](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-sec-0013), we analyze and explain the empirical findings of the study. Finally, the study's conclusion and policy consequences are presented in Section [5](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-sec-0014). 2 LITERATURE REVIEW To provide an in-depth assessment of the current study, we divided this review into subsections that examine GG, environmental quality, GTO, eco-innovation, and carbon price. 2.1 Research on GTO, GG, and CEs In the recent past, nations and economies have become increasingly interested in expanding their international interactions. consequently, human activities linked to the consumption of energy and extraction of natural assets have become more prevalent and detrimental to environmental quality (Rafei et al., [2022](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0060)). Several studies have examined the association among trade, economic growth, and ecological sustainability. In light of this, Ahmed et al. ([2021](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0001)) investigated the connotation between green energy generation, technical advancements, trade, and economic growth for South Asian economies (SAE). Based on the research results, the researchers concluded that green trade had made significant contributions to SAE's green economic growth. Likewise, Li et al., ([2022](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0048)) found a positive long-run association between green trade and green economic growth for China and proposed long-term global integration of the nations to strengthen the production of green goods. Similarly, Liu et al. ([2022](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0051)) utilizes a Chinese city-level panel dataset to investigate how green good exports affect the green total factor productivity (GTFP). The results suggest that green products export hamper China's sustainable growth. Conventional green goods for resolving environmental problems considerably reduce GTFP. Furthermore, Alam and Sumon ([2020](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0006)), and Keho ([2017](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0044)) discovered that international trade had a favorable impact on economic growth. Similarly, Li et al., ([2022](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0050)) concluded that substitution of renewable energy sources in the production process and trade openness contribute to the reduction of global CEs and promote economic growth. The authors also investigated how GTO influences CEs. To this backdrop, Ali et al. ([2020](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0007)) studied how different types of trade impact greenhouse gas emissions for OIC countries. The study discovered that green trade substantially cuts greenhouse gas emissions. For the top 10 green future economies Wei et al. ([2023](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0084)) considered the impact of green trade on environmental quality and findings showed that green trade boost quality of the environment. Research related to the impact of international trade on CEs yielded contradictory findings. Some scholars, for example, Rehman et al. ([2021](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0062)) and Ullah et al. ([2022](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0071)) using ARDL findings in the Pakistan economy context, found positive and fruitful relationships exist between globalization, energy consumption, and international trade, and ecological footprint. Concerning South African economies, Udeagha and Ngepah ([2019](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0070)) explored the link between trade openness and discovered a positive short-run relationship but a negative correlation in the long run. Mensah et al. ([2018](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0052)) showed that international trade, urbanization, and energy use are the primary contributors to environmental deterioration in China. Duan and Jiang ([2017](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0026)) discovered similar sorts of findings in their analysis for the Chinese economy. Another study analyzed the impact of international trade on CEs. It was concluded that international trade boosts economic activity by accelerating the movement of goods and services. But, as a consequence of globalization, nations now require greater resources. Also, trade openness encourages nations to relocate industries with high-pollution levels, which has a significant negative impact on the environment (Wang et al., [2023](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0080)). 2.2 Eco-innovation, GG, and CEs Several empirical research Ahmed et al. ([2021](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0001)); Hao et al. ([2021](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0033)) and Sohag et al. ([2019](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0064)), demonstrated a positive and substantial relationship among eco-innovations and green economic growth. Sohag et al. ([2019](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0064)) highlighted financial sector reforms to support green technologies and sustainable development. Eco-innovations are the most appropriate mechanism for boosting living standards and ensuring social sustainability. They achieve this by effectively and efficiently using limited resources (Klewitz & Hansen, [2014](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0046)). Ahmed et al. ([2021](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0001)) examined the connection between advancements in technology and green economic growth from the perspective of South Asian countries and found that green technological advances contribute to green economic growth by acknowledging several environmental issues like the reduction of carbon dioxide emissions. Similar findings were made by Padilla-Pérez and Gaudin ([2014](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0056)), who found a significant and positive correlation among technology, science inventions and the rate of green economic growth in Central American nations. Green technological advancements improve the energy sector and reduce CEs, which promote long-term growth (Chen et al., [2016](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0018); Guo et al., [2020](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0032)). Contradictory findings were found in the literature on how technological innovation affects CEs. In the case of the Middle East and West Asian economies, Kihombo et al. ([2021](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0045)) investigated that how technological advancements decrease environmental impact and accelerate economic growth? The authors concluded that green innovations reduce CEs. Similarly, Ahmed et al. ([2021](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0001)) proposed that although the expansion of energy resources and economic growth increase the ecological footprint, technological advancement is crucial in the long run to maintain environmental sustainability. Their research findings in emerging economies supported this assertion. Usman and Hammar ([2021](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0074)), on the other hand, for Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) countries discovered that technological innovations enhance the ecological footprints. Furthermore, Destek and Manga ([2021](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0023)) found that technological advancements have greatly reduced CEs but were ineffectual in falling ecological footprint for the large emerging market economies. Bekun ([2022](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0012)) suggested for Indian policymakers that they must provide incentives for reducing CEs, tax breaks, and other forms of financial support to companies that produce appropriate green energy technologies. 2.3 Research on the carbon price, GG, and CEs In recent decades, most of the world's economies have adopted a low carbon inclusive growth policy, with carbon taxes serving as the most direct mean of reducing CEs. Although a carbon price is an efficient instrument for reducing CEs, it also slows economic growth. Hence, a trade-off exists between the carbon price and GDP growth (Ojha et al., [2020](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0055)). Bi et al. ([2019](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0013)) discovered that, in the short term, carbon taxes significantly impacted China's economic growth while reducing carbon mitigation; however, both impacts were mitigated in the long run. A plethora of empirical studies Pal et al. ([2015](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0057)) and Ojha ([2009](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0054)) suggested that while carbon pricing is an effective mechanism for reducing CEs, it also decreases the country's economic progress. Researchers proposed carbon price revenue recycling (transferring income generated by carbon price/tax on fossil energy fuels such as coal, gas, and crude oil to green energy projects such as hydro, solar, wind, geothermal, and biomass, among others, as a subsidy) to enhance inclusive green economic growth (Gerlagh & Van der Zwaan, [2006](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0030)). The main purpose of levying a carbon tax/price on fossil fuels based on their carbon level is to assure ecological safety and sustainability. Tariq and Xu ([2022](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0068)), and Hao et al. ([2021](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0033)) examined the crucial role of carbon pricing on CO2 emissions in G-7 countries and discovered that carbon price is significantly reduced CO2 emissions; thus, these economies must concentrate on ecological pricing policies through taxation as well as green economic growth at the same time. Although most of the research reviewed in the literature showed the negative impact of carbon prices on pollutant emissions and the positive impact on environmental quality. Few studies, such as Wier et al. ([2005](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0086)) discovered evidence suggesting carbon prices slightly stimulate CO2 emissions. 2.4 Literature gaps Summarizing the current research literature, the results related to the GG and environmental impacts of green openness, eco-innovation, carbon price, and green energy were found to be sensitive to different research approaches, and there are still several shortcomings in the previous research studies. As we know from the literature, few studies focused on the relationship between green energy and GG. Although, few scholars have investigated the relationship between sustainable economic development and green innovations for the sample countries under investigation. To the best of our knowledge, no research has looked at the 4G (GG, trade, energy, and innovation) nexus for emerging countries since the 4G nexus is essential for emerging economies to attain socioeconomic and environmental sustainability. Although “GG” has been debated for some decades, an actual “GG index” has yet to be developed for emerging economies. In the academic literature, there is no generally agreed-upon single aggregate index of GG. However, in the present study, we have tried to develop a GG index that included the best and most reliable indicators from the five dimensions of GG. Furthermore, the majority of earlier studies relied on proxies to measure the worth of eco-friendly goods in a certain region, including applications for patents, and technical advancements, while some studies used individual green traded products to capture green trade indicators. However, the current study is relied on both traditional environmental goods and eco-friendly products, using 255 products in total from OECD combined list of environmental goods (CLEG) list, which is the largest basket of green products. Additionally, the results of the available studies are inconsistent and contradictory for a number of reasons, one of which could be the analytical methods. The studies mostly ignore the asymmetrical dynamic long and short-term links among the selected variables and assume symmetric relationships between green openness, eco-innovations, carbon price, GG, and CEs. Whereas, asymmetric empirical findings solve the shortcomings of responsiveness and interpretations of linear estimated approaches and can offset spurious impacts of independently targeted determinants on outcome indicators. 3 THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK, DATA, AND METHODOLOGY 3.1 Theoretical framework In literature, few studies have tried to appraise the connections between low-carbon emissions, GG, carbon price, and GTO. This section describes how “eco-innovations, green openness, carbon price, and green energy contribute to green economic growth”. From the limited literature we conclude that, in order to promote economic growth while addressing environmental issues, green economic growth is recognized as an effective strategy. To study the basic analytical pathway of the influence of green openness, green technological innovations, carbon price, and green energy consumption on green economic growth and low-carbon emissions, the present study designed neoclassical Green Solow growth model in accordance with (Brock & Taylor, [2010](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0015)). Though our emissions function has differed from the formulation of Brock and Taylor, we believe that our approach is conceptually much more straightforward and esthetically better. The cobb–Douglas production function is supposed to provide the functional form followed by (Huang & Quibria, [2013](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0037)): 𝑄=AK𝛼⁢𝐿1−𝛼,(1) where in the above equation, Q is output, K is capital, L is labor, and A represents the total factor productivity that represents the percentage change in output due to changes other than labor and capital. Equation ([1](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-disp-0001)) can also be written in an intense form as: 𝑞=Ak𝛼,(2) here q = Q/L represents gross productivity per worker and 𝑘 = K/L represents capital per worker. Since it is commonly recognized, (0<𝛼<1), suggests that the production per worker has diminishing returns. Given by, the (net) output is: γ𝑦=𝑞⁢(1−γ),(3) where y = Y/L is denoted by per worker net output; and γαγ=α symbolized a set fraction of the domestic (gross) product that is committed to emission control. We may write down the equation for capital accumulation as: γ𝜕𝑘𝜕𝑡=sAk𝛼⁢(1−γ)−(𝜎+𝑛).(4) Capital per worker productivity change is 𝜕𝑘𝜕𝑡. An amount of the net product is expected to be set aside for future investment. On the independent side, γsAk𝛼⁢(1−γ) stands for gross investment, whereas (𝜎+𝑛) is the combination of the depreciation rate of capital and the population size of the labor force. Assuming the following emission function regarding pollution, we have followed (Eriksson, [2013](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0028); Huang & Quibria, [2013](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0037)); ℇ𝓅ℇℇ𝑖,𝑡=pℇ𝑖,𝑡⁢𝑞𝑖,𝑡𝐴⁢𝐹,(5) on the left-hand side of the above equations, it is presumed that cumulative pollution from all economic sectors indicated by, ℇℇ𝑖,𝑡, with the share of emissions attributed to economic activity denoted by, 𝓅ℇpℇ𝑖,𝑡, whereas, 𝑞𝑖,𝑡, represents the output of that economy. In addition, we presume that emission reduction correlates negatively with technological progress. As suggested by (Huang & Quibria, [2013](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0037)), the greater amount of technology, 𝐴, denotes green technologies. Moreover, we presume that technology advances at a rate of 𝜗 due to exogenous factors, alternatively expressed by 𝐴̂=𝜗. Lastly, it is expected that emissions will be reduced when resources are dedicated to mitigation. We have presumed that a constant fraction of economic output, 𝐹, is allocated to abatement. Following is the abatement mechanism: γ𝐹=(γ⁢𝑞)𝜇,𝜇>0<1.(6) Equation ([6](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-disp-0006)) indicates that spending on environmental protection measures has a positive but declining influence on abatement. The previous studies are compatible with this reasonable assumption. The capital accumulation Equation ([4](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-disp-0004)) suggests equaling zero.[1](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-note-0001_note_0) As a result, the steady-state equation 𝑘\* is as follows: γ𝑘\*=sA⁢(1−γ)(𝜎+𝑛)1/(1−𝑎),(7) the above Equation [7](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-disp-0007) shows that the steady-state 𝑘\* decreases as the fraction of output allocated to mitigation increases. The steady-state per capita income (y) declines as 𝑘\* declines. This does not affect the growth rate of the steady-state. Afterward, we will establish a relationship between the Solow steady-state and the EKC. But to perform so, take into consideration Equation ([5](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-disp-0005)). The following is derived by substituting γ𝐹=(γ⁢𝑞)𝜇 from Equation ([6](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-disp-0006)) into Equation ([5](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-disp-0005)) and simplifying: ℇ𝓅ℇγℇ𝑖,𝑡=pℇ𝑖,𝑡⁢𝑘(1−𝜇)/𝑎𝐴𝑖,𝑡𝜇⁢γ𝜇,(8) by differentiating and simplifying Equation ([8](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-disp-0008)) with respect to time, we obtain the equation given below. ℇ𝓅ℇγℇ~𝑖,𝑡=pℇ~𝑖,𝑡+(1−𝜇)⁢𝛼⁢𝑘~𝑖,𝑡−𝜇⁢𝐴~𝑖,𝑡−𝜇⁢γ~𝑖,𝑡.(9) This could also be modified as follows: ℇ𝓅ℇγℇ~𝑖,𝑡=pℇ~𝑖,𝑡+(1−𝜇)⁢𝛼⁢𝑘~𝑖,𝑡−𝜇⁢𝜗𝑖,𝑡−𝜇⁢γ~𝑖,𝑡.(10) Equation [10](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-disp-0010) shows that the emission growth (ℇℇ~𝑖,𝑡) is inversely connected to technical advancement (𝜇⁢𝜗𝑖,𝑡) in addition to a rise in the abatement expenditures rate. Meaning that if improve in environmentally friendly technological progress and increase expenditures on abetment (γ𝜇⁢γ~𝑖,𝑡) will lead to decrease in the growth rate of total emissions (Hao et al., [2021](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0033)). Ceteris paribus, the emission curve precisely replicates the basic equation of the Solow growth model and provides the Environmental Kuznets Curve. According to the Equation [10](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-disp-0010), the economy can only experience to long run GG in the situation that the following conditions occurred: First: ℇ𝓅ℇγℇ~𝑖,𝑡=−𝜇⁢𝜗𝑖,𝑡<0,if and only if𝑘~𝑖,𝑡=pℇ~𝑖,𝑡=γ~𝑖,𝑡=0.(11) This proposes that if eco-innovation occurs, the EKC will attain its negatively sloped section even before the model obtains the Solow steady-state equilibrium, Ceteris paribus. Therefore, when there is an increase in the expenditure on abatement, γγ~𝑖,𝑡, or if Eco-innovation improves, 𝜇⁢𝜗𝑖,𝑡, the turning point of the EKC will come quicker; Second: ℇℇ~𝑖,𝑡=(1−𝜇)⁢𝛼⁢𝑘~𝑖,𝑡−𝜇⁢𝜗𝑖,𝑡=0,if and only if𝑘~𝑖,𝑡=𝜇⁢𝜗𝑖,𝑡(1−𝜇)⁢𝛼>0.(12) This suggests that if the capital per worker growth rate or level of income falls below the appropriate Solow steady-state growth thresholds, the emissions growth rate becomes zero. It is evident from the theoretical background that green economic growth is possible if more resources are allocated to research and development initiatives to improve eco-innovation and in order to meet carbon neutrality goals, authorities should announce a long-term comprehensive approach for boosting the trading of environmentally friendly goods and also increase the environmental taxes it will encourage to that work to guarantee a healthy environment while also increasing economic growth. Based on the theoretical concept, this study provides the following appropriate functional forms, which will be empirically examined. CEit=𝑓⁡(EIit,GTOit,CPit,GEit,GDPit,GDPit2),(13) GGit=𝑓⁡(EIit,GTOit,CPit,GEit,GDPit,GDPit2),(14) where from Equations ([13](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-disp-0013)) and ([14](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-disp-0014)), (CE) denotes “carbon emissions,” “GG,” “GTO,” “carbon price (CP),” “eco-innovation (EI),” “green energy consumption (GE),” “per capita gross domestic product (GDP),” “per capita GDP square (GDP2).” We extend Equations [13](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-disp-0013) and [14](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-disp-0014) to the subsequent empirical equations. CEit=𝜆𝑖+𝜆1⁢EI𝑖⁢t+𝜆2⁢GTOit+𝜆3⁢CPit+𝜆4⁢GEit+𝜆5⁢GDPit+𝜆6⁢GDPit2+𝜀it,(15) GGit=𝜆𝑖+𝜆1⁢EIit+𝜆2⁢GTOit+𝜆3⁢CPit+𝜆4⁢GEit+𝜆5⁢GDPit+𝜆6⁢GDPit2+𝜀it,(16) where “⁢𝑖” represent a cross-section (e.g., emerging economies) and 𝜆 represents constant, “⁢𝜆1, 𝜆2, 𝜆3, 𝜆4,and𝜆5” denotes the slope coefficients of all independent variables, while “⁢𝑡” represents the timeframe of the study. 3.2 Variables and data The present study examines the role of green openness, eco-innovations, carbon price, and green energy for the low-carbon emissions and GG in top 12 EMEs, where BRIICS economies are also included.[2](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-note-0002_note_1) Based on the availability of data for all indicators, this study covers the period from 1996 to 2021. Following are the operational definitions of key variables. 3.2.1 GG index GG is the primary explained variable in our study. It is hard to measure GG using a single composite index. Given the availability of data at the country level, we decided to create a new GG index using 5 dimensions and 30 indicators. For this purpose, the authors combined the list of GG dimensions and indicators proposed by OCED and (GGGI, [2020](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0031)) to offer the best feasible and most reliable indicators capable of monitoring important aspects of GG as well as reflective of a larger set of GG subjects. These suggested dimensions are divided into the following five categories: (i) natural asset basis, (ii) environmental and resource productivity, (iii) economic opportunities, (iv) socio-economic context and features of growth, and (v) the environmental quality of life. Detailed explanations of each indicator and dimensions for GG index are presented in Table [B1](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-tbl-0007) in the Appendix [B](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-app-0002). To construct an index, we must figure out the weights of the variables using a certain approach. Consistent techniques are required to measure the comprehensive performance of GG, and the weighting for indicators is a challenge that every approach must solve. Thus, the current study opted for the entropy weight technique to allocate emphasis across several indicators. The entropy weight technique is a useful tool for describing both certainties and unknowns. In addition, entropy weight can increase the neutrality of the decision-making process and reduce the chance of errors (Du et al., [2021](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0025); Wang et al., [2020](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0081)). The composite index we developed may represent GG levels from the perspective of all 30 indicators. Detailed methodology of the entropy weight method is presented in Appendix [A](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-app-0001). 3.2.2 GTO index Literature has no consensus on a typical green goods basket. Various organizations categorize several products as environment-friendly goods. Since some product lists include certain items, other product baskets may not contain the same items. However, all other green product baskets are covered under the OECD's CLEG. The “Friends List” issued by the World Trade Organization (WTO, [2009](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0088)) as well as the “plurilateral agreement on environmental goods and services” list made public by the OECD and APEC are both included in the CLEG basket (APEC, [2012](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0009)). The current study used 255 trading goods on the OECD CLEG list, the largest basket of green products. To construct a new GTO index for the top 12 emerging market economies the study used following formula, followed by (Can et al., [2021](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0016)). GTO𝑖,𝑡=(GIMP𝑖,𝑡+GEXP𝑖,𝑡GDP𝑖,𝑡)×100,(17) where GTO𝑖,𝑡, GIMP𝑖,𝑡, GEXP𝑖,𝑡, and GDP𝑖,𝑡 denote GTO, total environmentally friendly products imported, total environmentally friendly goods exported, and gross domestic product in the country respectively. The index is calculated from 1996 to 2021 based on the data availability from OECD database and the UN comtrade database. Appendix [C](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-app-0003), Table [C1](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-tbl-0008) provided the detailed list of Hs number of each environment friendly good. Table [1](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-tbl-0001) shows the data sources, acronyms, and measurement units. Except for indices of GG and GTO, all variables are converted into log form prior to performing the empirical analysis. TABLE 1. Variables, measurement, and sources [TABLE OMITTED] Figure [1](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-fig-0001) illustrates the average rates of GG and CEs for the countries under consideration from 1996 to 2021. China has the highest GG and CEs followed by other EMEs. India, on the other hand, ranks second in terms of CEs but has the lowest green economic growth, while Hungary, Greece, and the Czech Republic are the lowest polluters. This suggests that these two nations have made progress in decreasing the adverse impacts on the environment, as their CEs are lower than the other economies. It also indicates that environmental sustainability still remains an issue in most of EMEs. With the exception of Hungary, Greece, and the Czech Republic, these nations are experiencing deeply alarming situations that pose high consequences to the lives and health of their inhabitants. [GRAPH OMITTED] FIGURE 1 In-country Average green growth and, carbon emissions, 1996–2021. The right panel of the Figure [2](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-fig-0002) shows average GTO and eco-innovation, while the left panel shows carbon price and green energy for EMEs. Hungary is leading in terms of GTO followed by other economies. In contrast, economies including India, Brazil, Greece, South Africa, and Turkey have relatively lower GTO. Interestingly, the illustration shows that all the economies have higher eco-innovation capacity compared to GTO, indicating that they have progressed further in adopting innovative techniques and innovations for environmental sustainability. Besides, the majority of EMEs in the left panel have offered strong support for the transition to green energy, which can be attributed to both eco-innovation and the declining cost of green sources. The carbon price is relatively low (Figure [2](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-fig-0002)), which is important for sustainable development. Increase in carbon price may motivate industries to invest in developing low-carbon technology, which would boost productivity and promote environmental quality. [GRAPH OMITTED] FIGURE 2 In-country Average green trade openness, eco-innovation, carbon price, and green energy, 1996–2021. Summary of the box plot for the variables under consideration from 1996 to 2021 is illustrated in Figure [3](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-fig-0003). [GRAPH OMITTED] FIGURE 3 Summarize of the box plot for the variables under consideration: GG𝑖,𝑡,CE𝑖,𝑡,GTO𝑖,𝑡,EI𝑖,𝑡,CP𝑖,𝑡,andGEC𝑖,𝑡. 3.3 Empirical methodology While doing empirical estimations using panel data, it is crucial to determine cross-sectional dependency. Traditional panel data estimation methods are inconsistent due to cross-section dependency, caused by the growing interconnectivity of social and economic structures and by unexpected common shocks (Hao et al., [2021](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0033)). Thus, depending on methods that presume cross-sectional independence might lead to misguided results. The study under investigation employed LM test to check cross-sectional dependence (CD) with biased adjustment developed by (Breitung & Pesaran, [2008](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0014)) and the (Pesaran, [2015](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0059)) CSD test to confirm whether to apply first generation unit root or second-generation unit root tests for stationarity of the variables. In this context, we utilized the CADF, CIPS, and IPS unit root tests proposed by (Pesaran, [2007](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0058)). Prior to move further with empirical estimations, the present study also employed cross-country slope homogeneity test developed by (Swamy, [1970](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0066)) and (Hashem Pesaran & Yamagata, [2008](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0034)) to prevent the errors associated with erroneously assuming slope homogeneity. The long-run relationship between variables in both GG and CE models are investigated in this study using the (Westerlund, [2007](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0085)) co-integration test. Since it is effective with models exhibiting slope heterogeneity, this test is most relevant. In addition, this test also accounts for cross-sectional dependencies. 3.3.1 CS-NARDL model In this study, we developed an ingenious econometric technique called the CS-NARDL model based on CS-ARDL developed by (Chudik & Pesaran, [2015](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0020)) which is an improved variant of the pooled mean group-NARDL model. There are several advantages of using the CS-NARDL method instead of alternative approaches. To begin, this technique allows us to obtain both short-run and long-run estimates simultaneously. Second, we may include the variables that are integrated at different orders, in the analysis without having to do a preunit root test initially. Third, the cross-sectional dependency and slope heterogeneous issues are solved by using this technique. Furthermore, asymmetric empirical methodology resolves the shortcomings of responsiveness and interpretations of linear estimated approaches and can offset spurious impacts of independently targeted determinants on outcome indicators. Additionally, since the dynamic relationships between the specified series are impacted by a variety of factors, including political, social, and economic contexts, depending just on the symmetric correlation may result in poor policy decisions. Therefore, it is still crucial to separate the effects of negative and positive shocks in the dynamic series to identify their various effects on the performance of GG and CEs in EMEs. Finally, this estimation technique provides both long and short-run positive and negative shock coefficients. The assumption behind the CS-ARDL model is that the independent variables have symmetric influences on dependent variable. However, our prime objective is to modify the equation of CS-ARDL, so that we may examine the asymmetric impacts of independent variables on dependent variables. Accordingly, we need to generate new variables, as given below: GTO𝑖,𝑡+=∑𝑛=1𝑡∆GTO𝑖,𝑡+=∑𝑛=1𝑡max⁡(∆GTO𝑖,𝑡+,0)GTO𝑖,𝑡−=∑𝑛=1𝑡∆GTO𝑖,𝑡−=∑𝑛=1𝑡min⁡(∆GTO𝑖,𝑡−,0),(18) CP𝑖,𝑡+=∑𝑛=1𝑡∆CP𝑖,𝑡+=∑𝑛=1𝑡max⁡(∆CP𝑖,𝑡+,0)CP𝑖,𝑡−=∑𝑛=1𝑡∆CP𝑖,𝑡−=∑𝑛=1𝑡min⁡(∆CP𝑖,𝑡−,0),(19) EI𝑖,𝑡+=∑𝑛=1𝑡∆EI𝑖,𝑡+=∑𝑛=1𝑡max⁡(∆EI𝑖,𝑡+,0)EI𝑖,𝑡−=∑𝑛=1𝑡∆EI𝑖,𝑡−=∑𝑛=1𝑡min⁡(∆EI𝑖,𝑡−,0),(20) where GTO𝑖,𝑡+, GTO𝑖,𝑡−, CP𝑖,𝑡+, CP𝑖,𝑡−, EI𝑖,𝑡+, and EI𝑖,𝑡− are represents the positive and negative shocks of the variables. Following Sohail et al. ([2022](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0065)); Tariq et al. ([2019](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0069)) and Wang, Huang, et al. ([2022](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0078)), we Substitute the positive as well as negative variables in the Equations [21](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-disp-0021) and [22](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-disp-0022) CS-ARDL model yields the following revised equation. ∆CE𝑖,𝑡=𝛼it+𝜆𝑖⁢(CEit−1−𝜇𝑖⁢𝑋+it−1−𝜇𝑖⁢𝑋−it−1−𝜗𝑖⁢ln⁡CE¯𝑡−1−𝜗2⁢𝑖⁢𝑋¯𝑡−1)+∑𝑗=1𝜌−1𝜆ij∆CE𝑖,𝑡−𝑗+∑𝑗=0𝑞−1𝜃ij⁢𝑋+it−𝑗+∑𝑗=0𝑞−1𝜃ij⁢𝑋−it−𝑗+𝜂1⁢𝑖∆CE¯𝑡+𝜂2⁢𝑖∆𝑋¯+¯𝑡+∆𝑋¯−¯𝑡+𝜀it,(21) θ∆GG𝑖,𝑡=𝛼it+𝜆𝑖⁢(GGit−1−𝜇𝑖⁢𝑋+it−1−𝜇𝑖⁢𝑋−it−1−𝜗𝑖⁢ln⁡GG¯𝑡−1−𝜗2⁢𝑖⁢𝑋¯𝑡−1)+∑𝑗=1𝜌−1𝜆ij∆GG𝑖,𝑡−𝑗+∑𝑗=0𝑞−1𝜃ij⁢𝑋+it−𝑗+∑𝑗=0𝑞−1θij⁢𝑋−it−𝑗+𝜂1⁢𝑖∆CE¯𝑡+𝜂2⁢𝑖∆𝑋¯+¯𝑡+∆𝑋¯−¯𝑡+𝜀it,(22) After conducting a direct estimation of both models, the long-run coefficients can be calculated as follows: 𝜃̂CS−NARDL,𝑖=∑𝑗=0𝑞−1𝜃ij1−∑𝑗=1𝜌−1𝛾ij.(23) While CS-NARDL serves as the foundation for our investigation, we have also employed the AMG and NAMG regression models to verify the stability of our findings. The AMG estimator was first proposed by (Eberhardt & Bond, [2009](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0027)) to estimate the symmetric long-run parameters in heterogeneous panel data. Similar to the CS-ARDL estimator, the AMG estimator is resistant to both parameter heterogeneity and cross-sectional dependency. While NAMG estimator developed by authors with substituting the positive and negative variables based on Equations [18](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-disp-0018), [19](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-disp-0019), and [20](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-disp-0020) for nonlinear robustness estimation. 4 RESULTS AND DISCUSSION Results from testing the dependency in cross-sections are presented in Table [2](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-tbl-0002). The outcomes of the CDpesaran and LMBiased adjusted tests indicate that all the variables under consideration are reliant on the outcome variables CE and GG. Not only this, CD also exists among these variables. Furthermore, the results of CD test in residuals also confirm the presence of CD problem. These results suggest that, during the study time period, EMEs are interdependent on each other in terms of GG, CEs, green trade, eco-innovations, and green energy. TABLE 2. Cross-sectional dependency and slope homogeneity test results [TABLE OMITTED] Source: Author's estimations. Additionally, Table [2](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-tbl-0002) also provides the results of the slope homogeneity test. The findings supported alternative hypothesis and rejected null hypothesis of homogeneous slope coefficients for both the models at 1% level of significance. Thus we conclude that, the dataset has the problem of slope heterogeneity for emerging nations, where socioeconomic and demographic variables may predominantly cause this problem. The CD and slope homogeneity tests results confirmed that the null hypotheses are invalid; hence further empirical investigation can be carried out by employing second-generation panel data econometric methods. Given the presence of CD and slope heterogeneity, this study has been constrained to apply second-generation CIPS and CADF unit root tests, considering the possible challenges with panel data. The results of the CIPS and CADF unit root tests are shown in Table [3](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-tbl-0003). On the basis of these results, it can be inferred that certain variables, such as GG, CE, GTO, CP, GDP, and GE, exhibit nonstationary at the level while EI is stationary at the level. However, CADF and CIPS indicate stationary at the first difference for most of the variables. Therefore, we conclude from the unit root tests results that our model has mixed order of integration. As there is a combination of the I(0) and I(1) stationary series, we may use the Westerlund co-integration technique to analyze the long-run associations among the study variables. TABLE 3. First and second-generation unit root test results [TABLE OMITTED] Note: \*\*\*, \*\*, \* denotes significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Table [4](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-tbl-0004) summarizes the results of Westerlund cointegration test and supports the presence of long-term co-integration connections among the variables. It implies that all variables move in tandem throughout time, leading to a long-term equilibrium. After confirming the co-integration among the study variables, we applied CS-NARDL technique to measure nonlinear coefficients for the variables under consideration. TABLE 4. Cointegration test results [TABLE OMITTED] Source: Author's estimations.

[CONDENSED FOR READABILITY]

Table [5](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-tbl-0005) provided the long-run and short-run results for both GG and CE models. Results indicate that any positive shock in GTO leads to an increase in GG and decrease in CEs. According to the coefficient, it is evident that 1% increase in positive shock of GTO leads to 0.153% improvement in GG, for example, 𝜕GG𝑖,𝑡𝜕GTO𝑖,𝑡+>0 and it is associated with a 0.0453 percentage decrease in CE, as shown by the coefficient, for example, 𝜕CE𝑖,𝑡𝜕GTO𝑖,𝑡+<0. The estimated coefficient for the negative shock in GTO has negative effect on GG and statistically insignificant, while it has a positive and significant effect on CE for example, 𝜕GG𝑖,𝑡𝜕GTO𝑖,𝑡−=0, and 𝜕CE𝑖,𝑡𝜕GTO𝑖,𝑡−>0. This particular result of any negative shock in GTO suggests that any reduction in GTO has no significant long-term impact on GG in EMEs. This result is consistent with various international trade theories including comparative advantage, the Porter hypothesis, and ecological modernization. GTO in emerging nations can reduce CEs, improve energy efficiency, enlarge eco-friendly industries, and contribute to sustainable development. This evidence also supports earlier researches conducted by (Can et al., [2021](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0016); Huang & Zhao, [2022](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0036)), which showed that Green trade encourages sustainable development and lowers greenhouse gas emissions, especially in developing nations. Similarly, these results are also consistent with Ahmed et al. ([2021](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0001)), and Can et al. ([2021](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0016)), who demonstrated that green trade could promote the adoption of environment friendly industrial techniques and benefits countries in achieving their climate targets. Likewise, Li, Wang, and Wang ([2022](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0050)), and Wei et al. ([2023](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0084)) also found similar results for positive long-run association between green trade and green economic growth for China and proposed long-term global integration of the nations to strengthen the production of green goods. International trade has made it possible for EMEs to produce and export green goods around the globe and import a wide range of green goods from other countries. Furthermore, positive shocks in carbon price (CP) have a considerable and favorable impact on GG and significant negative effect on CEs [Carbon Emissions], for example, 𝜕GG𝑖,𝑡𝜕CP𝑖,𝑡+>0, and 𝜕CE𝑖,𝑡𝜕CP𝑖,𝑡+<0. Specifically, it suggests that a 1% change in positive shocks of CP [Carbon Pricing] ultimately results in a 0.130% increase in GG and 0.163% decrease in CEs [Carbon Emissions]. However, any negative shock in carbon price has no significant effect on both GG and CE in EMEs. This finding is consistent with the economic theory that higher prices incentivize individuals and firms to adopt cleaner technologies and reduce emissions. These results are also consistent with the results of Chien et al. ([2021](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0019)), and Hao et al. ([2021](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0033)) who argued that environmental taxes could play a vital role in sustainable development via reduction in CEs. Similar types of results that is, increase in carbon prices or environmental taxes can reduce the amount of CO2 emissions in the environment and improve environmental sustainability were found by (Chien et al., [2021](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0019); Tao et al., [2021](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0067)). Carbon price as a policy instrument has been designed to discourage greenhouse gas emissions. Moreover, the carbon price mechanisms can encourage firms to invest in advancing low-carbon technologies, resulting in an increased productivity and environment friendly economic growth in EMEs.

TABLE 5. Long and short run results of cross-sectional augmented nonlinear autoregressive distributed lag

| Variables | Long run coefficients | | | | Short run coefficients | | | |
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
| Green growth model dependent variable (GG) | | Carbon emissions model dependent variable (CE) | | Green growth model dependent variable (GG) | | Carbon emissions model dependent variable (CE) | |
| Coefficients | 𝓏𝑧stats | Coefficients | 𝓏𝑧stats | Coefficients | 𝓏𝑧stats | Coefficients | 𝓏𝑧stats |
| GTO𝑖,𝑡+ | 0.1537\*\*\* | 4.7600 | −0.0453\*\*\* | −3.117 | 0.0193 | 1.260 | −0.0354\* | −1.8348 |
| GTO𝑖,𝑡− | −0.0827 | −1.0972 | 1.0272\*\* | 5.818 | .02210\*\* | −2.130 | 0.7694\*\* | 1.9769 |
| CP𝑖,𝑡+ | 0.1302\*\* | 1.9994 | −0.1635\*\* | −1.952 | 0.1502\*\*\* | 3.635 | −0.6839 | −1.3700 |
| CP𝑖,𝑡− | −0.0846 | −1.2991 | 0.0942 | 1.277 | −0.12931 | −1.06 | 0.0473 | 1.3806 |
| EI𝑖,𝑡+ | 0.0318\*\*\* | 2.885 | −0.0348\*\*\* | −2.636 | 0.0344\*\* | 2.157 | −0.3865\*\* | −1.9893 |
| EI𝑖,𝑡− | −0.0926\*\*\* | −8.4029 | 0.1528\* | 1.8498 | −0.0625\*\*\* | −2.932 | 0.0847 | 1.6198 |
| GE𝑖,𝑡 | 0.7561\*\*\* | 4.9868 | −1.6361\*\*\* | −4.269 | 1.0453\*\* | 2.100 | −0.7862\*\*\* | 5.1625 |
| Gdp𝑖,𝑡 | 0.352\*\* | 1.9498 | 0.758\*\*\* | 3.1167 | 0.327\* | 1.942 | 1.2851\*\* | 8.4385 |
| Gdp2𝑖,𝑡 | −0.361\*\*\* | −2.890 | −0.4952\*\*\* | −2.727 | −0.643\*\* | −2.107 | −0.8512\*\*\* | −3.9660 |
| GG−1 |  |  |  |  | −0.6985\*\*\* | −6.774 | −0.7125\*\*\* | −6.864 |

Abbreviations: CE, carbon emissions; GG, green growth.

Note: \*\*\*, \*\*, \* denotes significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.

Source: Author's estimations.

Further, the study results also demonstrate that positive shocks in eco-innovations have a growing impact on GG and reduce CEs in EMEs. According to the result, a 1% increase in positive shock in EI leads to a 0.031% increase in GG while the same increase in positive shock of EI reduces CEs by 0.026% in the long-run, for example, 𝜕GG𝑖,𝑡𝜕EI𝑖,𝑡+>0, and 𝜕CE𝑖,𝑡𝜕EI𝑖,𝑡+<0. Besides, the negative shock of EI has negative and significant impact on GG and positive effect on CEs [Carbon Emissions] with the coefficients respectively −0.092 and 0.1528 in the long-run for EMEs, for example, 𝜕GG𝑖,𝑡𝜕EI𝑖,𝑡−<0, and 𝜕CE𝑖,𝑡𝜕EI𝑖,𝑡−>0. Our findings about the favorable correlation between eco-innovations and GG are supported by earlier studies, such as Hussain et al. ([2022](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0038)), Wang, Umar, et al. ([2021](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0077)), and Urbaniec et al. ([2021](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0073)) who claimed that eco-innovations assist in maintaining a sustainable environment by limiting the use of scarce resources and strengthening circular economy policies. Prior studies have shown that in order to transform the country from brown to green, ambitious green energy regulations and eco-innovation improvements are required (Akhtar et al., [2021](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0005); Wang, Umar, et al., [2021](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0077)). This result suggests that the usage of environment friendly technologies in the growth process may cause a direct reduction in the pollution. These outcomes also show that eco-innovations may have a remarkable influence while maintaining environmental sustainability and achieving the global objective of GG that is, they can reduce negative environmental consequences, increase agro-industrial production, protect natural resources, and promote capital accumulation in EMEs. Moreover, Green energy consumption has significant positive impact on GG while negative effect on CEs for example, 𝜕GG𝑖,𝑡𝜕GE𝑖,𝑡>0, and for example, 𝜕CE𝑖,𝑡𝜕GE𝑖,𝑡<0, 𝜕GG𝑖,𝑡𝜕GDP𝑖,𝑡>0. These results are in line with the findings of (Chien et al., [2021](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0019)), who concluded that green energy contributes to the environmental sustainability by reducing CEs. Li, Wang, and Wang ([2022](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0050)) also claimed that the green energy consumption improves environmental quality while promoting economic growth for 120 sample economies. Similarly, these results were also supported by a recent study conducted by Balsalobre-Lorente, Ibáñez-Luzón, et al. ([2022](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0011)), who claimed that environmental deterioration can be slowed down since renewable energy has a negative influence on CO2 emissions. Thus, we conclude that consumption of renewable energy sources like solar, hydro, wind, and geothermal etc. in the production process can reduce CEs and promote GG leading towards the accomplishment of global objective of sustainable development. GDP per capita have positive effects both on CEs for example, 𝜕CE𝑖,𝑡𝜕GDP𝑖,𝑡>0, and GG that is, 𝜕GE𝑖,𝑡𝜕GDP𝑖,𝑡>0. This result in line with the findings of Wang, Wang, and Li ([2022](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0079)) who concluded that economic development and environmental quality are nonlinear. As urbanization grows, the impact of economic growth on CEs is amplified.

Finally, any change from positive to negative in the coefficients of GDP to GDP-square denotes an inverted U-shaped link between economic growth and CEs in EMEs which is consistent with the EKC hypothesis. The coefficient of Gdp2𝑖,𝑡 for GG is also negative for example, 𝜕GG𝑖,𝑡𝜕Gdp2𝑖,𝑡<0, which shows the inverted U-shaped relationship between GG [Green Growth] and GDP for these economies. This outcome is consistent with the result of (Hussain et al., [2022](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0038); Jahanger et al., [2022](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0042)) that the square of GDP negatively influences GG. In addition to this, this result was also supported by the outcome of (Wang et al., [2023](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0080)) for 208 world economies. In contrast, these results are inconsistent with the findings of Ahmed and Le ([2021](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0003)) and (Zafar et al., [2020](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-bib-0090)), who found U-shaped relationship between GDP per capita and CEs. These results suggest that emerging economies urgently need huge amounts of natural capital to flourish economically. If it happens, natural resources abundance is likely to contribute GG positively. But, when a certain threshold was reached, GG began to drop alongside rising GDP due to the increase in aggregate demand, which in return would reduce the availability of nature-based resources.

The robustness of the CS-NARDL results of both GG and CEs models for this study were re-examined by employing the AMG and NAMG methods in Table [6](https://onlinelibrary-wiley-com.proxy2.cl.msu.edu/doi/full/10.1002/sd.2711#sd2711-tbl-0006). It is noticeable that the results of long-run estimations produced by AMG, as well as NAMG and CS-NARDL estimators are quite similar. Although the magnitudes of the coefficients differ slightly in different estimators. If we compare the magnitudes of the coefficients of CS-NARDL with that of NAMG estimator, CS-NARDL estimator produces higher magnitudes of the coefficients than NAMG estimator. The results of both robustness estimators indicate that GDP, GTO, CP, EI, and GE have significant influences on GG and CEs in EMEs.

## EU Diplomacy DA

### EU DA---2AC

#### EU policy is already moved by Trump’s hostility like the NSS but the EU can’t lead because of structural divisions and lack of defense

Shrimsley 1/8 [Robert Shrimsley is UK chief political commentator and executive editor of the Financial Times. He writes a weekly column on British politics and for the FT weekend magazine. Before this, he served as the FT’s chief political correspondent, news editor, managing editor of FT.com and editorial director, Jan 8 2026, "Strategic supplication is Europe’s only Trump policy", Financial Times, https://www.ft.com/content/1439dce5-00a5-4010-bd9a-385a918bac1b]

Two words now sum up European policy towards Donald Trump’s United States: strategic supplication. The countries of Nato, including the UK, will render unto Caesar that which he declares to be his — in the hope that he does not ask for too much and looks kindly on their most urgent requests.

This perhaps explains the muted reactions to Trump’s latest military and diplomatic claims on Venezuela and Greenland. European leaders may talk a bigger game but this week much of the pretence has been stripped away. Donald Trump’s senior adviser, Stephen Miller was more succinct: “We are a superpower and we are going to conduct ourselves as a superpower.”

The former French premier Gabriel Attal says Europeans are now “powerless spectators of the unravelling of global rules”. The world will be “governed by force” and those who lament the loss of an international order “no longer have the means for such indignation”.

One might argue it was long thus. There have been plenty of cases where the US overrode the concerns of Nato partners. Lord Ricketts, Britain’s former national security adviser, reminds people of Ronald Reagan’s 1983 invasion of Grenada, a huge embarrassment to Margaret Thatcher’s government. For all her private rage, she knew she had to pick her fights with the US and hold her tongue in public.

But there are crucial differences. The first is the unique nature of the Trump regime. The president’s imperial court is utterly centred round his personality and idées fixes. Where once there were other routes into American policymaking — the Pentagon or state department — decisions now flow through Trump and his coterie.

The second is the loss of a shared ideology or analysis. There were sometimes splits (Harold Wilson refused to send troops to Vietnam) but American security policy reflected a worldview shared by western Europe, primarily opposing communism or, later, jihadi terror. A president did not need persuading of the Russian threat.

What ideology there is in Trump’s outlook is often turned against Nato allies, with a determination to spread Maga values across Europe and destabilise liberal governments.

A third difference is Trump’s rejection and indeed sabotage of an international order America can no longer control. He sees only a world divided between the strong and weak.

Finally, as befits a transactional and non-ideological presidency, virtue is no longer its own reward. Trump expects a return and does not fear turning America’s economic power against allies.

Without the traditional alignment of ideals, how do you manage a mercurial president upon whom your security still depends? Recognition of these hard truths helps explain the tremulous response to both the Venezuela coup and his threats to Greenland. Western European leaders will not waste diplomatic capital on Venezuela. There was no love for Nicolás Maduro and they have bigger fish to fry. Their focus is rightly and overwhelmingly on keeping the US onside on Ukraine, where diplomacy is bearing some fruit. This strategic priority will not be jeopardised with pointless declaiming about a lost international order.

On Greenland, European leaders did ultimately muster a hands-off statement. Defiance may help head off the worst outcome. Since a US invasion would spell the end of Nato, Europe has an incentive to ensure it does not come to that. So, in fact, does the US.

But it is hard to believe Denmark will not be forced into some form of accommodation with Trump over Greenland. The first pitch will be a pledge to step up Nato presence and security there, but if the president’s aims are primarily territorial and economically extractive something more substantial may yet be forced on the Danes.

Such prioritisation makes life uncomfortable for all European leaders. For Keir Starmer, this is especially true. Foreign policy was considered one of the prime minister’s successes. (Absurdly he is attacked as “never here Keir” for spending time on crises with a direct bearing on the UK). Against calls for a more combative stance towards Trump, he struggles to communicate geopolitical realities.

There is only one alternative approach. More military might. Not only does Trump want to see this, it might also increase his respect for Europe’s views. But the UK and Europe do not have sufficient hard power. They talk up higher defence spending but Germany aside, few are rushing. Starmer, for example, has committed to raise UK defence spending to 3.5 per cent of GDP by 2035. On Ukraine, the UK is promising forces it barely has. This is simply not serious.

Aside from the lack of military might, national divisions are inhibiting the EU’s economic clout and constraining a coherent security policy. Europe punches way below its potential weight.

The uncomfortable reality for Europe’s leaders is a US they need but no longer trust. They must play nice, prioritise the urgent issues — in this case Ukraine — while recognising their security guarantor believes only in a zero-sum world of strongmen, spheres of influence and economic returns.

Until western Europe seriously commits to its own defence, its only tactic is to try to retain a voice at the American Caesar’s court. For now, calculated abasement is the only foreseeable policy.

#### Europe’s not key---any benefit can be achieved by experts post-plan in the US once expert capacity is re-established

#### BUT, EU initiating only ensures an inward turn, disintegration, and war---flipping the impact

Fay 17 [Matthew Fay, foreign and defense policy analyst at the Niskanen Center. He has two master’s degrees, one in international relations from American Military University and one in diplomatic history from Temple University and is currently pursuing his PhD in political science"The Problem with Europe Paying its Defense Bills," Niskanen Center, https://www.niskanencenter.org/problem-europe-paying-defense-bills/]

The two reasons Gilli notes for the inability of European states to increase defense spending also raise another question: should the United States want European states to do so? Writing at the end of the Cold War, political scientist John Mearsheimer warned that a Europe free from superpower domination would return to its recurrent patterns of interstate warfare. Europe’s major states would be forced to pay for their own defense absent American and Soviet security guarantees. To convince domestic populations to support investment in military capabilities—likely at the expense of welfare spending—state leaders would likely lean on nationalist rhetoric and policies. According to Mearsheimer, the reason they have not had to do so was because the American “pacifier” has remained in place even after the superpower standoff in Europe ended.

An American withdrawal as an effort to induce greater defense spending in Europe might lead to the empowerment of the very nationalist populist parties that would like to see the European Union dismantled. The disintegration of Europe—coupled with increased spending on military capabilities by its largest states—could lead to the return of security competition and the dilemmas inherent in it. Meanwhile, smaller states—Estonia just being one example—unable to invest sufficiently in their own defense will be subject to manipulation and domination by the continent’s major powers.

### EU DA---A2: Attali---2AC

#### Attali proves EU fails – it’s written post-Trump and says EU won’t act as it leaders refuse integration, procrastinate actual action, withdraw from MENA, and do nothing on Ukraine

#### It’s also empirically denied – says EU leadership has been anemic for decades

[For reference. MSU = Green]

Attali ’25 [Jacques; Summer 2025; Special Adviser to the French President François Mitterrand and the founder and first President of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Paris Dauphine; Center for International Relations and Sustainable Development, “Europe’s Choice in the Face of Global Reckoning,” no. 31]

Twenty years from now, people may say that the year 2025 was Europe’s last opportunity. It was the moment when the EU could have (had it chosen so) reclaimed its role as a central actor on the global stage—or, conversely, the year it resigned itself, through fatigue, fear, or ~~blindness~~ [ignorance], to irrelevance. The moment it lost control over its destiny and the totality of its freedom.

Europe has all the tools to become number one in the world again, or at least to maintain its rank as number two: with over 440 million people, the EU is one of the most extensive and most integrated economic areas in the world, enabling the free movement of goods, services, capital, and people. The euro is the world’s second most widely used currency, reinforcing the EU’s monetary influence. The EU is a global trade giant, negotiating free trade agreements and setting global standards—especially in regulation, data, and sustainability. EU regulations often become de facto global standards, particularly in the tech, environmental, and consumer protection sectors.

Through institutions such as the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the European Court of Justice, the EU has established a distinctive model of transnational governance. The EU champions democracy, the rule of law, and human rights—both internally and in its external diplomacy, particularly through its enlargement and neighborhood policies. It exerts global influence not through military force, but through normative appeal, diplomatic networks, development aid, and cultural outreach. Through programs like Horizon Europe, the EU is a significant funder of scientific innovation and cross-border research. It leads in setting climate goals (e.g., the Green Deal) and digital regulation (e.g., the Digital Markets Act and AI Act). By setting high standards for ethics and safety—particularly in the areas of AI and data privacy (e.g., GDPR)—the EU influences global technological norms.

Europe is also home to immense linguistic, artistic, and philosophical traditions that influence global thinking and soft power. Erasmus+, the European Research Council, and open academic networks make the EU a hub for higher education and intellectual exchange. EU institutions have withstood crises (e.g., Brexit, the euro crisis, and COVID-19). A robust network of NGOs, unions, and active citizen participation supports democratic life and policy innovation. It remains a magnet for neighboring countries and regions (e.g., Ukraine, the Western Balkans), offering stability and development in exchange for reforms. Through PESCO, Frontex, and its missions abroad, the EU is gradually developing more credible standard defense tools.

However, the stakes are numerous, existential, and planetary: climate change, exacerbation of poverty, water shortages, and uncontrolled technologies—not to mention the specific European issues: democracy threatened, European institutions slowed down by bureaucracy, the lack of real integration, the absence of a comprehensive migration policy, and the lack of a credible common defense and security arm.

And yet, although these challenges are so existential, Europe has rarely remained so silent, its voice so hollow, its actions so lacking. At a time when the world cries out for clear leadership, for vision, for collective will, Europe hides behind rhetoric, reports without follow-up, and sterile debate. Let us examine just a few of the most telling examples.

Industrial Decline

The evidence of industrial decline is overwhelming. Prominent voices—those of former Italian Prime Ministers Mario Draghi and Enrico Letta, and others—have painted a damning portrait: the absence of European champions in key future sectors, a steady erosion of competitiveness, loss of technological sovereignty, waning innovation, fragmented markets, absurd competition rules that block continental consolidation, and a stubborn refusal to fund even dual-use military industries. There is no coherent industrial policy, collective innovation financing, and strategic vision to prevent economic subjugation. And these reports, though accurate, have led nowhere. Neither the Commission nor the Council have moved to transform their insights into concrete directives. No political will has emerged to turn diagnosis into action.

The forces of inertia—within Brussels, national governments, corporations, and bureaucracies—cling to their micro-sovereignties and narrow privileges. They prefer a patchwork of petty kingdoms to the rise of continental giants. They defend an outdated doctrine that prioritizes consumer protection while sacrificing strategic foresight and the interests of producers and workers. Thus, we maintain a hundred telecom operators while the U.S. has four; we uphold a fragmented banking system; we keep on forbidding transborder mergers; we let our savings finance America’s trade deficit, which in turn erodes what remains of our industry. Meanwhile, China—now the world’s leading power—relentlessly expands its reach, undermining our markets, jobs, and our autonomy.

And yet, all is not lost. In many sectors, Europe remains the leader. In nearly every domain, the Union counts at least two companies among the global top ten. The EU possesses vast savings, world-class researchers, a great entrepreneurial spirit, and agile and inventive family businesses. All it lacks is shared political will to invest massively in the sectors of what I call the economy of life, which should be the priorities: renewable and nuclear energy, recycling, water, biodiversity, regenerative agriculture, healthy food, education, healthcare, culture, democracy, security, defense, and research. The moment has come to break with the economy of death—built on fossil fuels, pesticides, industrial food, and legalized addictions—and shift to a wartime economy, aiming not to destroy, but to rebuild.

Geopolitical Theaters

In Ukraine, European countries are diplomatically represented: the French, Germans, Poles, and Brits are visible and active. For now, they appear to have delayed the inevitable American withdrawal. But everyone knows—in Paris, Berlin, Warsaw, London, Moscow, Beijing, and Kyiv—that such a day will come: perhaps tomorrow, in a week, or a year. And everyone knows Russia awaits that moment to deal a fatal blow to the heroic Ukrainian army. Yet nothing is being done—or far too little—to ramp up the production of urgently needed weapons, either for ourselves or Ukraine: no ammunition, no drones, no advanced warfare systems. And yet, the list of needs is clear: the Ukrainians themselves are handing it to us, at the cost of their lives.

Once again, we are not in a wartime economy. We act as if the Ukraine conflict will resolve itself, as if we won’t soon face shortages of raw materials monopolized by China, of components, of strategic supplies. Even the U.S. President is beginning to realize this—belatedly and painfully.

The U.S. President has openly and repeatedly expressed his desire—perfectly rational from a geopolitical standpoint—to take control of Greenland, rich in resources and strategically located along the future Northwest Passage. Meanwhile, Europe remains idle. Nothing is being done to secure this land, a Danish sovereign territory under international law, and by extension, part of the EU. There are no guarantees of this EU member state’s sovereignty. And yet, it is of vital importance to Europe for the same reason as it is to Washington.

Changing this equation would require Denmark receiving far more robust and explicit support from its European partners, including military backing. Why, then, has no proposal been made to station European troops there, to build fortifications, ports, and airbases on a collective basis? Unless such a request was made in secret and denied just as secretly, which would be absurd. Let us imagine: would U.S. troops dare to confront NATO allies on that soil? They would lose all credibility in Europe—and perhaps in Asia as well.

In Africa, as the United States turns its back, China advances economically, Russia expands militarily, and ideologies and religions spread their influence, no one can deny that Africa is Europe’s natural and strategic partner. Africa is the future of Europe. It could be its most fabulous opportunity—or its gravest threat.

Working with African institutions, countries, peoples, and diasporas is the only way forward. But if we abandon the continent, catastrophe looms. In the immediate future, Africa will be home to a third of the world’s youth. Soon after, a third of the world’s total population. And if we do nothing, hundreds of millions of climate migrants will be knocking at our doors. The next migratory wave must be anticipated, managed, and co-created. Yet neither Brussels nor major European capitals seem willing to rethink our relationship with Africa, to extend a hand, or build a shared future.

In the Middle East, the EU remains a mere spectator. It announces imaginary conferences, issues weak statements, and postures at the margins—but stays absent from real negotiations. Its paralysis prevents it from sanctioning, as it should, both corrupt or terrorist Palestinian factions and the Israeli government guilty of war crimes and betrayal of the Zionist ideal. Europe is incapable of aiding the devastated population of Gaza, of contributing to the elimination of Hamas, of helping to build a Palestinian Authority that is credible, honest, and capable of governing a peaceful sovereign state alongside Israel. And yet, Europe bears historic responsibility: its powers once drew the region’s borders. Its nations know the scars of war. It could use its tragic experience to propose peace. Why not imagine a Middle Eastern Common Market, stretching from Ethiopia to Iran, from the Arabian Peninsula to Turkey, including Israel and Palestine?

Environmental Issues

If Europe wishes to remain true to what it once was, it must now dare to become what it could be: a power of the universal. Not through weapons, but through ideas. Not through domination, but through exemplarity. Not through fear, but through hope. And first of all, by becoming the vanguard of a civilization reconciled with life itself. For there is no time left to waste: the planet is suffocating, the oceans are rising, and species are collapsing. We have entered the age of runaway dynamics, where the fragile balances of the world are unraveling faster than we can comprehend them. In the face of this, Europe can no longer be content with being a regional model of ecological virtue. It must become the architect of a global pact for life, built on five essential pillars. Europe can make every trade agreement a lever for environmental progress. No more free trade without climate clauses. No more investments without guarantees for nature. The Union can forge strategic green alliances with emerging powers—such as India, Brazil, Indonesia, and African nations—that combine financial support, technology transfer, and shared sustainability goals. It can lead to the creation of a World Environment Organization, with binding rules mirroring the WTO’s power over trade. And why not, tomorrow, a Climate G20, enforcing a global carbon price, a planetary tax on fossil-fueled transport, and minimum biodiversity standards?

Oceans are the beating heart of the planet. Yet they are being plundered, polluted, and exploited. Europe can initiate a global moratorium on deep-sea mining until science can assess its actual impact. It can establish a vast network of marine protected areas, particularly in the high seas, made possible by the new UN Treaty on Marine Biodiversity. Europe can help Southern nations monitor their exclusive economic zones by satellite and combat illegal fishing, often linked to organized crime.

We must now repair the living world. Europe can make a significant contribution to a Global Biodiversity Fund, which would finance reforestation, species reintroduction, agroecology, and the establishment of ecological corridors. It can mobilize banks, insurers, and investment giants to treat nature as a priceless asset—as essential as gold or oil. Above all, it must demand carbon-free, deforestation-free supply chains. Every product consumed in Europe—from tablets and steak to shirts—should display its biodiversity footprint. Buying can no longer be morally neutral. Europe can enforce this awareness.

Europe must go further: grant rights to nature, recognize ecocide as an international crime, and support the establishment of an International Criminal Court for Environmental Destruction—capable of prosecuting those responsible for oil spills, illegal deforestation, and the poisoning of rivers.

Just as it once led on human rights, Europe can now champion a Universal Declaration of the Rights of Nature—a legal and moral revolution, necessary and urgent.

None of this will succeed without a new alliance between science and youth. Europe could establish a Transcontinental Green University, connecting its top research centers with those in Africa, Latin America, and Asia to train a generation of planetary ecologists.

It could launch a Global Climate Erasmus, allowing millions of young people to gain hands-on ecological experience. And build a public, open-access platform for environmental data—a global observatory tracking both degradation and regeneration.

The AI Revolution

A new frontier has opened, silent and immense, made not of matter but of thought—a frontier where the machines we have created begin to think, decide, and act without us. Artificial intelligence is not coming. It is already here. And with it, the most radical upheaval humanity has ever known: a shift from the logic of tools to the logic of minds. A moment where decisions are taken before we think, where desires are anticipated before they are born, and where the boundaries between freedom and prediction, between democracy and algorithm, blur into opacity. In this grand transformation, the role of Europe is not to dominate, but to orient. Not to build the biggest servers, but to write the rules that will preserve our humanity. Not to chase others’ empires, but to become the guardian of meaning in a world flooded with data.

Europe has always had this singular vocation: to think about the world before transforming it. In the face of artificial intelligence, it is once again Europe’s task not to slow down progress, but to ensure that progress remains human. With the AI Act, the European Union is the first political entity in history to define the conditions under which artificial intelligence—even if it is not yet fully developed—can be considered acceptable. It classifies risks, sets boundaries, prohibits surveillance dystopias, and affirms that some technologies, however efficient, have no place in a democratic society. Thus, Europe sets a precedent: a civilization where machines are not above the law, and where the digital world adheres to the same moral imperatives as the physical one.

AI systems learn, decide, recommend, and exclude—sometimes without anyone understanding why. Europe refuses this opacity. It demands transparency, explicability, and accountability—principles that seem philosophical, but are deeply political. What is at stake is the very notion of justice. In tomorrow’s world, a decision to grant a loan, assign a school, detect a crime, or prescribe a treatment may be made by a machine. The EU reminds us that a decision is only legitimate if it can be explained, challenged, and appealed. It affirms that freedom begins where comprehension begins. Elsewhere, AI is seen as a lever of supremacy. In Europe, it is—or should be—viewed as a means to serve the common good.

The Union invests in collaborative research, funds cross-border scientific alliances, and supports projects that leverage AI to benefit climate, health, education, and urban life. Rather than selling attention, it seeks to optimize energy. Rather than manipulating emotions, it aspires to detect diseases. Rather than predicting consumption, it works to preserve life. It is the outline of another model: a knowledge-based economy where machines augment responsibility rather than replace it. Europe must serve as a counterweight to technological authoritarianism. It can lead the fight for global AI governance, the ban on lethal autonomous weapons, and the preservation of human dignity in the face of the algorithmic gaze. It can carry this message to the UN, the African Union, the G7, and to all who still believe that intelligence without conscience is nothing but ruin. Europe must make AI literacy a fundamental right: every child and every adult must know what an algorithm is, what it does, and how to live alongside it. Europe must also invent new professions, new ethics, and humanities—not to resist technology, but to better live with it. To ensure that the future belongs not to those who know how to code, but to those who understand why they code. And we could go on, about education, research, and health—so many domains where Europe could lead.

There are so many instances of silence and procrastination. How should one explain this passivity, abdication, and tragic drift? If not, it is due to the leaders’ failure to grasp the urgency of the moment. An inert Europe only strengthens populism, fuels extremism, and paves the way for its downfall.

It is not too late. We can still choose. We can still reclaim our sovereignty. We can still become a major actor in history. An extraordinary opportunity lies before Europe. But it must find the courage to seize it.